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2
The accelerating development of the world economy during the last decades has 
challenged government economic policy. Heterogeneous firms participating in global 
production are stimulated to select sophisticated integration strategies to exploit profit 
opportunities. Among others, the best possible answers to political decisions motivate 
firms to modify their integration status dynamically. Considerations and tasks of 
policy makers are multifaceted, including the anticipation of the behavior of 
heterogeneous firms, the choice of policy instrument, the design of optimal trade 
policy, and interaction with other jurisdictions.  
 
The incorporation of heterogeneity in firm productivity into models of monopolistic 
competition with international trade and multinational firms is a recent innovation in 
the trade literature. The first models of horizontal or vertical integration strategies of 
multinational firms were developed assuming homogeneous productivities between 
all plants in a market.1 This was followed by theoretical work focused on the study of 
optimal integration strategies of complex firms in the presence of firm heterogeneity 
in terms of total factor productivity.2 One main insight was that the integration 
strategy of a firm is dependent on its productivity level. Given productivity differences 
across firms, alternative integration modes coexisted, driven by the notion of firm 
heterogeneity.  
Starting in 1995, the body of empirical literature has included evidence that firms 
serving the domestic market are less productive than firms trading internationally.3 
Empirical studies have indicated that exporters and multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
are larger and more productive and differ in input characteristics compared with 
domestic firms.4 Additionally, the activity of MNEs has been among the most dynamic 
economic activities, followed by international trade in goods and services.5  
Intuitively, the degree to which firm heterogeneity is present in the jurisdiction of a 
government not only determines the distribution of firms in terms of integration 
strategies but also influences policy outcomes. In this context, governments 
anticipate the behavior of heterogeneous firms that are motivated to modify their 
                                            
1
 As in Markusen (1984) and Helpman (1984). 
2
 Compare with Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). 
3
 For a survey, see Bernard, Jensen and Lawrence (1995). 
4
 As in Barba Navaretti et al. (2003); and Criscuolo and Martin (2003); and Clerides, Lach and Tybout 
(1998).  
5
 In 2006 global, FDI inflows grew for the third consecutive year and reached the level of $1.306 trillion 
being slightly below the record level of $1.411 trillion in 2000, as in UNCTAD (2008) and World Bank 
Institute (2007). 
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integration status dynamically, depending on political decisions. The increasing 
mobility of firms and their potential option to modify their integration status influence 
government policy outcomes. The efficiency of trade policy is influenced by the 
possibilities of firms relocating their production, shifting profits, bypassing trade 
barriers by engaging in a multinational strategy, and exiting the market. Thus, 
governments are challenged by multifarious considerations to be incorporated in the 
design of optimal trade policy.  
They are confronted with the task of identifying optimal trade policy instruments and 
developing welfare-maximizing economic environments using these instruments.  
 
This thesis is an analysis of the implications of ad-valorem tariffs, on the one hand, 
and profit taxation, on the other hand. The optimality and efficiency of policy 
instruments mainly depend on the preferences of households, the presence of firm 
heterogeneity, and the ability of firms to modify their integration status.  
Furthermore, the cooperation or noncooperation of governments with each other is 
central to explaining policy outcomes. Whereas a social planner maximizes welfare 
considering all countries (i.e., welfare maximization from a world welfare 
perspective), single governments behave noncooperatively, without policy 
coordination. Noncooperative behavior implies that countries find best responses to 
the policies of their neighbour countries to increase their own welfare at the expense 
of the other countries. The potential gain of single governments may be the potential 
loss of households in the other countries. Therefore, international policy coordination 
has entitlement in avoiding, for example, a prisoner’s dilemma outcome in policy 
competition.6 Empirical work has resulted in support for this view in context with tariff 
setting. In their study, the authors have found evidence that the United States has set 
higher tariffs on goods when no constraints from the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) exist, which explains the coordinating role of that organization.7 
 
This thesis contains three sections, all based on a similar, numerically solvable, 
model.  
In section 1 and 2, the model is focused on optimal trade policy of benevolent 
governments that maximize welfare under the optimal choice of ad-valorem tariff 
                                            
6
 Compare with Nash (1951). 
7
 As in Broda et al. (2008). In contrast, see Rose (2004), who does not find significant reduction in 
tariffs due to WTO membership. 
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rates. Section 3 focuses on withholding profit tax rates levied on MNE profits. Both 
benevolent governments provide lump-sum transfers to households in their own 
jurisdictions when levying tariffs on imports or taxes on MNE profits. 
 
We have set up a model that consists of two countries, A and B, in which only one 
factor, labor (L), is used for production and firm or plant setup. Households in A and 
B share the same love-for-variety preferences and benefit from consumption of 
homogeneous goods and differentiated goods. The homogeneous good is supplied 
under perfect competition. We have focused on parameter configurations that ensure 
diversification of production so that the homogeneous good is produced in both 
countries in equilibrium and may be traded at zero costs across national borders. 
Heterogeneous firms in the differentiated sector produce under monopolistic 
competition.  
Profit maximization results in different integration strategies, depending on the 
individual productivity of the firms (i.e., domestic production to serve domestic 
consumers only, producing in one country and serving consumers in both countries 
from there (exporting), or engaging in multiplant production and serving consumers 
locally through domestic and foreign subsidiaries [MNEs]). Furthermore, the mass of 
firms that enter the market in equilibrium depends on the level of ad-valorem tariff or 
tax rate. Hence, the mass of firms in equilibrium is determined endogenously. This 
endogeneity results in corresponding endogenous market sizes. 
 
In section 1, Ad-Valorem Tariff and the Heterogeneous Firm, we have focused on 
welfare maximization of social planners that endogenously determine the ad-valorem 
tariff rates of the two countries τ .8 In this first section, neither governments has the 
possibility of optimally reacting to the policy of the neighboring country.  
Depending on the tariff rate, not only MNEs and exporters decide on entering the 
market depending on the tariff. Trade policy also influences the mass of domestic 
firms. Given a certain tariff rate, the composition of prevailing integration strategies is 
due to the constitution of competition.  
In this context, the emphasis in the empirical work has been that cuts in tariffs by the 
United States and Canada induce a stronger export orientation in some of the 
                                            
8
 For seminal contributions, see Torrens (1933), Mill (1948), and Bickerdike (1907). 
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Canadian affiliates of U.S. parent firms.9 Further empirical work has revealed an 
emphasis on countries setting tariffs according to their market power.10 For example, 
an increasing tariff rate induces fewer exporters to enter the market and, depending 
on the size of fixed costs fi, may also cause them to refrain from becoming MNEs. 
Consequently, fewer firms supply demand in this country and expected profits 
increase. Therefore, the output of each single firm is influenced; and more domestic 
firms can enter the market, competing expected profits to zero.11 Results of 
numerical analysis show that social planners maximize the welfare of households, 
determining a free trade scenario. This result is optimal from a world welfare 
perspective (i.e., welfare of both countries is maximized).  
 
Section 2, Best-Response Tariffs with Endogenous Market Size and Economic 
Integration, extends the analysis of section 1, incorporating transport costs. We have 
determined optimal tariff rates set by benevolent planners (i.e., when countries 
behave cooperatively) and contrasted them to optimal best-response tariff rates (i.e., 
when countries behave noncooperatively). As in the previous section social planners 
determine free trade scenarios to be optimal. In a noncooperative setting, a 
government has a unilateral incentive to deviate from a free trade scenario. This 
behavior can be anticipated by the other government; therefore, both deviate from 
zero tariff scenarios. This results in inefficiently high tariff rates, which are stable 
Nash equilibria. These Nash equilibria are characterized by lower welfare for both 
countries than in the social planner’s scenario without tariffs. The welfare-superior 
free trade scenario can only be obtained under reliable policy coordination. Hence, 
section 2 provides rationale for the existence of ad-valorem tariffs in a model of 
heterogeneous firms.  
 
In contrast to previous chapters, section three, Best-Response Tax Rates on Profits 
of Multinational Firms: A Numerical Approach, is a study of the implications of an 
alternative policy instrument. We have analyzed taxes on profits of MNEs. Empirical 
work indicates that FDIs react sensitively to variations in tax rates. In his work, Hines 
determines the elasticity of FDIs subject to taxes to be -0.6.12 Further work has 
                                            
9
 As in Feinberg and Keane (2001). 
10
 For a survey, see Broda et al. (2008). 
11
 See Davies, Egger and Egger (2009). 
12
 Compare with Hines (1999). 
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indicated support for Hines but with weaker reactions according to taxes.13 Social 
welfare-maximizing governments levy withholding taxes on MNE profits earned by 
subsidiaries producing in their jurisdictions. The generated tax revenue is spent for 
lump-sum transfers to the households in their countries. 
As in section 2, we have distinguished between the perspectives of social planners 
and single governments. Additionally, we have derived optimal tax rates with identical 
country sizes and contrasted our results to the outcome of the model assuming 
marginally differing country sizes. Furthermore, in this section, we have pointed to 
competition brought to single governments that maximizes welfare, levying 
withholding taxes on MNE profits. However, this model does not join standard tax 
competition models. Because governments levy withholding taxes on MNE profits 
earned in their jurisdictions, they do not compete for the same tax base. Still, the 
selected tax rate of a foreign government influences welfare of the representative 
household in the home country, inducing this government to react with another tax 
rate (i.e., best-response withholding tax rate). This is because the integration 
strategies chosen by firms are influenced by the tax rate of the other country. 
Empirical work has shown support for an increase in withholding tax rates inducing a 
decline of MNE investments in this jurisdiction.14 This coherence is consistent with 
the findings of Hines (1999) or Devereux and Griffith (2003).15 
Results of numerical analysis show that a social planner’s cooperative approach 
maximizes world welfare, resulting in efficient tax rates. Welfare maximization of a 
single government (i.e., governments behave noncooperatively), results in inefficient, 
high tax rates in equilibrium. Because the social planner’s tax rates are unstable in a 
noncooperative setting, both governments have a unilateral incentive to deviate from 
this efficient equilibrium. We have show that coordination of governmental decisions 
helps to avoid a prisoner’s dilemma and results in efficient tax rates in equilibrium.16  
 
The following three sections are studies of the outlined topics of economic policy and 
the intentions of government welfare maximization and contain the author’s 
                                            
13
 As in Devereux and Griffith (2003). In contrast, older literature indicated negligible effects from tax 
policies on FDI. See Brainard (1997); and Wheeler and Mody (1992) for a survey. For further work in 
this context see Grubert and Mutti (1991); Maskus (1998); Blonigen and Davies (2000); and in Egger, 
Egger and Greenaway (2008). 
14
 Evidence for this can be found in Devereux (2006) and in Hines and Rice (1994). 
15
 Early empirical work finds negligible effects of tax policies on FDI. See Brainard (1997) and Wheeler 
and Mody (1992) for a survey. 
16
 As in Nash (1951). 
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contribution to this lively debate on trade policy.17 These sections may also be read 
independently of the others. 
 
                                            
17
 The last chapter three is based on joint work with Julia Lichtenberg. 
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1.1 Introduction 
The idea that countries can profit from protection has a long tradition. In this context, 
the concept of optimal tariff setting is built on the argument that a tariff results in 
production and consumption distortions. However, it also results in terms-of-trade 
benefits, depending on the market power of importers.18  
Observed empirically, applied tariff levels show variations among different groups of 
countries. Generally, tariffs decrease with an increasing degree of industrialization of 
countries (e.g., developed countries effectively apply 2.1% on imports from the world, 
whereas developing countries apply 4.9%).19 Due to this fact, the purpose of this 
paper is to answer the question of whether tariffs undermine the idea of global free 
trade or if there is evidence of positive welfare implications.  
 
To meet the requirements of increasing economic integration, we have put emphasis 
on recent innovations in the trade literature of incorporating heterogeneity of firm-
productivity into models of monopolistic competition with international trade and 
multinational firms.20 In this context, the studies in theoretical work are focused on 
optimal integration strategies of complex integrated firms in the presence of firm 
heterogeneity in terms of total factor productivity.21 Firm heterogeneity appears in 
various layers, such as productivity, size, and integration status.22 One key finding is 
that differences in productivity levels across firms often result in a variety of optimal 
integration strategies, which result in domestic production, exporting operations, and 
multinational activities being elements of economic trading activities.23 Empirical work 
indicates that the activity of multinational enterprises is among the most dynamic 
economic activities, followed by international trade in goods and services.24 The 
                                            
18
 For a survey of seminal contributions, see Torrens (1833), Mill (1844), and Johnson (1954). Latest 
literature, as in Broda, Limão and Weinstein (2008), are empirical studies of the coherence of market 
power and tariff setting. 
19
 As in UNCTAD (2007a). 
20
 Initially, models of vertical or horizontal integration strategies of multinational firms were developed 
under the assumption of homogeneous productivities between all plants in a market. For a survey, see 
Markusen (1984) and Helpman (1984). 
21
 Compare with Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). 
22
 As in Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998). 
23
 As in Bernard et al. (2007). 
24
 In 2006, global FDI inflows grew for the third consecutive year and reached the level of $1.306 
trillion, slightly below the record level of $1.411 trillion in 2000. As in UNCTAD (2008) and World Bank 
Institute (2007). 
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average annual growth rate of foreign affiliate sales, for instance, was 8.4% during 
the period 1996-2000 and was even 16.2% in 2006.25  
 
To incorporate the outlined topics of optimal tariff setting, firm heterogeneity, and the 
increasing importance of MNEs, we set up a numerically solvable model of 
heterogeneous firms that select their optimal integration strategies from a menu of 
three options: domestic operation, exporting operation, or horizontal MNE activities.26  
Empirical analysis of integration strategies of multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
indicates support for this approach through indirect evidence that is mainly in favor of 
horizontal MNE models in contrast to vertical MNE models.27 We assume that firms 
in the manufacturing sector supply a variety of differentiated goods under 
monopolistic competition. 
In our model, benevolent policy makers cooperatively maximize welfare of two 
symmetric countries by endogenously selecting an optimal tariff rate (i.e., a social 
planner maximizes welfare). The generated tariff revenue is spent on a lump-sum 
transfer to the households in the jurisdictions of the respective governments. 
Furthermore, the integration strategies that heterogeneous firms select as optimal are 
affected by the tariff rate. Not only increasing fixed costs, such as market entry costs, 
but also increasing tariff rates induce exporters to leave the market or, depending on 
their productivity levels, to become horizontal MNEs. Emphasized in the empirical 
work is that cuts in tariffs by the United States and Canada induce stronger export 
orientations in some Canadian affiliates of U.S. parent firms.28 Further empirical 
evidence reveals confirmation that the decision of firms to export is dependent on the 
market-entry cost and plant heterogeneity.29  
 
Another objective of this paper is to highlight the role of heterogeneity in monopolistic 
competition trade models. The question is whether firm heterogeneity is an inevitable 
feature or whether the assumption of homogeneous firms is a sufficient determinant 
                                            
25
 In the same time, the gross product of foreign affiliates increased 7.3% p.a. in the years 1996-2000 
and rose by 16.2% in 2006. Exports of foreign affiliates showed an increase of 3.3% p.a. in 1996-2000 
and rose by 12.2% in 2006. As in UNCTAD (2008).  
26
 In contrast to Davies and Eckel (2007), assuming mobile firms; and in contrast to Jørgensen and 
Schröder (2007a) and Jørgensen and Schröder (2007b), not focusing on utility maximization and 
monopolistic competition. 
27
 As supported by Markusen and Maskus (2001) and Brainard (1993a). 
28
 As in Feinberg and Keane (2001). 
29
 As in Bernard and Jensen (2004). 
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for welfare-maximizing tariff rates. For this reason, we ease the assumption that 
productivity follows a distribution function, and, instead examine the model with 
homogeneous firms. 
  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 describes the setup 
of the model and explicitly introduces the preferences of the consumers and the 
resulting demand in section 1.2.1. Section 1.2.2 presents the production process of 
heterogeneous firms through an explanation of relevant production parameters for 
the reader. Section 1.3 describes the behavior of firms and their respective 
integration strategies. Section 1.3.1 shows the strategy allocation of firms with 0=τ ; 
section 1.3.2 determines the integration strategies of firms with 0>τ . Section 1.3.3 
shows the effects of the tariff on the mass of firms and on the available different 
varieties in each country. Section 1.3.4 is an analysis of the extensive border effects 
that a tariff has on the export sector. Section 1.4 addresses the aspects of welfare 
maximization. After showing the effects through the introduction of an ad-valorem 
tariff, we maximize the utility of the consumers with respect to τ  using a numerical 
approach, in section 1.5. The results are presented in chapter 1.6. In section 1.7, we 
flesh out the role of heterogeneity in monopolistic competition trade models. Finally, 
in section 1.8, we conclude the results and discuss the findings. 
 
1.2 The setup of the model 
1.2.1 Demand 
In this model, we use a quasi-linear approach to reflect consumers´ preferences.  
Because all consumers share the same preferences, a representative consumer is 
used to clarify utility. The utility function is represented by: 
( ) }B,A{j,diix11xU max
0
j0j ∈







αµ
+=
µθ
α
∫                               (1) 
The representative household in A and B benefits from consumption of the 
homogeneous good xo, which is taken as the numéraire for convenience. Each of the 
two countries hosts a second industry that produces differentiated goods under 
monopolistic competition. )i(x j  is the consumption of output of the i-th  firm, which is 
{ }max,...,0i θ∈ . The condition 0< α <1 being constant results in a constant elasticity of 
substitution (C.E.S.) of =σ 1/ (1-α ) >1 between any pair of differentiated goods. This 
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expression reflects standard properties of love-for-variety preferences in which a 
richer supply of differentiated goods results in increased utility. µ  is a constant with 
0<µ < α <1 and reflects the preference for the differentiated industry over the 
homogenous industry in the utility function of the representative household. At a 
certain level of differentiated products supplied in one country, an additional unit 
shows diminishing marginal utility. The consumption of differentiated products is 
represented by the expression 








α
= ∫
θ
αdi)i(x1X
max
0
j , the subutility of the differentiated 
sector. Obviously, the utility function is linear in 0x , but nonlinear in the differentiated 
varieties. This implies that the demand for differentiated products depends on prices 
of differentiated goods but not on earnings. Consumers of different countries show 
the same love-for-variety preferences and, therefore, apply the same elasticity of 
substitution σ . 
 
To derive the demand for variety xj(i) of a single household in country j,  we consider 
the utility function in (1) and satisfy the standard side condition 
∫
θ
⋅+⋅≥
max
0
jj00j )i(x)i(pxpm . Labor income m is spent on the homogeneous goods, 
where we set p0 = 1, and on differentiated goods. This results in the demand of a 
single household for differentiated goods of30 
α−
α−
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θ
α








α
=
∫ 1
1
j
1
1
0
j
j
)i(pdi)i(x1
1)i(x
max
                (2)  
or 
( ) α−
µ−θ
α








α
=
∫
1
j
1
0
j
j
)i(xdiix1
1)i(p
max
.               (3) 
The demand of a single household in country j for differentiated goods of the i-th firm 
depends on the price that firm i sets, on the substitutability of any pair of 
differentiated goods for another through α, on µ , and on the subutility of consumption 
                                            
30
 See Appendix 1.9.1. 
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







α
= ∫
θ
αdi)i(x1X
max
0
j . The impact of an increasing α is that products in the 
differentiated sector become closer substitutes for one another, which reduces the 
market power of a single firm. As µ increases, the benefit of differentiated goods 
decreases. The marginal utility of a further unit of differentiated goods becomes 
smaller. An increasing X reduces the distribution of the single firms as competition 
between the firms intensifies.  As can be seen from equations (2) and (3) the size of 
X is determined endogenously. For this reason, X can also be interpreted as the 
market size for differentiated goods and demands for specification. X depends on the 
strategic alignment of heterogeneous firms.  
Therefore, we distinguish between different scenarios. In the first case, market size X 
consists of the market of domestic firms, foreign firms exporting their goods from 
abroad (henceforth referred to as exporters), and, firms choosing horizontal MNE 
activity. Then, market size X in equilibrium is defined as: 
44 344 2144 344 2144 344 21
)i(MNE
j
)ex(orterexp
j
)d(domestic
0
ji,ex,d di)i(x1di)i(x1di)i(x1X
max
i/ex
i/ex
ex/d
max






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
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+








α
+








α
= ∫∫∫
θ
θ
α
θ
θ
α
θ
α
                                           (4) 
 
Alternatively, the export strategy does not exist (i.e., is not profitable); and firms 
choose either supplying domestically or acting as MNEs. This specified market size 
in this scenario shows: 
44 344 2144 344 21
MNE
j
domestic
0
ji,d di)i(x1di)i(x1X
max
i/d
max








α
+








α
= ∫∫
θ
θ
α
θ
α
                                                                         (5) 
 
Finally, MNE activity may be nonprofitable so that market size consists of demand 
from domestic and exporting producers only. The specified market size in this case 
shows: 
44 344 2144 344 21
orterexp
j
domestic
0
jex,d di)i(x1di)i(x1X
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
α
= ∫∫
θ
θ
α
θ
α
                                                                      (6) 
Figure 1 is a visualization of market size under alternative integration strategies of 
heterogeneous firms. 
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Figure 1. The market size X, depending on different integration strategies. 
  
 
1.2.2 Production 
Each of the two symmetric small countries, j={A,B}, hosts two industries.31 The 
subscript j is the identifier for the country in which the economic activity takes place. 
We focus on equilibria with diversification of production so that each of the two 
countries, j={A,B}, hosts the two industries. One industry provides a homogeneous 
good x0 that is traded under competitive conditions and is the numéraire in this 
model. Firms in the other industry produce differentiated goods under monopolistic 
competition. 
 
Let us assume that Countries A and B are endowed with a fixed amount of 
internationally immobile labor, L. Because the homogeneous good is freely tradable, 
used as the numéraire, and uses one unit of L for one unit of output, there is 
international wage equalization at unitary wages (i.e., wj=1) as long as diversification 
of production prevails. 
 
Firms are located symmetrically in each country and produce under monopolistic 
competition. Hence, each firm in the differentiated sector produces a single variety of 
a certain good. The differentiated goods available in a country j are provided by 
different sources. Consumers in j buy goods produced by national producers in j,  
imports from the other country, and goods from subsidiaries in j that have their origin 
                                            
31
 The countries being small imply that they cannot influence prices.  
Integration strategies 
Market size 
domestic,exporter domestic, exporter, 
multinational 
domestic, multinational 
Xd,ex Xd,ex,i Xd,i 
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in the other country (MNEs). Hence, the mass of firms in the world equals the amount 
of differentiated goods potentially available.  
Firms in the differentiated sector differ with respect to their productivity, but ex-ante 
all these firms are identical. If they expect positive earnings from the production 
process, they pay sunk entry costs fd upfront, which are measured in units of labor. 
As long as firms expect positive profits, they enter the market. It is assumed that the 
individual productivity levels of the firms in each country are independent draws from 
a cumulative productivity distribution function F( θ ). The fee fd allows the firms to 
independently draw their productivity from the distribution F(θ) with support over (0, 
θmax). With this procedure, firms located in the home country are guaranteed to 
produce domestically, even with very low productivity, to reduce the loss of fd. The 
time line in figure 2 shows the logical sequence from the moment prior to entry, when 
all firms are identical, to the moment when firms in the industry decide their 
integration strategies and outputs. 
 
Figure 2. Steps towards the choice of integration of the firm. 
 
According to their productivity θ(i), firms choose their integration strategies. In their 
domestic countries all firms start as domestic producers. If their productivity is low, a 
firms will not enter the foreign market, neither through exports nor through foreign 
plant setup. If productivity is high enough, firms have the additional choice to serve 
foreign markets via exports or foreign affiliate production (the latter being referred to 
as horizontal MNE activity). The choice between exporting and setting up foreign 
plants is driven by the proximity-concentration trade-off, characterized by the fact that 
MNE activity relative to exports saves trading costs as reflected by the tariff τ  for 
cross-border trade of differentiated varieties.32 On the other hand, foreign plant setup 
has fixed costs fi in terms of units of labor that are higher than fixed costs for 
                                            
32
 See, for example, Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Brainard (1993b), or Markusen and Venables 
(2000) for a survey. 
0 A-priori, all 
firms are 
identical. 
Firm expects 
positive 
earnings and 
pays market 
entry costs fd. 
Productivity  
θ  is 
revealed.  
Domestic 
production 
and its 
output are 
decided.  
If θ sufficient, 
output decision 
for additional 
export or MNE 
activity is made. 
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exporters fex because production facilities must be duplicated.33 For this reason, 
fd<fex<fi is assumed.  
 
Beyond these fixed costs, firms pay variable costs, depending on their productivity 
levels θ(i) [i.e., x(i)/ )i(θ ] and their integration strategies (i.e., exporters’ activities are 
subject to the tariff τ ). According to x(i)/ )i(θ , when comparing two firms with the 
same amount of output, the firm with higher productivity θ (i) must bear lower variable 
costs. 34  
 
Furthermore, governments may choose positive ad-valorem tariff rates τ  subject to 
imports (i.e., the tariff is a percentage of the value of one unit of the imported good). 
With Aτ >0, these firms (i.e., exporters from B importing to A) consider A τ  an 
additional factor influencing profits and vice versa. If tariff revenue in j is positive, it is 
passed on to households in j as a lump-sum transfer.  
 
Given the preferences in (1), the demand of households in (2), and the price 
consumption curve in (3), it is straightforward to compute maximum attainable profits 
of a firm in j serving its domestic market:35   
d
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dj
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The derivative with respect to xj(i) is an expression for the profit-maximizing output of 
a domestic firm i in its domestic market j, j { }B,A∈ :36 
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44 344 21
,              (7)  
                                            
33
 As in Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). 
34
 As in Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2006); Melitz (2203); Schröder (2007); and in Helpman, 
Melitz and Rubinstein (2007). 
35
 See Appendix 1.9.1. 
36
 See Appendix 1.9.2. 
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associated with the optimal price37 
)i(
1)i(p *dj
αθ
= .                       (8) 
The optimal output of a firm in the domestic market depends on market size X.38 
According to (7), the optimal output level a single firm is negatively correlated with X 
due to competitive conditions. Furthermore, the productivity level of a firm is 
positively correlated with its output.  
Because there is monopolistic competition, the market power of a single producer 
depends on the elasticity of substitution σ between two varieties of differentiated 
goods. Therefore, firms maximize their profits by charging the mill price (i.e., 
)i(
w1))i((p
θα
=θ , where w=1 as assumed and 1/ α  reflects the mark-up on the price).39 
This is the standard markup pricing in which a greater elasticity of substitution is 
associated with a smaller markup. Producers in a market in which differentiated 
goods are close substitutes associated with a higher α  only apply small markups on 
their prices because their market power is infinitesimally small. Accordingly, 
maximum attainable profits of a domestic firm i in j are given by:40  
d
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              (9) 
Analogously, we can now derive profits of firms with an export strategy. Profits of 
exporters from Country A are defined by: 41 
dA
0ifortsexpinengage
ex
exB
exBexBexA )i(f)i(
)i(x)i(x)1()i(p)i( pi+−
θ
−τ+=pi
>
444444 3444444 21
                                (10) 
Profits of exporters from Country B are defined by: 
dB
0ifortsexpinengage
ex
exA
exAexAexB )i(f)i(
)i(x)i(x)1()i(p)i( pi+−
θ
−τ+=pi
>
444444 3444444 21
                                                              (11) 
                                            
37
 See Appendix 1.9.2. 
38
 The market size X has to be specified according to Xd,ex, Xd,ex,i, or Xd,i. 
39
 This follows from the derivative of the profit function with respect to the price as in Appendix B. 
40
 See Appendix 1.9.2. 
41
 See Appendix 1.9.3. 
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The exporting firm has two sources of earnings: domestic sales and export activity. 
For a firm i from j, the expression in (10) or (11) results in optimal output in the other 
country (output for exporting):42  
)1(
)1(
)1(
1
)1(
1
*
exj
X)1(
)()i(x
α−
µ−
α−
α−
τ+
αθ
= ,           (12) 
associated with the optimal price for exports q(i) *ex =p(i) *ex (1+ τ ):43 
( )
)i(
1)i(q *exj
αθ
τ+
=              (13) 
In addition to the previous analysis, one can see that the optimal output and price for 
exports depend on the tariff τ  in contrast to the optimal output and price when 
supplying domestic demand. Because raising a tariff results in increased prices for 
imports q(i) *ex , the supply of an exporting firm xj(i) *ex  decreases. The representative 
household is not willing to pay any higher price for imported goods to satisfy the love-
for-variety preference. Hence, the demand for imported goods decreases more than 
proportional to increases in the tariff τ .  
Accordingly, maximum attainable profits of an exporting firm i in j are given by:44 
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Now, it is straightforward to compute maximum attainable profits of a firm engaged in 
MNE activities. As the firm produces goods for both markets locally, the tariff rate is 
not relevant. Instead, a firm i from Country A opens an affiliate in B and becomes a 
horizontal MNE. Profits of an MNE i headquartered in Country A are defined by:45 
dA
0ifMNEinengage
i
iB
iBiBiA )i(f)i(
)i(x)i(x)i(p)i( pi+−
θ
−=pi
>
4444 34444 21
         (15) 
Analogously, this can be derived for a firm i from B building up a subsidiary in A. 
 
An MNE expects at least zero profits from running both domestic and foreign 
subsidiaries. 
                                            
42
 See Appendix 1.9.3. 
43
 See Appendix 1.9.3. 
44
 See Appendix 1.9.3. 
45
 See Appendix 1.9.4. 
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Profit-maximizing plant output of an MNE i headquartered in j is shown by:46 
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associated with the optimal price:47 
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Accordingly, maximum attainable profits of an MNE i headquartered in j are given 
by:48 
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Firms choose their integration strategies based on the knowledge of their productivity 
levels. This results in cut-off levels being determinants of minimum levels of 
productivity for a firm i to generate zero profits additionally when ex-ante selecting 
strategies with more than domestic production. In general, more productive firms are 
more successful in all three strategies. The least productive firms only serve the 
domestic market through domestic production. Because of their low productivity, their 
variable costs are too high so that higher fixed costs to operate in an additional 
market cannot be covered.  
 
The first cut-off occurs when the productivity of a firm is such that additional profits of 
exporting exactly results in zero profits.This can be derived from (10) and applies 
for:49 
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                                 (19)                              
The market size X results endogenously, according to Xd,ex,i. A firm with productivity 
ex/dθ  generates zero profits from exporting. Hence, this firm is indifferent between 
only selling domestically or additionally engaging in exports. A firm with productivity 
just above this level already earns positive profits from exporting and will definitely 
                                            
46
 See Appendix 1.9.4. 
47
 See Appendix 1.9.4. 
48
 See Appendix 1.9.4. 
49
 See Appendix 1.9.5. 
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engage in exporting. The critical productivity level ex/dθ  is positively correlated with τ , 
fex, and market size X. Hence, the indifferent firm must be more productive to break 
even. In other words, higher productivity yields lower variable costs of production. 
Furthermore, conditional on the existence of the export strategy, productivity levels 
exist that ensure the profits of exporters exceed the profits of MNEs. This results in 
the next threshold where profits of an exporting firm equal profits of an MNE (i.e., 
iex )i()i( pi=pi ).50 This applies to the following expression: 
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          (20) 
Only firms with i/ex)i( θ>θ  gain positive profits from serving foreign markets through 
building subsidiaries instead of exporting their goods. i/exθ  depends on the difference 
in fixed costs (fi – fex) > 0, which can be interpreted as overhead and setup costs of 
an MNE subsidiary. The higher the overhead costs (fi – fex) for a foreign subsidiary, 
the more productive the indifferent firm must be to engage in MNE activity (i.e., the 
cut-off level i/exθ  takes over a higher value). As the tariff τ  increases, the firm 
becomes more likely to engage in the MNE strategy, which also results in a lower 
value of i/exθ . Furthermore, if 0=τ , the threshold i/exθ  is infinite. Hence, i/exθ  is only 
defined for 0>τ . Intuitively, firms do not engage in MNE activities if the tariff is 0=τ . 
The MNE strategy does not exist under this constellation. 
 
Alternatively, certain configurations of parameters may result in a situation in which 
domestic firms directly integrate as MNEs instead of choosing the export strategy. 
The following cut-off level is the relevant productivity threshold when for example the 
tariff τ  reaches a level at which firms do not choose the export strategy anymore 
(i.e., i/dθ < ex/dθ ).  The associated cut-off level results from 0)i( ij ≥pi  and is given by:51 
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 See Appendix 1.9.6. 
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 See Appendix 1.9.7. 
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The associated market size X in this scenario endogenously results in Xd,i. As can be 
seen, this setup ensures that all three strategies can coexist and are determined by 
the individual productivity of the firm. 
 
1.3 The behavior of the firms 
Consumers in the home country can buy all the goods being provided by 
domestically located firms. Furthermore, consumers can buy goods from foreign 
firms. The decisions by firms to export to foreign markets or to build foreign 
subsidiaries depend on their specific productivity levels associated with 
corresponding parameter configurations (e.g., the tariff τ , variable costs, and fixed 
costs). The influence of a tariff on firm integration strategies can be demonstrated by 
analyzing the bahavior of the firms if 0=τ  and by comparing it to the situation at 
0>τ  or 21 τ<τ . 
 
1.3.1 Integration strategies at τ =0 
Because exporting activities are not linked to additional transport costs and 0=τ , 
firms will not benefit from building subsidiaries. This will result in higher fixed costs, 
(i.e., fi>fex) but will not have any further upside for heterogeneous firms. At 0=τ , the 
cut-off level i/exθ that separates exporting firms from MNEs is infinite because 
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MNE activities do not exist. Hence, no firms engage in FDI. Instead, firms export to 
foreign markets. Figure 3 is representative of the allocation of foreign firms at 0=τ . 
  
Figure 3. The allocation of foreign firms, τ=0. 
 
The productivity level ex/dθ that at least guarantees zero profits for exporters in this 
scenario (i.e., 0=τ ) is represented by: 
domestic 
 
ex/dθ  0 maxθ  
export 
θ
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The threshold ex/dθ  requires a productivity level sufficient to cover the fixed costs fex. 
Furthermore, ex/dθ  is positively correlated with the market size Xd,ex. Therefore, an 
increasing market size results in a decreasing demand for the products of the i-th 
firm. The indifferent firm must be more productive. A situation in which governments 
do not apply ad-valorem tariffs on imports results in a scenario in which foreign goods 
are solely imported.   
 
1.3.2 Integration strategies at τ >0 
A tariff is an additional decision parameter when firms choose their integration 
strategies. 0>τ  decreases consumers´ demand for imports which results in an 
increasing value of the cut-off level ex,dθ . In contrast to the scenario at 0=τ , the 
indifferent firm must be more productive to break even. The tariff forces low-
productivity firms to exit the export strategy and harms consumers by supplying the 
market with fewer varieties. The tariff also affects exporters with higher productivity 
levels. Highly productive exporters are now in favor of engaging in MNE activities. 
Although fixed costs associated with MNE integration are higher than in the export 
strategy (fi>fex), the MNE activity bypasses the tariff. Hence, consumers do not face 
distorted prices that affect their decisions. Firms in the export strategy face reduced 
demand due to the tariff, whereas the same firms using an MNE strategy are not 
confronted with such a consequence.  
The determined cut-off levels (19), (20), and (21) give information about the 
allocation of firms utilizing the different integration strategies. From the perspective of 
the home country, all firms located in the home country manufacture differentiated 
goods as domestic producers. In addition, it is valuable to know the distribution of 
foreign firms across the other strategies. This is shown in figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. The allocation of foreign firms, τ>0. 
multinational 
ex/dθ  i/exθ  maxθ  
 
domestic export 
0 
θ  
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Firms desiring to export goods must be at least as productive as the cut-off level 
defined in (19). The next threshold (20) gives the productivity level of the highest- 
productivity exporting firms. Above this level, firms engage in MNE activities to satisfy 
demand. 
 
Alternative parameter configurations may result in situations in which the export 
strategy disappears and foreign firms directly integrate as MNEs. This is the case as 
soon as the condition ex/di/d θ<θ  holds, which is given by:52 
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The expression depends on the ratio of fixed costs and the tariff rate τ . Figure 5 is a 
representation of that situation.  
 
Figure 5. The allocation of foreign firms, θd/I ≤ θd / ex. 
 
The coexistence of both international strategies disappears and foreign firms directly 
choose the MNE strategy.  
 
1.3.3 The effect of the tariff on the mass of firms  
Now, it is straightforward to calculate the mass of firms following the different 
strategies. The mass of exporting firms supplying the market in j through imports can 
be derived by calculating ex/di/ex θ−θ , which is given by: 
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The mass of exporters in the home country is positively dependent on the fixed costs 
of MNEs fi, negatively on fex, and positively on the consumption index as denoted by 
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 See Appendix 1.9.7. 
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X. Although an increase in X stimulates an increase in exporters to sell their goods 
competition among them intensifies and results in lower demand per firm. This 
competition effect can be clarified using the expression in (12). The derivative subject 
to X results in the following negative expression: 
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        (23) 
The single exporter importing to j faces a reduced demand due to increased available 
varieties from which to choose. Thus, consumers buy fewer goods from a single firm. 
 
Analogously, the mass of firms engaging in FDI is defined by i/exji,j nn θ−=  and 
results in the following expression: 
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The mass of MNEs in j is positively correlated with the tariff τ , the fixed costs 
associated with the export strategy fex, and the mass of firms in country j, nj. An 
opposite effect can be seen if fixed costs for MNE activity fi or the general market 
size X increases.  
  
1.3.4  The effects of the tariff on the export sector: Extensive border effects 
Because a tariff has different implications for the behavior of heterogeneous firms, 
the export sector is analyzed explicitly. First, we examine the effects on less 
productive exporters. Their relevant threshold ex/dθ , without the application of a tariff, 
is given by (19a). Hence, the mass of firms leaving the strategy due to the tariff τ  can 
be derived from the following expression: 
=θ−θ
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This way of calculating the mass of firms is applicable because we assume the firms 
to be distributed following a uniform distribution. 
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Figure 6 shows the effect of a tariff on the lower productivity threshold. 
 
Figure 6. Extensive border effect on low-productivity exporters. 
 
The mass of firms affected by introduction of a tariff is denoted as C in the figure and 
forces firms in this interval to remain domestic producers in their home countries. An 
increase in the tariff results in increases in the cut-off level and to the mass of firms in 
C. This is because consumer demand decreases due to higher prices. Therefore, 
firms in the interval C must be more productive to break even. As explained 
previously, an increase in the market size X also enlarges the interval in C as 
competition intensifies.  
To analyze the implications of an ad-valorem tariff on the behavior of highly 
productive exporters, we analyze the effect assuming 21 τ<τ . Figure 7 visualizes how 
the tariff affects the integration strategy of highly productive exporters: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Extensive border effect on high-productivity exporters, τ1 < τ2. 
 
The tariff 12 τ>τ lowers sales of exporters and equalizes the difference in the cost 
structure between the export and the MNE strategies. As a result, the mass of D 
firms changes its strategy and engages in FDI because this strategy requires a lower 
minimum productivity as seen in (20). The mass of firms affected by a higher tariff 
can be derived by 
12 i/exi/exD ττ θ−θ= , which is given by:  
C 
0ex/d =τθ  i/exθ  maxθ  
 
domestic FDI 
θ  
0 
exporters 
0ex/d >τθ  
D
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An increase in τ  makes MNE activities more likely. Therefore, the mass in D 
increases. Hence, the higher the tariff τ , the more firms change their strategies and 
engage in MNE activities.  
The opposite effect may be found if the fixed costs fi are relatively more expensive 
than fex. The mass of firms in interval D being affected by the tariff decreases. Fewer 
firms change their strategies to engage in FDI. Therefore, the decision of firms is not 
solely affected by the fixed costs of one strategy but by the fixed costs fi relative to 
fixed costs fex.  
An increase in the market size X also has the effect of decreasing the mass in D. 
Table 1 is a summary of the effects on the strategies of firms with respect to the 
previously analyzed cases. 
 
0=τ  0>τ  
Varieties available Maximum in imports Less imports due to tariff 
Export strategy Yes Yes 
Multinational strategy No Yes 
 
Table 1. Comparison of τ = 0 versus τ > 0. 
 
At 0=τ , imports to the home country are maximized. The mass of foreign goods 
available in the home country decreases when 0>τ . The introduction of the tariff 
causes low-productivity exporters to exit the market. As a result, consumers forfeit 
the varieties of those suppliers. The export strategy remains the only international 
strategy when 0=τ . In this scenario, the MNE strategy requires higher fixed costs but 
has no further upside to firms. The situation changes when 0>τ . The tariff induces 
high-productivity firms to start MNE activities. The tariff reduces the demand of 
exporting firms, which reduces firm profits. Sufficiently productive firms engage in 
MNE strategies to bypass the tariff. They generate higher fixed costs to build 
subsidiaries but profit from higher sales volumes. 
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1.4 The welfare-maximization process 
The objective of the government is to evaluate the effects of an ad-valorem tariff on 
the welfare of households. Such a policy evokes reactions in the integration 
strategies of firms influencing the utility of the household. Therefore, the implications 
of these reactions must be considered in the welfare-maximization process. 
Anticipating the behavior of firms, governments maximize consumer welfare by 
endogenously determining ad-valorem tariffs τ . Because in this paper we assume 
two completely symmetric, small countries, it is sufficient to show the decision-
making process of only one country. The objective of a government is to maximize 
the expression 
τ∂
∂U to find the level of the tariff rate τ  maximizing welfare. In the 
following, the relevant effects are described for the general case that three strategies 
exist (i.e., domestic producers, exporters and horizontal MNEs). This implies that 
i/exθ is finite as ensured by 0≠τ , and that i/exex/d θ<θ  holds. Of course, the market 
size X may endogenously have different outcomes and must be specified according 
to (4), (5), and (6), depending on parameter configuration. Furthermore, to guarantee 
a continuous solution, firms are ranked according to their individual productivity 
levels, starting with low-productivity firms.  
 
The utility of the households is positively dependent on consumption of the 
numéraire. This monetary effect is given by the difference in labor income mj and 
expenses for differentiated goods. Without transfer, utility from x0 is shown by: 
( ) ( ) ( )
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Additionally, and in contrast to the scenario at 0=τ , the government in j generates 
revenues that are transferred to consumers in j. This monetary effect enables 
consumers in j to buy more of the numéraire good x0, having a positive effect on the 
utility. Considering the utility function in (1) and the profit-maximizing output of 
exporters in (12), this effect is given by: 
∫
θ
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The government in j generates tariff revenues for its consumers in j on all imports to 
the market in j.  
 
The next utility generating effect stems from consumption of domestic goods: 
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Furthermore, the utility of consumers in j consists of consumption of imported goods. 
This effect is depicted by: 
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By maximizing utility, the government considers the ambiguous effect of the tariff τ . 
On the one hand, an increase in the tariff τ  stimulates highly productive exporters to 
engage in MNE activities. This makes the affected varieties cheaper because the 
goods of MNEs are not subject to the trade barrier. On the other hand, low-
productivity exporters are forced to leave the market because their productivity θ (i) is 
not sufficient. The products of these suppliers are no longer available to consumers 
in j, which has a negative influence on the utility of the households in j. 
 
The next utility-generating element is represented by consumption of goods of MNEs. 
In formal accounts, this effect can be described by the following expression: 
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The demand of households for goods of MNEs is not directly affected by the tariff τ . 
However, an increasing tariff rate τ  influences the lower limit of integration because 
highly productive exporters may change their integration status following MNE 
activities. Therefore, the area described by the integral increases (i.e., i/exθ  
decreases), having positive implications on utility.  
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Governments in j consider that all the described elements influence utility of the 
representative household interdependently. Therefore, the expression governments 
in j maximize subject to the tariff τ  is shown by: 53 
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or                                                                                                                              (33) 
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In this expression, we also consider that ( ) θ=θ
n
ii  and that the market size results 
endogenously depending on the integration strategies of heterogeneous firms. The 
endogeneity of market size X results in a situation in which every parameter 
configuration results in a different level of X.  As well endogenous, the mass of firms 
n in equilibrium varies with associated dependent variables. Expected profits for the 
coexistence of the domestic, the export, and the MNE strategies are depicted by:54 
 
                                            
53
 Utility of the representative household under alternative parameter configurations resulting in Xd/ex’ 
Xd/i and Xd is shown in Appendix 1.9.8.  
54
 Expected profits result endogenously according Xd/ex/i, Xd/ex, Xd/i or Xd. 
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Furthermore, both variables, the market size X and the mass of firms n in equilibrium, 
are interdependent. The market size X and the mass of firms n induce further 
interdependences to other equilibrium determining expressions (i.e., the cut-off levels 
and the demand of the households). Even without the complexity being induced by 
the linkages of the different variables, the maximization of the previously mentioned 
expression,
τ∂
∂ jU
, results in a problem with a dimensionality higher than fourth 
degree.55 These aspects preclude an analytical solution of 
τ∂
∂ jU
 and suggest using 
numerical analysis to determine the welfare-maximizing tariff rates τ  and their 
interactions with other variables. 
  
1.5 The setup of the numerical framework 
To derive a solution to the problem discussed previously and to find a welfare-
maximizing expression for the tariff τ , we use Mathematica 6.0 to set up the 
numerical framework that represents the theory of the model as derived in previous 
sections.56  
 
1.5.1 Definitions 
The coding of the numerical framework begins with defining variables and making 
assumptions. Analogously to the assumptions of the model, the fixed costs, maxθ , as 
well as α  and µ , are defined as constant numerical values, considering fd<fex<fi and 
0<µ < α <1. 
 
                                            
55
 A derivation of a unique solution with dimensionality higher than fourth degree cannot be provided. 
This is proved by the theory of E. Galois. For a survey, see Taton (1983). 
56
 See Appendix D for the full input sheet. For a survey of numerical mathematics and methods, see 
Knorrenschild (2008) and Spelucci (1993). 
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After generating the market-entry costs of fd, firms draw their individual productivity θ. 
We apply a uniform distribution and specify the density as f[θ_]:=1/θmax. The 
associated distribution function is computed as F[θ_]:=θ/θmax. To guarantee 
continuous results, firms are ranked according to their individual productivity, starting 
with low-productivity firms. This is reflected by the expression θ[i_,n_]. The 
productivity θ[i_,n_] depends on the rank i of the i-th firm, given a mass of firms in 
the economy n.  
For further analysis, a function is computed to provide the rank of indifferent firms 
between two strategies. This expression is given by inr[θ_,n_] and reports the 
rank of each firm, given the productivity θ and the mass of firms n founded in the 
country.  
The demand of the representative household, as in (2), results in optimal output for 
the firms, as derived previously. The computation of the profit-maximizing output is 
represented by xdi[θ_,X_]for domestic firms and MNEs and by x[θ_,X_,τ_] 
for firms in the export sector. 
The choice of the integration strategy of each firm is driven by cut-off productivity 
thresholds. The first threshold separates domestic producers from exporters and is 
computed as θde[X_,τ_], considering  X and τ  in the country in which 
differentiated goods are sold. The associated firm number is reported by 
ide[n_,X_,τ_]:=inr[θde[X,τ],n]. The expression calculates the rank of the 
indifferent firm in means of productivity, depending on the mass of firms n, the market 
size X, and the tariff τ . For example, by entering ide[50,1000,0.03], the system 
calculates that with 50 firms in the country j, a market size of 1000, and a tariff of 3% 
in j,  the firm that just has the cut-off productivity ex/dθ  is the 22.8084nd firm. Hence, it 
is the 23rd firm out of 50 that exports for sure.  
Analogously, we compute the threshold productivity i/exθ  as θei[X_,τ_], 
associated with the expression for the firm that produces with the cut-off productivity 
iei[n_,X_,τ_]:=inr[θei[X,τ],n], considering  X and τ  in the country in 
which the economic activity takes place. The same notion is used to compute the 
threshold i/dθ as θdi[X_,τ_], associated with its rank idi[X_,τ_], considering  X 
and τ  in the country in which the economic activity takes place. 
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1.5.2 Consistency of market size X 
The market size X depends on the mass of firms n, the tariff τ , and household 
demand x(i). It is given by 








α
= ∫
θ
α
max
0
j )i(x1X . The inclusion of the endogenously 
defined market size X from a demand perspective as in section 1.2.1, into the 
numerical model does not result in the consistency needed to derive results. The 
proof of inconsistency starts with computing the market size of country j from a 
supply perspective for firms active in the different strategies in j, j { }B,A∈  (i.e., Yd 
[supply of a domestic firm from A and vice versa from B], Yex [supply of an exporting 
firm from A and vice versa from B], and Yi [supply of MNEs with origin in B and vice 
versa with origin in A]). The market size for domestic producers in A referring to the 
representative household yields 
Yd[n_,X_,τ_]:=NIntegrate[(1/α)(xdi[ θ[i,n],X])^α,{i,0,n}]. 
Yd depends on the mass of firms n in A, the market size X in A, and the tariff τ  being 
applied in A. It is characterized by the integral over the output of all domestic firms i. 
 
Analogously, we compute the market size of firms that export from B to A. From the 
perspective of firms producing in B and exporting to A, the export market size 
referring to the representative household in A is given by 
Yex[n_,X_,τ_]:=If[ide[n,X,τ]<Min[iei[n,X,τ],n],NIntegrate[(1/α
)x[ θ[i,n],X,τ])^α,{i,ide[n,X,τ],Min[iei[n,X,τ],n]}],0]. 
Yex depends on the mass of firms n in country B, the market size X in A, and the 
tariff τ  in A. The definition of Yex in the numerical analysis also considers the 
scenario that possibly no exporters exist based on the implemented conditions. 
The expression starts with a condition for Yex to exist as depicted by 
If[ide[n,X,τ]<Min[iei[n,X,τ],n]. 
Only if the number of the cut-off firm ide is smaller than the smaller value of either the 
number of the cut-off firm iei or the mass of firms n, does an export market exist. If 
ide<iei <n, the export strategy and the MNE strategy coexist. If ide<n<iei, the MNE 
strategy does not exist. The reverse is that ide>iei or ide>n, providing intuition that 
the export sector does not exist, which results in ouput 0 for the export strategy.  
The condition being satisfied gives the system the indication to integrate the output x 
of all firms i in the export sector. The integration has its lower limit given by the cut-off 
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firm ide and its upper limit given by the smaller value of either iei or n. The included 
conditions are essential for the result to exist because this procedure guarantees that 
the lower limit of integration is always smaller than the upper limit. Otherwise, the 
program can under certain circumstances, erroneously generate misleading results. 
 
The market size for MNEs in terms of the representative household is defined by 
Yin[n_,X_,τ_]:=NIntegrate[(1/α)(xdi[θ[i,n],X])^α,{i,Min[n,iei[
n,X,τ]],n}].   
The market for MNEs in Country A depends on the mass of firms being located in 
Country B, the market size X in A, and the tariff rate τ . Also, here, the coding 
includes conditions to guarantee that the system integrates correctly regarding 
prevailing integration strategies.  
The entire market size from a supply perspective, referring to the representative 
household in A, is determined as the sum of all three market segments and is 
represented by 
Y[n_,X_,τ_]:=Yd[n,X,τ]+Yex[n,X,τ]+Yin[n,X,τ]. 
 
The inconsistency of the market size from a supply (Y) and a demand (X) perspective 
can be clarified by figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. The inconsistency of the market size. 
 
The inconsistency of the market size in figure 8 is considerably apparent. The curve 
of the market size X has a different progression than the curve Y. The intersection of 
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both graphs gives the true market size, given the mass of firms n and the tariff τ  (i.e., 
343,524). 
 
To achieve the essential consistency, the computation is performed in two steps. We 
implement FindRoot[Y[1000,X,.2]X,{X,6}], an expression to find the exact 
market size for given values for the mass of firms n and the tariff τ . The result in this 
case for X is 1338.65. To program the correct and consistent market size Xm, we 
must define the expression  
Xm[n_,τ_]:=ReplaceAll[X,FindRoot[Y[n,X,τ]-X0,{X,10}]], to replace 
all values for X with the results of the FindRoot command.57 For further analysis, the 
expression Xm indicates the consistent market size and, therefore, is used in the 
following section. 
 
1.5.3 The mass of firms in equilibrium 
The decision of firms to enter the market is based on the expectation of future profits. 
Heterogeneous firms enter production as long as their future earnings expectations 
are positive. Hence, the mass of firms in the market is determined by expected profits 
being equal to zero. After computing the profit function of the single firm i with its 
particular strategy, expected profits are determined by the profits of all firms in the 
specific market. The profit functions of the single firm i in the different strategies are 
computed. The profit function of a firm with rank i following a domestic integration 
strategy is computed as Gd[i,n,τ]. Similarly, profits of a firm in the export sector 
are computed as Gex[i,n,τ], and the code Gin[i,n,τ] defines the profit 
function of a firm with an MNE strategy. 
 
Expected profits (EG) in an economy result from the integration of profits over all 
firms in the different strategies. They are given by 
EG[n_,τ_]:=EGd[n,τ]+EGex[n,τ]+EGin[n,τ]. The computation of expected 
profits includes conditions to ensure that profits are only integrated if the associated 
strategy exists. Finally, coding the mass of firms in equilibrium results from expected 
profits being competed to zero by firms entering the market.  
The computed loop calculates the mass of firms n in country j given a tariff rate τ .  
                                            
57
 The test of Xm[1000,0.2] approves the approach and yields 1338.65. 
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This expression is given by firms[τ_]. The process to find the null is coded by the 
instruction to test several values in defined steps. After determining the first negative 
value of expected profits, the program returns to approach the null exactly while the 
width of the steps is permanently reduced. For example, a tariff of 1.0=τ % results in 
19728.7 firms in equilibrium with associated expected profits of 1.61949×10-6.58 This 
is support for the previously described method. 
 
1.5.4 The maximization of welfare 
Considering the utility function in (1), households in the two symmetric small 
countries benefit from consumption of the homogeneous good x0 and the 
differentiated goods.  To implement the utility maximization process, we first consider 
the stand-alone contribution of x0. Without the existence of a differentiated goods 
sector, the representative household only generates utility by consuming x0. Hence, 
the benefit of one unit of a differentiated good is constituted by its net contribution 
(i.e., additional utility versus additional costs). The computation of the equilibrium 
utilizes this notion to implement the utility-maximizing process. The equilibrium of the 
model depends on a given value of the tariff τ  and is computed so that the system 
delivers data describing the equilibrium.59 
The expression describing the equilibrium is labelled as Equilibrium[τ_]and 
indicates the expression is dependent on a given value of the tariff τ .60 
At first, the program delivers a value for the mass of firms in equilibrium 
Ngg=N[firms[τ]], which delivers a numerical value of the expression 
firms[ τ]. The next value of interest is the market size in equilibrium 
Xmgg=Xm[Ngg,τ] , which depends on the derived value for the mass of firms in 
equilibrium Ngg and the tariff τ . The utility in equilibrium is defined as Ugg and sums 
up the contribution of consumption of domestically produced goods, imports, and 
goods supplied by MNEs.61 
The computation of the utility in equilibrium Ugg utilizes conditions to guarantee the 
limits of integration to be valid, delivering stable results. Analogously, we derive the 
expenses of a single household in equilibrium Egg. They are computed based on 
                                            
58
 The codes are N[firms[.1]]and EG[19728.666015625`,.1]. 
59
 See Appendix 1.9.9 for the computation of the equilibrium. 
60
 The notation for values in equilibrium consists of “gg” as additional two letters (e.g. Ugg is the utility 
in equilibrium). 
61
 See Appendix 1.9.9 for the computation of the utility in equilibrium.  
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demand in a single household for domestic products, imports, and goods produced 
by MNEs linked to their associated prices.62 Finally, welfare in equilibrium Wgg is 
calculated as the net contribution of the differentiated goods sector (i.e., Wgg = 
Ugg-Egg). 
 
1.6 The results of the numerical model 
Using the knowledge of the behavior of firms concerning their integration strategies, 
the requirement of this paper is to find coherence of the tariff τ  and the welfare of 
households from a social planner’s perspective. Therefore, we examine equilibria of 
the model resulting from a variation of the tariff rate τ .  
To analyze the numerical output, we focus on the mass of firms in equilibrium n, 
which indicates the mass of differentiated goods available in the country to satisfy the 
consumers´ love-for-variety preferences. The market size in equilibrium Xmgg is 
utilized to derive utility Ugg and expenses Egg in equilibrium. Finally, the welfare in 
equilibrium Wgg is derived by calculating the saldo of Ugg and Egg (i.e., Wgg=Ugg-
Egg). Table 2 is a summary of the results of the model in equilibrium utilizing different 
levels of the tariff τ . 
Tariff Ngg Xmgg Ugg Egg Wgg ide iei idi strategies 
0 23600 5164.00 281.608 126.723 154.884 18213 1591040 19706 exporter
0.01 23543 5114.82 279.993 125.522 154.471 18317 34302 19556 exporter
0.02 23503 5068.22 278.460 124.400 154.060 18438 27269 19429 exporter
0.03 23480 5024.19 277.006 123.354 153.651 18575 23879 19321 exporter
0.035 23314 5004.66 276.359 123.193 153.166 18524 22565 19144 exporter/ multinational
0.037 23238 4998.58 276.158 123.207 152.951 18500 22100 19070 exporter/ multinational
0.04 23149 4991.05 275.908 123.244 152.664 18485 21484 18981 exporter/ multinational
0.05 23002 4976.15 275.413 123.478 151.935 18574 19941 18831 exporter/ multinational
0.06 23013 4971.78 275.268 123.834 151.434 18810 18909 18831 exporter/ multinational
0.07 21989 4963.86 275.005 123.752 151.253 18184 17279 17978 multinational
0.08 21078 4944.16 274.350 123.457 150.892 17611 15927 17196 multinational
0.09 20338 4971.78 275.268 123.834 151.434 17158 14847 16642 multinational
0.1 19729 4894.03 272.677 122.705 149.972 16800 13967 16008 multinational
 
Table 2. Summarized results of the model in equilibrium. 
 
The summary of the generated results shows the configuration of equilibria- 
describing parameters. Furthermore, the allocation of firms on the different 
integration strategies is clarified by columns ide, iei, and idi. The last column gives 
intuition about existing integration strategies in equilibrium. In the following, we 
explicitly examine important equilibria: 
 
                                            
62
 See Appendix 1.9.9 for the computation of the expenses in equilibrium Egg. 
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1.6.1 Tariff τ  = 0% 
If the level of the tariff τ  a social planner chooses is τ =0%, the welfare 
(Wgg=154.884) of the representative household, and therefore, of the whole country 
is maximized in this scenario. The equilibrium is characterized by a maximum of 
differentiated available varieties (Ngg=23600) being linked to a market size Xmgg of 
5164.08. The derived values create utility Ugg of 281.608 and expenses Egg of 
126.723.  
In addition to the values describing the equilibrium, the allocation of firms producing 
with the different strategies is the focus of this analysis. Here, the firm with cut-off 
productivity ex/dθ  (i.e., ide=18212.8) or the 18212.9th firm out of 23600 firms, starts to 
engage in an export strategy. In the case of τ =0, the least productive MNE is iei= 
1591040. Hence, in this economy, no heterogeneous firm represents the MNE 
strategy because founding an MNE is wasteful in terms of overhead fixed costs (fi-
fex). In this economy, it is always advantageous to supply foreign markets via exports.  
Furthermore, there are 5387.2 exporting and, consequently importing firms. This 
results in an overall share of differentiated varieties of 22.83% being imported by 
foreign firms. 
 
1.6.2 Tariff τ  = 3.5% 
With an increase in the tariff to τ =3.5%, the relevant parameters decrease (i.e., the 
mass of firms in equilibrium Ngg, market size Xmgg, utility Ugg, expenses Egg, and 
welfare in equilibrium). In this equilibrium, welfare Wgg=153.166. In contrast to the 
equilibrium with τ =0, this is equivalent to a reduction of welfare of 1.11%. τ =3.5% 
has an influence on firm integration strategies. The tariff τ  reduces household 
demand for imported goods, affecting profits of exporters and making the MNE 
strategy attractive. This equilibrium hosts both international strategies (i.e., exporters 
and MNEs). The share of foreign differentiated varieties is 20.54%.  
 
1.6.3 Tariff τ  = 7% 
A further increase in the tariff τ  results in a further decrease of the parameters 
affecting the welfare in equilibrium Wgg. With τ =7%, welfare Wgg=151.253 is 
equivalent to a reduction in welfare of 2.34% compared with the optimal policy. 
The integration strategies are affected so that the export strategy disappears. 
Because idi<ide, heterogeneous foreign firms directly integrate as MNEs because 
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τ =7% reduces the profit of exporting firms, making it beneficial to accept higher 
overhead fixed costs and to engage in MNE strategies instead. The indifferent MNE, 
producing with the cut-off productivity, has the number idi=17978. Hence, in this 
economy, the share of foreign firms and, therefore, of foreign goods is at 18.24%. 
 
1.7 The role of heterogeneity 
To analyze the role of heterogeneity in this model, we examine the previous model, 
assuming that the productivity θ (i) does not follow a distribution function F(θ ) and 
that all firms have the same productivity θ . The choice of integration strategy by the 
firm still focuses on productivity thresholds, thereby maximizing profit. 
However, the choice of θ  predetermines the outcome of the model, thereby defining 
prevailing integration strategies. The firms being homogeneous result in an 
equilibrium in which all firms charge the same price and choose the same strategy. In 
general, the model can generate four scenarios, depending on the choice of θ , 
which will be discussed in the following section. 
 
1.7.1  Autarky 
We study the scenario in which productivity θ  is chosen so that i/dex/d θ≤θ≤θ . 
Satisfying the condition for θ , the market size is given by ( )∫
α
α−
µ−
α−









 θα
α
=
n
0 )1(
)1(
)1(
1
X
1X , which 
results in 
( ) )1(
)1(
)1(d
1
nX
αµ−
α−
α−
α





 θα
α
=  .           (35)  
The market size Xd is a constant, increasing with the mass of firms n=nA=nB. With 
θ below the minimum productivity requirement for an international strategy, all firms 
in j remain domestic producers for the domestic market in j, which results in the 
economy operating in autarky. The utility of the household is given by 
( )
µ
αµ−
α−
α−
α















 θα
αµ
=
)1(
)1(
)1(d
1
n
1U  ,          (36)  
and expenses are given by  
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( )
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Welfare of the representative household can be derived as the saldo of utility and 
expenses, also giving a constant value. 
 
1.7.2 Domestic firms and exporters 
To generate a scenario in which firms are active in the domestic and the export 
market, productivity θ  is chosen so that i/exi/dex/d θ≤θ≤θ≤θ . Satisfying this 
condition, market size Xex consists of the market of domestic producers, depending 
on the mass of firms in the home country, A. Furthermore, the mass of firms in 
Country B nB exports to the home country. Xex can be derived 
using ( ) ( )
( )
∫∫
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Because the two countries are symmetric, we apply n=nA=nB; the market size Xex is 
represented by 
( )
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The corresponding utility of the representative household is given by 
( )
( )
µ
αµ−
α−
α−
α
α−
α




























τ+
+θα
αµ
=
)1(
)1(
)1(
)1(
ex
1
11n1U .          (39) 
Expenses for consumption of domestic goods are ( ) 



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expenses for exports are ( )
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. The sum of both positions 
gives total expenses. The welfare Wex results as the saldo of Uex-Eex.  
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The stability of the constellation that all firms export to the foreign market is mainly 
dependent on the condition that ex/dθ≥θ . If the parameter configuration changes 
(e.g., the tariff τ  is increased), the export market crunches and the economy returns 
to the autarky scenario. This happens if ex/dθ<θ , which results in the following 
coherence, depending on the tariff τ :  
( ) ( )
α
α
α−
α
α−








α−αθ
>τ+
ex
)1(
ex
)1(
Xf
11            (40) 
 
1.7.3 Domestic firms and MNEs 
The homogeneous model may result in a situation in which θ  is chosen so that only 
domestic and MNE firms exist. The productivity of all firms in this scenario is i/exθ≥θ , 
which results in the following condition for equilibrium to exist in the described way:  
( ) ( )( ) µ−α−
αα−α
−
θα−α
−≥τ+ 1
i
)1(
exi
)1(
Xff
111 .            (41) 
 If ( )τ+1  satisfies the condition, the economy only consists of domestic firms and 
MNEs, which results in a market size ∫∫
αα
α
+
α
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0
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The associated utility is given by  
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in which expenses are Ei=2Ed. The stability of this constellation is dependent on the 
above condition in (41). If ( )τ+1  does not satisfy the condition in (41), the market for 
MNEs crunches and only domestic firms and exporters produce their goods. 
 
Alternatively, θ  may be fixed so that i/dθ≥θ . This scenario generates a market size 
constituted by domestic firms and MNEs. The utility and, therefore, expenses and 
welfare do not differ from the previous results; but equilibrium returns to the autarky 
scenario if i/dθ<θ . 
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1.7.4 The market size with homogeneous firms and the role of heterogeneity 
After discussing all potential outcomes of the model assuming homogeneous firms, 
the market size under all alternative scenarios in formal accounts is given by 
( )
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The relaxation of the assumption that the productivity levels of the firms follow a 
distribution function F(θ) results in a model in which possible equilibria have 
punctiform characteristics predetermining the framework of later equilibria. The 
market size depicts the different outcomes, depending on the strategic alignment of 
the firms (e.g., the market size ends in an autarky scenario with Xd if the productivity 
θ  is below the minimum requirement of productivity for an international strategy). 
Similarly, the market size X results in Xex or Xi, depending on the choice of θ . 
 
In contrast to the model with heterogeneous firms, the coexistence of both the export 
and the MNE strategy disappears. The gradual characteristics of the model get lost. 
A social planner is able to make an either-or decision on the preferred strategic 
alignment of firms in the country with limited further influence.  
However, the model is hardly adequate to build reality because the existence of a 
multitude of possible integration strategies of heterogeneous firms is an omnipresent 
phenomenon. Finally, the assumption of heterogeneity in monopolistic trade models 
is unavoidable. 
 
1.8 Conclusion 
The objective of this paper is to model a two-country trade model with firm-level 
heterogeneity. Exporting is linked to an ad-valorem tariff τ , which reduces household 
demand for those varieties. To avoid the tariff, firms may select a horizontal MNE 
strategy.  
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The requirement of a social planner is to maximize the welfare of the representative 
household by endogenously determining an optimal positive level of the tariff τ .  
 
The integration strategies heterogeneous firms choose as optimal are dependent on 
exogenously given parameters. This choice is represented by cut-off productivity 
levels determined by exogenously given values for fixed costs and the tariff rate. 
Their relative size and ratio influence the choice of integration status of 
heterogeneous firms.63 
Additionally, market entry and market size are treated endogenously. Therefore, we 
are able to analyze the implications of national and international policy decisions on 
integration modi of heterogeneous firms. Not only MNEs and exporters decide on 
entering the market depending on the tariff, but also the mass of domestic firms is 
influenced by trade policy. Given a certain tariff rate, the composition of prevailing 
integration strategies is due to the constitution of competition. For example, an 
increasing tariff rate induces fewer exporters to enter the market and, depending on 
the size of fixed costs fi, may also cause them to refrain from becoming MNEs. 
Consequently, fewer firms will supply demand in this country and expected profits will 
increase. Therefore, the output of each single firm is influenced; and more domestic 
firms can enter the market competing expected profits to zero.64 
This paper is a study of the implications of our model, assuming the firms to be 
homogeneous. We show that the assumption of heterogeneity is central to analyze 
equilibria consisting of different integration strategies. In the homogeneous model, all 
firms select the same integration strategy as optimal, depending on the choice of θ .  
Additionally, firm level-heterogeneity in our model follows a uniform distribution F(θ), 
influencing our results. The specification of an alternative distribution function, 
therefore, may induce differing results. The assumption of a distribution G(θ),  
according to which the mass of firms increases with productivity so that many MNEs 
and few domestic firms exist, slows the stimulating effect on domestic firms of 
entering the market if positive tariff rates are selected. 
 
                                            
63
 See Davies and Eckel (2007). 
64
 See Davies, Egger and Egger (2009). 
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These aspects of several interdependent endogenous variables preclude an 
analytical solution of 
τ∂
∂ jU
 and suggest using numerical analysis to determine the 
welfare-maximizing tariff rates τ  and their interactions with other variables. Utilizing 
numerical analysis, we show that welfare is maximized when the tariff τ =0. This 
equilibrium is characterized by foreign goods being imported solely. MNEs do not 
exist is this scenario. The exclusive existence of the export strategy in this equilibrium 
can be explained by the wastefulness caused by the overhead fixed costs of the 
MNE strategy. Furthermore, the optimality of the tariff τ =0 is reasonable because 
exporting is not linked to further trading costs (e.g., transport costs).  
The result is mainly motivated by a variety effect induced by the trade barrier (i.e., 
increasing tariff rates decrease the mass of firms in equilibrium and, therefore, 
available varieties). This loss in utility cannot be compensated by monetary transfer 
of tariff revenues. Consumers prefer a rich supply of differentiated varieties to a 
monetary transfer they spend on homogeneous goods. The intervention into market 
outcomes, thereby relieving consumers of available varieties, does not have the 
appreciated effect. 
 
Finally, our model shows the implications of welfare-maximizing governments from a 
social planner’s perspective. Resulting tariff rates in both countries are identical. 
Additionally, the governments do not have the possibility of reacting optimally to the 
trade policy of the government in neighboring countries.  
A perspective for further research is to study best-response tariffs in the same 
setting. Furthermore, our model does not include the implication of negative tariff 
rates (i.e. subsidies), which also may be an objective of further studies. 
 
1.9 Appendix  
 
1.9.1 Demand 
We use the utility function in (1), 
µθ
α






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αµ
+= ∫
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0
j0j di)i(x11xU and the standard side 
condition to derive the demand of a representative household for goods of the ith firm: 
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j di)i(x1 , which denotes the sub-utility and market size 
specifiable as Xd,ex,i in (4), Xd,i in (5) and Xd,ex in (6). 
 
 
1.9.2 The domestic firm 
The derivation of the profit-maximizing output is shown in the following: 
d
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The derivation of the optimal price: 
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The domestic firm i applies the price pj(i), which is the standard mill price. The factor 
α
1
 expresses the markup on the price.  
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The derivation of maximum attainable: 
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1.9.4 The MNE 
The profit function of a firm that engages in an MNE strategy is similar to the profit 
function of a domestic firm. Only fixed costs in this strategy are higher fi>fex.  
The derivation of the profit-maximizing price:
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Analogously, we find profit-maximizing output by applying *ij(i)p  into xj(i) which is 
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1.9.5 Cut-off level ex/dθ  
The productivity level that at least guarantees zero profit from exporting is derived in 
the following: 
ex
)1(
1
)1(
)1(
)1(
1
ex
)1(
1
)1(
)1(
)1(
1
)1(
1
)1(
)1(
)1(
1
*
exj
ex
*
exj*
exj
*
exj
*
exj
f11
)i()1(X
))i((
0f
)i()1(X
))i((
)i(
11
)1(X
))i(()i(
0f)i(
)i(x)i(p)i(x)i(
≥





−
α
θτ+
αθ
≥−
θτ+
αθ
−
θα
τ+
αθ
=pi
≥−
θ
−=pi
α−α−
µ−
α−
α−α−
µ−
α−
α−α−
µ−
α−
 
ex
)1(
)1(
)1(
1
)1(
1
f1
)i(X)1(
))i((
≥





α
α−
θτ+
αθ
α−
µ−
α−
α−
 
 
( )
( )
ex
)1(
)1(
)1(
1
)1()1(
ex
)1(
)1(
)1(
1
)1(
f
X)1(
1)i(
f
X)1(
1))i((
≥
τ+
α−θα
≥
τ+
α−αθ
α−
µ−
α−
α−
α
α−
α
α−
µ−
α−
α−
α
 
( )
( ) αα−
αα
µ−
α
α−
α−
α
α−
µ−
α−
α−
α
α−α
τ+
=θ
α−α
τ+
≥θ
)1(
1)1()1(
ex
ex/d
)1(
)1(
)1(
)1(
1
ex)1(
1
)1(Xf
1
X)1(f)i(
 
Firms that are at least as productive as ex/dθ engage in export strategies. 
 
1.9.6 Cut-off level i/exθ  
The next threshold is characterized by a productivity level at which exporting and 
MNEs have the same profits. Firms with productivity levels above this level engage in 
an MNE activity. 
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Firms producing with productivity i/exθ  are indifferent whether to choose MNE or 
exporting strategies. A firm with productivity )i(θ  just above i/exθ  engages in an MNE 
strategy and generates positive profits from this activity. 
 
1.9.7 Cut-off level i/dθ  
The next cut-off level characterizes a situation where the export strategy does not 
exist. Firms in this scenario directly integrate their firm following MNE activities.  
The resulting cut-off level can be derived as follows: 
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Firms satisfying the following condition integrate their firm as an MNE,  export 
strategies do not exist:  
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1.9.8 Utility of the representative household at Xd,i, Xd/ex and Xd 
For the constellation that ensures the market size to be Xd,i, the following condition 
i/dθ < ex/dθ  has to hold and utility is given by:  
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Since the export strategy does not exist, a transfer cannot be provided. 
For that the market size is Xd,ex, the condition ex/dθ < maxθ  has to hold to ensure that 
the export strategy exists. Furthermore the MNE strategy does not exist if 0=τ  since 
i/exθ  is infinite ( ) 01
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 which results in utility with transfer:  
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Only the domestic strategy exists if ex/dθ > maxθ  and i/dθ > maxθ  hold. This results in 
following utility for the household: 
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1.9.9  Mathematica input and plots 
fex:=.0015 
fin:=.0019 
α :=0.75 
µ :=0.6 
θmax:=30 
f[θ_]:=1/θmax 
F[θ_]:=θ/θmax 
inr[θ_,n_]:=n F[θ] 
θ[i_,n_]:=i θmax/n 
x[θ_, X_,τ_]:=(α θ)^(1/(1-α))/((1+τ)^(1/(1-α)) X^((1-µ)/(1-α))) 
xdi[θ_, X_]:=(α θ)^(1/(1-α))/(X^((1-µ)/(1-α))) 
Plot[x[15,X, 0.1],{X,1,50},AxesLabel→ {X,x}] 
10 20 30 40 50
X0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
x
 
θde [ X_,τ_] :=fex^((1-α) / α) X^((1-µ) / α) (1+τ) ^ (1/α)/(α (1-α)^((1-α)/α)) 
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ide[n_,X_,τ_]:=inr[θde[X,τ],n] 
Plot[{ide[300,X,0.4],idi[300,X,0.4]},{X,0,150},AxesLabel→ {X,inr}] 
20 40 60 80 100 120 140
X
10
20
30
40
50
inr
 
Plot[{θde[30, τ], θei[30, τ]},{τ, 0, 2}, PlotRange→ {{0, .5}, {0, 10}}, AxesLabel→{τ,θ}]  
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
t0
2
4
6
8
10
q
 
θei [ X_,τ_]:= (fin-fex)^((1-α)/α) X^((1-µ)/α)/(α (1-α)^((1-α) /α) (1-(1/(1+τ))^(1/(1-α)))  
^((1-α) / α)) 
iei[n_,X_,τ_]:=inr[θei[X,τ],n] 
θdi[X_,τ_] :=fin^((1-α)/α) X^((1-µ)/α)/(α (1-α)^((1-α)/α)) 
idi[n_,X_,τ_]:=inr[θdi[X,τ],n] 
Plot[{θde[X,0.2],θei[X,0.2]},{X,0.01,20}] 
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Y[n_,X_,τ_]:=NIntegrate[(1/α) (xdi[ θ[i,n],X])^α,{i,0,n}]+NIntegrate[(1/α) (x[ 
θ[i,n],X,τ])^α,{i,ide[n,X,τ],iei[n,X,τ]}]+NIntegrate[(1/α) (xdi[ [i,n],X])^α,{i,iei[n,X,τ],n}] 
Yd[n_,X_,τ_]:=NIntegrate[(1/α) (xdi[ θ[i,n],X])^α,{i,0,n}] 
Yex[n_,X_,τ_]:=If[ide[n,X,τ]<Min[iei[n,X,τ],n],NIntegrate[(1/α) (x[ 
θ[i,n],X,τ])^α,{i,ide[n,X,τ],Min[iei[n,X,τ],n]}],0] 
Yin[n_,X_,τ_]:=NIntegrate[(1/α) (xdi[ θ[i,n],X])^α,{i,Min[n,iei[n,X,τ]],n}] 
Y[n_,X_,τ_]:=Yd[n,X,τ]+Yex[n,X,τ]+Yin[n,X,τ] 
Plot[{Y[50,X,0.02],X},{X,0,500}, AxesLabel→ {X,Y}] 
100 200 300 400 500
X
500
1000
1500
Y
 
 
FindRoot[Y[1000,X,.2]X,{X,6}] 
Xm[n_,τ_]:=ReplaceAll[X,FindRoot[Y[n,X,τ]-X0,{X,10}]] 
Test[n_,τ_]:={Xm[n,τ],Y[n,Xm[n,τ],τ]} 
Gdom[i_,n_,τ_]:=(xdi[θ[i,n],Xm[n,τ]])^α/(Xm[n,τ])^(1-µ)-xdi[θ[i,n],Xm[n,τ]]/θ[i,n]-
0.001 
Gd[i_,n_,τ_]:=xdi[θ[i,n],Xm[n,τ]] (1/(α θ[i,n]))-xdi[θ[i,n],Xm[n,τ]]/θ[i,n]-0.001 
Gin[i_,n_,τ_]:=xdi[θ[i,n],Xm[n,τ]] (1/(α θ[i,n]))-xdi[θ[i,n],Xm[n,τ]]/θ[i,n]-fin 
X 
θ 
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Gex[i_,n_,τ_]:=(1+τ)^(-1/(1-α)) xdi[θ[i,n],Xm[n,τ]] (1/(α θ[i,n]))- (1+τ)^(-1/(1-α)) 
xdi[θ[i,n],Xm[n,τ]]/θ[i,n]-fex 
ide[7,Xm[7,0.2],0.2] 
EGd[n_,τ_]:=NIntegrate[Gd[i,n,τ],{i,0,n}] 
EGex[n_,τ_]:=If[ide[n,Xm[n,τ],τ]<Min[iei[n,Xm[n,τ],τ],n],NIntegrate[Gex[i,n,τ],{i,ide[n
,Xm[n,τ],τ],Min[iei[n,Xm[n,τ],τ],n]}],0] 
EGin[n_,τ_]:=NIntegrate[Gin[i,n,τ],{i,Min[n,iei[n,Xm[n,τ],τ]],n}] 
EG[n_,τ_]:=EGd[n,τ]+EGex[n,τ]+EGin[n,τ] 
firms[τ_]:=(N1=1;K=0;While[EG[N1,τ]>0,N1=2 N1;K=K+1];K=K-2;N1=N1-
2^K;While[K>-9,K=K-1;If[EG[N1,τ]>0,N1=N1+2^K,N1=N1-2^K]];Return[N1]) 
N[firms [.1]] 
128585/32 
EG[23170.091796875`,.1] 
-5.98913×10-7 
N[firms [τ]] 
Equilibrium[τ_]:=(Ngg=N[firms[τ]];Xmgg=Xm[Ngg,τ];Ugg=(1/µ) (NIntegrate[(1/α) 
(xdi[θ[i,Ngg],Xmgg])^α,{i,0,Ngg}]+If[ide[Ngg,Xmgg,τ]<Min[iei[Ngg,Xmgg,τ],Ngg]+NInt
egrate[(1/α)(x[θ[i,Ngg],Xmgg,τ])^α,{i,ide[Ngg,Xmgg,τ],Min[iei[Ngg,Xmgg,τ],Ngg]}],0]
+NIntegrate[(1/α) (xdi[θ[i,Ngg],Xmgg])^α,{i,Min[Ngg,iei[Ngg,Xmgg,τ]],Ngg}])^µ; 
  Egg=NIntegrate[ xdi[θ[i,Ngg],Xmgg] 1/(α θ[i,Ngg]),{i,0,Ngg}] 
    +If[ide[Ngg,Xmgg,τ]<Min[iei[Ngg,Xmgg,τ],Ngg]+NIntegrate[x[θ[i,Ngg],Xmgg,τ] 
1/(α θ[i,Ngg]),{i,ide[Ngg,Xmgg,τ],Min[iei[Ngg,Xmgg,τ],Ngg]}],0] 
    +NIntegrate[ xdi[θ[i,Ngg],Xmgg] 1/(α 
θ[i,Ngg]),{i,Min[Ngg,iei[Ngg,Xmgg,τ]],Ngg}];Wgg=Ugg-
Egg;{Ngg,Xmgg,Ugg,Egg,Wgg})
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BEST-RESPONSE TARIFFS WITH ENDOGENOUS 
MARKET SIZE AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
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2.1 Introduction  
Empirical observations of applied tariff levels show that developed countries 
effectively apply 2.1% on world-wide imports; developing countries even 4.9%.65 An 
approach to justify the application of tariffs uses the concept of optimal tariff setting 
that builds on the argument that a tariff generates production and consumption 
distortions. However, it also generates terms-of-trade benefits, depending on the 
market power of importers.66  
This paper identifies further rationale to explain the application of ad-valorem tariffs. 
What is the optimal tariff a social planner determines that maximizes the welfare of 
countries (i.e., countries behave cooperatively)? What is the optimal best-response 
tariff if countries behave uncooperatively?  
To answer these questions, we have considered the existence of increasing 
economic integration, emphasizing recent innovations in the trade literature in which 
heterogeneity in firm productivity has been incorporated into models of monopolistic 
competition with international trade and MNEs.67 In this context, the theoretical work 
has focused on optimal integration strategies of complex, integrated firms in the 
presence of firm heterogeneity in terms of total factor productivity.68 Firm 
heterogeneity appears in various layers, such as productivity, size, and integration 
status.69 One key finding is that differences in productivity levels across firms often 
result in a variety of optimal integration strategies, which result in domestic 
production, exporting operations and MNE activities being elements of economic 
trading activities.70 Empirical work has shown support for MNE activity being among 
the most dynamic economic activities, followed by international trade in goods and             
                                            
65
 As in UNCTAD (2007a). 
66
 For a survey of seminal contributions, see Torrens (1833), Mill (1844), and Johnson (1954). Latest 
literature, as in Broda, Limão and Weinstein (2008), are empirical studies of the coherence of market 
power and tariff setting. 
67
 Initially, models of vertical or horizontal integration strategies of multinational firms were developed 
under the assumption of homogeneous productivities between all plants in a market. For a survey, see 
Markusen (1984) and Helpman (1984). 
68
 Compare with Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). 
69
 As in Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998). 
70
 As in Bernard et al. (2007). 
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services.71 The average annual growth rate of foreign affiliate sales, for instance, was 
8.4% during the period of 1996-2000 and even 16.2% in 2006.72  
 
To incorporate the outlined topics of optimal tariff setting with cooperative and 
noncooperative behavior of countries, firm heterogeneity, and the increasing 
importance of MNEs, we have set up a numerically solvable model of heterogeneous 
firms that select their optimal integration strategies from a menu of three options: 
domestic operations, exporting operations, or horizontal MNE activities.73  
Empirical analysis of integration strategies of MNEs has resulted in indirect evidence 
more in favor of horizontal MNE models more so than vertical MNE models.74 It has 
been assumed that firms in the manufacturing sector supply a variety of differentiated 
goods under monopolistic competition. 
In our model, a social planner cooperatively maximizes welfare of two symmetric 
countries by endogenously selecting an optimal tariff rate. To contrast this approach 
of welfare maximization of a benevolent planner, we have determined the best-
response tariffs countries that behave uncooperatively may select. Governments in 
each country spend the generated tariff revenue on a lump-sum transfer to the 
households in their jurisdictions. Furthermore, the integration strategies that 
heterogeneous firms select as optimal are affected by the tariff rate. Not only 
increasing fixed costs, such as market entry costs, but also increasing tariff rates 
induce exporters to leave the market or to become horizontal MNEs, depending on 
their productivity levels. Empirical work has emphasized that cuts in tariffs by the 
United States and Canada have induced a stronger export orientation in some 
Canadian affiliates of U.S. parent firms.75 Further empirical evidence has indicated 
confirmation that firm decisions to export are dependent on market entry costs and 
plant heterogeneity.76  
 
                                            
71
 In 2006, global FDI inflows grew for the third consecutive year and reached the level of $1.306 
trillion, being slightly below the record level of $1.411 trillion in 2000, as in UNCTAD (2008) and World 
Bank Institute (2007). 
72
 In the same time, the gross product of foreign affiliates increased 7.3% p.a. during 1996-2000 and 
rose by 16.2% in 2006. Exports of foreign affiliates showed an increase of 3.3% p.a. in 1996-2000 and 
rose by 12.2% in 2006. As in UNCTAD (2008).  
73
 In contrast to Davies and Eckel (2007), assuming mobile firms, and in contrast to Jørgensen and 
Schröder (2007a) and Jørgensen and Schröder (2007b), not focusing on utility maximization and 
monopolistic competition. 
74
 As supported by Markusen and Maskus (2001) and Brainard (1993a). 
75
 As in Feinberg and Keane (2001). 
76
 As in Bernard and Jensen (2004). 
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 describes the setup 
of the model and explicitly introduces the preferences of the consumers and the 
resulting demand in section 2.2.1. Section 2.2.2 presents the production process of 
heterogeneous firms and the derived optimal integration strategies of firms in the 
differentiated sector. These depend on the relative size of fixed costs for plant setup, 
market sizes, firm productivity, transport costs, and ad-valorem tariffs. Section 2.3 
describes the behavior of firms and prevailing integration strategies under alternative 
combinations of transport costs and ad-valorem tariff rates.  
After presenting welfare maximization and the objective of governments, we set up a 
numerical framework in section 2.5. In contrast to related theoretical work, we 
endogenously derive the mass of firms entering markets as well as the market size 
itself.77 The results in terms of both cooperative and noncooperative behavior in the 
maximization process are presented in section 2.6. In section 2.7 we flesh out the 
main differences of this approach relative to recent theoretical work. Finally, section 
2.8 contains the conclusion and implications of our findings referring to optimal tariff 
setting and economic outcome. 
 
2.2  The setup of the model 
2.2.1 Demand 
In this model, we use a quasi-linear approach to reflect consumers´ preferences. 
Because all consumers share the same preferences, a representative consumer is 
used to clarify utility. The utility function is represented by:     
( ) }B,A{j,diix11xU max
0
j0j ∈







αµ
+=
µθ
α
∫          (45) 
The representative household in A and B benefits from consumption of the 
homogeneous good xo, which is taken as the numéraire for convenience. Each of the 
two countries hosts a second industry that produces differentiated goods under 
monopolistic competition. )i(x  is the consumption of output of the i-th firm,  which is 
{ }max,...,0i θ∈ .  
The condition 0< α <1 being constant results in a constant elasticity of substitution 
(C.E.S.) of =σ 1/ (1-α ) >1 between any pair of differentiated goods. This expression 
reflects standard properties of love-for-variety preferences in which a richer supply of 
                                            
77
 In contrast see Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2006) or Davies, Egger and Egger (2009). 
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differentiated goods results in increased utility. µ  is a constant with 0<µ < α <1 and 
reflects the preference for the differentiated industry over the homogenous industry in 
the utility function of the representative household. At a certain level of differentiated 
products supplied in one country, an additional unit shows diminishing marginal 
utility.  
The consumption of differentiated products is represented by the 
expression








α
= ∫
θ
αdi)i(x1X
max
0
j , the subutility of the differentiated sector. Obviously, 
the utility function is linear in 0x  but nonlinear in the differentiated varieties. This 
implies that the demand for differentiated products depends on prices of 
differentiated goods but not on earnings. Consumers of different countries show the 
same love-for-variety preferences and, therefore, apply the same elasticity of 
substitution σ . 
To derive demand for variety xj(i) of a single household in country j,  we consider the 
utility function in (45) and satisfy the standard side condition 
∫
θ
⋅+⋅≥
max
0
jj00j )i(x)i(pxpm . Labor income m is spent on the homogeneous goods, 
where we set p0 = 1, and on differentiated goods. This results in the demand of a 
single household for differentiated goods of78 
)1(
1
j
)1(
)1(
0
j
)i(pdi)i(x1
1)i(x
max
α−
α−
µ−
θ
α








α
=
∫
  ,         (46)   
or  
)1(
j
)1(
0
j
)i(xdi)i(x1
1)i(p
max
α−
µ−θ
α








α
=
∫
 .          (47) 
The demand of a single household in country j for differentiated goods of the i-th firm 
depends on the price that firm i sets, on the substitutability of any pair of 
differentiated goods for another through α, on µ , and on the subutility of consumption 








α
= ∫
θ
αdi)i(x1X
max
0
j . The impact of an increasing α is that products in the 
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 See Appendix 2.9.1.  
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differentiated sector become closer substitutes for one another, which reduces the 
market power of a single firm. As µ increases, the benefit of differentiated goods 
decreases. The marginal utility of a further unit of differentiated goods becomes 
smaller. An increasing X reduces the distribution of single firms as competition 
between the firms intensifies.  
 
As can be seen from equations (46) and (47), the size of X is determined 
endogenously. For this reason, X can also be interpreted as the market size for 
differentiated goods and demands for specification. X depends on the strategic 
alignment of heterogeneous firms. Therefore, we distinguish between three different 
scenarios.  
In the first case, market size X consists of the market of domestic firms, foreign firms 
exporting their goods from abroad (henceforth referred to as exporters), and firms 
choosing horizontal MNE activity. Then, market size X for the representative 
household is given by:  
44 344 2144 344 2144 344 21
)i(MNE
j
)ex(orterexp
j
)d(domestic
0
ji,ex,d di)i(x1di)i(x1di)i(x1X
max
i/ex
i/ex
ex/d
max








α
+








α
+








α
=
αθ
θ
αθ
θ
αθ
∫∫∫                 (48) 
Alternatively, the export strategy does not exist (i.e., is not profitable); and firms 
choose either domestic supply or MNE. This scenario results in a market size of: 
44 344 2144 344 21
MNE
j
domestic
0
ji,d di)i(x1di)i(x1X
max
i/d
max








α
+








α
=
αθ
θ
αθ
∫∫ .          (49) 
Finally, MNE activity may be nonprofitable so that market size consists of demand 
from domestic and exporting producers only. The specified market size in this case 
shows: 
44 344 2144 344 21
orterexp
j
domestic
0
jex,d di)i(x1di)i(x1X
max
ex/d
max








α
+








α
=
αθ
θ
αθ
∫∫          (50) 
Figure 9 is a visualization of market size under alternative integration strategies of 
heterogeneous firms. 
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Figure 9. The market size X, depending on different integration strategies. 
  
 
2.2.2 Production 
Each of the two symmetric small countries, j={A,B}, hosts two industries.79 The 
subscript j is the identifier for the country in which the economic activity takes place. 
We focus on equilibria with diversification of production so that each of the two 
countries, j={A,B}, hosts the two industries. One industry provides a homogeneous 
good x0 that is traded under competitive conditions and is the numéraire in this 
model. Firms in the other industry produce differentiated goods under monopolistic 
competition. Thereby we implicitly assume that a firm in the differentiated sector does 
not produce in the homogeneous goods sector.  
We assume that Countries A and B are endowed with a fixed amount of 
internationally immobile labor, L. Because the homogeneous good is freely tradable, 
used as the numéraire, and uses one unit of L for one unit of output, there is 
international wage equalization at unitary wages (i.e., wj =1) as long as diversification 
of production prevails. This will be the case as long as the numéraire good is 
produced in every country and can be traded at no cost.  
 
Firms in the differentiated sector can be founded in each country and every firm in 
the differentiated sector produces a single variety under monopolistic competition. 
The differentiated goods available in a country j are provided by different sources. 
Consumers in j buy goods produced by national producers in j, imports from the other 
country, and goods from subsidiaries in j that have their origin in the other country 
                                            
79
 The countries being small imply that they cannot influence prices.  
Integration strategies 
Market size 
domestic,exporter domestic, exporter, 
multinational 
domestic, multinational 
Xd,ex Xd,ex,i Xd,i 
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(MNEs). Hence, the mass of firms in the world equals the amount of differentiated 
goods potentially available. Firms in the differentiated sector differ with respect to 
their productivity, but ex-ante all these firms are identical. If they expect positive 
earnings from the production process, they pay sunk entry costs fd upfront, which are 
measured in units of labor. As long as firms expect positive profits, they enter the 
market. It is assumed that the individual productivity levels of the firms in each 
country are independent draws from a cumulative productivity distribution function 
F( θ ). The fee fd allows the firms to independently draw their productivity from the 
distribution F(θ) with support over (0, θmax). With this procedure, firms located in the 
home country are guaranteed to produce domestically, even with very low 
productivity, to reduce the loss of fd. The time line in figure 10 shows the logical 
sequence from the moment prior to entry, when all firms are identical, to the moment 
when firms in the industry decide their integration strategies and outputs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Steps towards the choice of integration of the firm. 
 
According to their productivity θ(i), firms choose their integration strategies. In their 
domestic countries all firms start as domestic producers. If their productivity is low, 
firms will not enter the foreign market, neither through exports nor through foreign 
plant setup. If productivity is high enough, firms have the additional choice to serve 
foreign markets via exports or foreign affiliate production (the latter being referred to 
as horizontal MNE activity). The choice between exporting and setting up foreign 
plants is driven by the proximity-concentration trade-off, characterized by the fact that 
MNE activity relative to exports saves trading costs as reflected by iceberg transport 
costs t for cross-border trade of differentiated varieties.80 The idea of iceberg 
transport costs is that to deliver one unit of differentiated goods, the producer must 
ship t ≥ 1 units to the distant point of sale. On the other hand, foreign plant setup has 
fixed costs fi in terms of units of labor that are higher than fixed costs for exporters fex 
                                            
80
 See, for example, Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Brainard (1993b), or Markusen and Venables 
(2000) for a survey. 
0 A-priori, all 
firms are 
identical. 
Firm expects 
positive 
earnings and 
pays market 
entry costs fd. 
Productivity  
θ  is 
revealed.  
Domestic 
production 
and its 
output are 
decided.  
If θ sufficient, 
output decision 
for additional 
export or MNE 
activity is made. 
t 
BEST-RESPONSE TARIFFS WITH ENDOGENOUS MARKET SIZE  
 
 
63 
 
 
because production facilities must be duplicated.81 For this reason, fd<fex<fi is 
assumed.  
Beyond these fixed costs, firms pay variable costs, depending on their productivity 
levels θ (i) [i.e., x(i)/] )i(θ ]  and their integration strategies (i.e., exporters pay transport 
costs t>1). According to xj(i)/ θ (i), when comparing two firms with the same amount of 
output in one country, the firm with higher productivity θ (i) must bear lower variable 
costs.82  
 
Furthermore, governments may choose positive ad-valorem tariff rates τ  subject to 
imports (i.e., the tariff is a percentage of the value of one unit of the imported good). 
With Aτ >0, these firms (i.e., exporters from B importing to A) consider A τ  an 
additional factor influencing profits and vice versa. If tariff revenue in j is positive, it is 
passed on to households in j as a lump-sum transfer.  
 
Given the preferences in (45), the demand of households in (46), and the price 
consumption curve in (47) it is straightforward to compute maximum attainable profits 
of a firm i in j serving its domestic market:83       
d
dj
dj
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       (51) 
The derivative with respect to xj(i)d is an expression for the profit-maximizing output 
of a domestic firm i in its domestic market j, j { }B,A∈ :84  
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associated with the optimal price:85 
                                            
81
 As in Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). 
82
 As in Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2006); Melitz (2003); Schröder (2007) and Helpman; Melitz 
and Rubinstein (2007). 
83
 See Appendix 2.9.2. 
84
 See Appendix 2.9.2. 
85
 See Appendix 2.9.2. 
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 )i(
1)i(p *dj
αθ
=              (53) 
The optimal output of a firm i in its domestic market j depends on market size X.86 
According to (52), the optimal output of a single firm level is negatively correlated with 
X due to competitive conditions. Furthermore, the productivity level of a firm is 
positively correlated with its output.  
Because there is monopolistic competition, the market power of a single producer 
depends on the elasticity of substitution σ between two varieties of differentiated 
goods. Therefore, firms maximize their profits by charging the mill price 
(i.e., )i(
w1))i((p
θα
=θ , where w=1 as assumed and 1/ α  reflects the mark-up on the 
price).87 This is the standard markup pricing in which greater elasticity of substitution 
is associated with a smaller markup. Producers in a market in which differentiated 
goods are close substitutes associated with a higher α  only apply small markups on 
their prices because their market power is infinitesimally small. Accordingly, maximal 
attainable profits of a domestic firm i in j are given by:88 
d
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          (54) 
Analogously, we can now derive profits of firms with an export strategy. Profits of 
exporters from Country A are defined by:89  
dA
0ifortsexpinengage
ex
exB
exBexBexA )i(f)i(
t)i(x)i(x)1()i(p)i( pi+−
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⋅
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>
4444444 3444444 21
           (55) 
Profits of exporters from Country B are defined by: 
dB
0ifortsexpinengage
ex
exA
exAexAexB )i(f)i(
t)i(x)i(x)1()i(p)i( pi+−
θ
⋅
−τ+=pi
>
4444444 3444444 21
         (55a) 
The exporting firm has two sources of earnings: domestic sales and export activity. 
For a firm i from j, the expression in (55) and (55a) results in optimal output in the 
other country (output for exporting):90 
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 The market size X has to be specified according to Xd,ex, Xd,ex,i or Xd,i. 
87
 This follows from the derivative of the profit function with respect to the price as in Appendix B. 
88
 See Appendix 2.9.2. 
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 See Appendix 2.9.3. 
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 See Appendix 2.9.3. 
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associated with the optimal price for exports q j (i) *ex =p j (i) *ex (1+ τ ):91 
( )
)i(
t1
*)i(q exj
αθ
⋅τ+
=              (57) 
In addition to the previous analysis, one can see that the optimal output and price for 
exports depend on the tariff τ  and on transport costs t in contrast to the optimal 
output and price when supplying domestic demand. Because raising a tariff results in 
increased prices for imports q j (i) *ex , the supply of an exporting firm xj(i) *ex  decreases. 
The representative household is not willing to pay any higher price for imported 
goods to satisfy the love-for-variety preference. Hence, demand for imported goods 
decreases more than proportional to increases in the tariff τ . Accordingly, maximum 
attainable profits of an exporting firm i in j are given by:92 
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Now, it is straightforward to compute maximum attainable profits of a firm engaged in 
MNE activities. As the firm produces goods for both markets locally, transport costs 
do not occur. Instead, a firm i from Country A opens an affiliate in B and becomes a 
horizontal MNE. Profits of an MNE i headquartered in Country A are defined by:93 
dA
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         (59) 
Analogously, this can be derived for a firm i from B building up a subsidiary in A. 
 
An MNE expects at least zero profits from running both domestic and foreign 
subsidiaries. 
Profit-maximizing plant output of an MNE i headquartered in j is shown by:94 
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associated with the optimal price:95 
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Accordingly, maximum attainable profits of an MNE i in j are given by:96 
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Firms choose their integration strategies based on the knowledge of their productivity 
levels. This results in cut-off levels being determinants of minimum levels of 
productivity for a firm i to generate zero profits when ex-ante selecting strategies with 
more than domestic production. In general, more productive firms are more 
successful in all three strategies. The least productive firms only serve the domestic 
market through domestic production. Because of their low productivity, their variable 
costs are too high so that higher fixed costs to operate in an additional market cannot 
be covered.  
The first cut-off characterizes occurs when the productivity of a firm is such that 
additional profits of exporting exactly result in zero profits. This can be derived from 
(55) and applies for:97 
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            (63)                               
       
The market size X results endogenously, according to Xd,ex,i. A firm with productivity 
ex/dθ  generates zero profits from exporting. Hence, this firm is indifferent between 
only selling domestically or additionally engaging in exports. A firm with productivity 
just above this level already earns positive profits from exporting and will definitely 
engage in exporting. The critical productivity level ex/dθ  is positively correlated with τ , 
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t, fex, and market size X. Hence, the indifferent firm must be more productive to break 
even. In other words, higher productivity yields lower variable costs of production. 
Furthermore, conditional on the existence of the export strategy, productivity levels 
exist that ensure the profits of exporters exceed the profits of MNEs. 
This results in the next threshold where profits of an exporting firm equal profits of an 
MNE (i.e., iex )i()i( pi=pi ).98 This applies to the following expression:  
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Only firms with i/ex)i( θ>θ  gain positive profits from serving foreign markets through 
building subsidiaries instead of exporting their goods. i/exθ  depends on the difference 
in fixed costs (fi – fex) > 0, which can be interpreted as overhead and set up costs of 
an MNE subsidiary. The higher the overhead costs (fi – fex) for a foreign subsidiary, 
the more productive the indifferent firm must be to engage in MNE activity (i.e., the 
cut-off level i/exθ  takes a higher value). The higher the transport costs t are, the more 
likely firms are to engage in the MNE integration strategy. Higher t, therefore, results 
in a lower value of i/exθ . As the tariff τ  increases, the firm becomes more likely to 
engage in the MNE strategy, which also results in a lower value of i/exθ . Furthermore, 
if 0=τ , the threshold i/exθ  is infinite. Hence, i/exθ  is only defined for 0>τ . Intuitively, 
firms do not engage in MNE activities if the tariff is 0=τ . The MNE strategy does not 
exist under this constellation. 
Additionally, if 1)1(t )1(
1
)1( ≤τ+ α−α−
α
 the expression is infinite which can be reduced to 
( )τ+≤
α
1
1t .   If the parameter configuration of the transport costs t, the tariff τ , and α  
satisfies the condition, the MNE activity does not exist. 
 
Alternatively, certain configurations of parameters may result in a situation in which 
domestic firms directly integrate as MNEs instead of choosing the export strategy. 
The following cut-off level is the relevant productivity threshold when for example, the 
tariff τ  reaches a level at which firms do not choose the export strategy anymore 
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The associated market size X in this scenario endogenously results in Xd,i. As can be 
seen, this setup ensures that all three strategies can coexist and are determined by 
the individual productivity of the firm. 
 
2.3 The behavior of the firms 
Consumers in the home country can buy all the goods provided domestically. 
Furthermore, they can buy goods from foreign firms. Firm decisions to export to 
foreign markets or to build foreign subsidiaries are dependent on their specific 
productivity levels associated with corresponding parameter configurations (e.g., the 
tariff τ , transports costs t, variable costs, and fixed costs). Consequently, we analyze 
the behavior of firms under different parameter configurations regarding the tariff rate 
and transport costs. 
 
2.3.1 Integration strategies at t=1 and τ=0 
The influence of a tariff on the integration strategies of firms can be demonstrated by 
analyzing firm behavior at t=1 and 0=τ . In these situations, firms have no advantage 
to engaging in MNE activities. This strategy requires higher fixed costs (i.e., fi>fex) 
without having any further upside for the firms. At 0=τ  and t=1, the cut-off level i/exθ  
in (64) is infinite because 0
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Hence, no firm with sufficient productivity will engage in MNE activities but will deliver 
foreign markets via exports.  
Figure 11 shows the allocation of foreign firms for t=1 and 0=τ . 
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Figure 11. The allocation of foreign firms, τ = 0, t = 1. 
 
The productivity level that at least guarantees zero profits for exporters is given by 
(63) in which, in this special case, t=1 and 0=τ . Hence, the threshold requires a 
productivity that is able to cover the fixed costs fex. Furthermore, the productivity of 
the firm takes the market size X into account. Referring to (46), an increasing market 
size results in a decreasing demand for goods of the i-th firm. Hence, the indifferent 
firm must be more productive. In this scenario, consumers benefit from a maximum of 
available differentiated products. Thus, this situation results in a scenario in which 
foreign goods are solely imported.  
 
2.3.2 Integration strategies at t=1 and τ>0 
A tariff is an additional decision parameter when firms choose their integration 
strategies. 0>τ  decreases consumers´ demand for imports, which results in an 
increasing value of the cut-off level ex,dθ . In contrast to the scenario at 0=τ , the 
indifferent firm must be more productive to break even. The tariff forces low-
productivity firms to exit the export strategy and harms consumers by supplying the 
market with fewer varieties.  
The tariff also affects exporters with higher productivity levels. Highly productive 
exporters are now in favor of engaging in MNE activities. Although fixed costs 
associated with MNEs are higher than in the export strategy (fi>fex), the MNE activity 
bypasses the tariff. Hence, consumers do not face distorted prices that affect their 
decisions. In contrast to MNEs, firms in the export strategy face reduced demand due 
to the tariff.  
The determined cut-off levels (63) and (64) give information about the allocation of 
firms utilizing the different integration strategies. From the perspective of the home 
country, all firms located in the home country manufacture differentiated goods as 
domestic producers. Figure 12 shows the allocation of foreign firms among the 
international strategies. 
ex/dθ   maxθ  
 
domestic export 
θ  
0 
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Figure 12. The allocation of foreign firms, τ > 0 and t = 0. 
 
Firms desiring to export goods must be at least as productive as the cut-off level 
determined in (63) with t=1. The next threshold as determined in (64) gives the 
productivity level of the highest-productivity exporting firm, again with t=1. Above this 
level, firms engage in MNE activities to satisfy demand. 
 
2.3.3 Integration strategies with t>1 and τ=0 
This scenario describes a situation in which exporting, in contrast to MNE activity, is 
linked to transport costs t>1.Transport costs are modelled as iceberg costs (i.e., t>1), 
which increase variable costs of the firm. The considerations of firms according their 
integration strategies include consequences arising from the different cost structures. 
According to their integration strategies, firms face the proximity-concentration trade-
off.101 Foreign plant setup requires higher fixed costs because production facilities 
are duplicated but saves trading costs as modelled by t. 
The barrier that separates exporting firms from MNEs is reflected by the productivity 
threshold in (64) and, in this case, is given by: 
( )
α
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α−
α
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α−
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






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
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t
111
X)ff(
        (64a) 
An increase in t makes the export strategy more expensive and, hence, stimulates 
firms to engage in MNE activity, as 0
t
i/ex <
∂
θ∂
.  
Furthermore, low productivity-exporters are forced to leave the market because 
consumers´ demand decreases due to higher prices caused by an increase in 
transport costs t. The associated cut-off level, as in (63) in the situation at t>1 and 
τ =0, shows 
                                            
101
 See, for example, Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Brainard (1993b), or Markusen and Venables 
(2000) for a survey. 
ex/dθ  i/exθ  θ max 
 
domestic export MNE activity 
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.  
Additionally if t1 =
α
 holds, the expression is infinite and the export strategy 
disappears. Then, certain parameter configurations may result in a scenario in which 
ex/di/d θ≤θ holds. This results in a situation in which domestic firms directly integrate 
their firms as MNEs. 
 
2.3.4 Integration strategies at t>1 and τ >0 
At t>1 and τ >0, firms in the export strategy face two effects reducing the demand of 
the single firm and, therefore, their profits exj )i(pi . Both, the tariff τ  and the transport 
costs t increase consumers’ prices for imported differentiated goods. This decreases 
household demand for those goods, which forces producers to reduce output. In this 
scenario, both international strategies potentially can coexist.  
Comparative statics of the relevant cut-off level in (64) with respect to the tariff τ  and 
the transport costs show the direction of the effects an increase of the tariff τ  or the 
transport costs t have. The derivative of i/exθ with respect to t is given by:  
0
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       (66) 
For the expression to be finite, it must hold that αt >1. Furthermore, the expression is 
negative, which intuitively is support for the notion that MNE activity becomes more 
attractive with an increase in t.  
The effect an increase of the tariff τ  has on the productivity threshold can be 
demonstrated by finding the derivative of (64) subject to τ , which is given by: 
0
)1t()1(
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Again, it must hold that αt >1 for the derivative to be defined. As the tariff τ  
increases, MNE activity becomes more likely, which decreases the cut-off level as 
seen in (64). 
 
2.4 Welfare of the representative household and decisions of 
governments 
The objective of governments is to evaluate the effects of ad-valorem tariffs on 
household welfare. Such policies evoke reactions in the integration strategies of 
firms, influencing the utility of the household. Therefore, the implications of these 
reactions must be considered in the welfare-maximization process. Anticipating the 
behavior of firms, governments maximize welfare of their consumers by 
endogenously determining ad-valorem tariffs τ . Because this model assumes two 
small, symmetric countries, this paper analyzes the utility-maximizing process of only 
one country. The objective of a government is to maximize the expression 
τ∂
∂U to find 
the level of the tariff rate τ  maximizing welfare. In the following, the relevant effects 
are described for the general case that the domestic, the export, and the MNE 
strategies exist. This implies the relevant limits of integration to be ex/dθ as  the lower 
and i/exθ  as the upper limits of integration. Of course, the market size X may 
endogenously have different outcomes and must be specified according (48), (49), or 
(50). Furthermore, to guarantee a continuous solution, firms are ranked according to 
their individual productivity, starting with low-productivity firms. Hence, we integrate 
over i, thereby considering F( θ )=i/n and ( ) 





=θ −
n
iFi 1 , respectively ( ) θ=θ
n
ii  or 
( )
θ
θ
=
ini . 
The utility of households is positively dependent on consumption of the numéraire 
and on all the other goods. This monetary effect is given by the difference of labor 
income m and expenses for differentiated goods. Without transfer, utility from xo is 
shown by: 
( ) ( ) ( )∫∫∫
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
++−
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i/ex
ex/d
max
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0
*
dj
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In contrast to the scenario at 0=τ , the government in j generates revenues that are 
transferred to consumers in j. This monetary effect enables consumers in j to buy 
more of the numéraire good x0, having a positive effect on utility. Considering the 
utility function in (45) and the profit-maximizing output of exporters in (56), this effect 
is given by: 
∫
θ
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1
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1
)1(
1
            (69) 
The governments in A and B generate tariff revenues for their consumers on all 
imports to their home countries. The effect applies to expression (68), considering the 
cut-off levels (63) and (64). All imported goods in the area defined by the cut-off 
levels are subject to the trade barrier.  
The next utility generating effect stems from consumption of domestic goods, which 
is shown by: 
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Furthermore, the utility of the consumers in A and B is constituted by consumption of 
imported goods. This is depicted by: 
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           (71) 
By maximizing the utility, the governments in A and B consider the ambiguous effect 
of the tariff τ . On the one hand, an increase in the tariff τ  stimulates highly productive 
exporters to engage in MNE activity. This makes the affected varieties cheaper 
because the goods of MNEs are not subject to the trade barrier. On the other hand, 
low-productivity exporters are forced to leave the market because their productivity 
θ (i) is not sufficient to break even. The products of these suppliers are no longer 
available for consumers, which has a negative influence on the utility of households. 
 
The next utility generating element is represented by the consumption of goods of 
MNEs. In formal accounts, this effect can be described by the following expression: 
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The household demand for goods of MNEs is not directly affected by the tariff τ . 
However, the tariff rate τ  influences consumers’ utility because the lower limit of 
integration decreases with an increase in τ . Hence, the area described by the integral 
increases, which increases utility. 
 
All the effects that have influence on the utility of the representative household can 
be summarized by the following expression:102 
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or                                                                                                                             (74) 
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To maximize the expression in (74), we must find the derivative subject to the tariff τ . 
In this expression we also consider that ( ) θ=θ
n
ii  and that the market size has 
different outcomes, depending on the integration strategies heterogeneous firms 
                                            
102
 For this constellation to exist, it must hold that ex/dθ < i/exθ and 0≠τ , which ensures that i/exθ is 
finite. Furthermore, the utility of the household under alternative parameter configurations resulting in 
Xd/ex, Xd/i ,and Xd is shown in Appendix 2.9.8. 
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choose. This endogeneity of the market size X results in a situation in which every 
parameter configuration results in a different level of X. The mass of firms n in 
equilibrium as well is endogenous and varies with the associated dependent 
variables. 
Because profits are competed to zero, expected profits are depicted by:103 
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Both variables, the market size X and the mass of firms n in equilibrium, are 
interdependent and induce further interdependences to other equilibrium-determining 
expressions (i.e. the cut-off levels and the household demand).  
Even without the complexity induced by the linkages of the different variables, the 
maximization of the expression above, 
τ∂
∂ jU
, results in a problem with dimensionality 
higher than fourth degree.104 These aspects preclude an analytical solution of 
τ∂
∂ jU
 
and suggest using numerical analysis to determine the welfare-maximizing tariff rate 
jτ  and its interactions with other variables. 
 
2.5 The setup of the numerical framework 
To derive a solution to this problem and to find a welfare maximizing expression for 
the tariff rate jτ  we use Mathematica 6.0. This program is utilized to set up the 
numerical framework that represents the theory of the model as derived in previous 
sections.105 
 
2.5.1 Definitions 
The coding of the numerical framework begins with defining variables and making 
assumptions. Analogously to the assumptions of the model, the fixed costs, maxθ , as 
                                            
103
 Expected profits result endogenously, according to Xd/ex/I, Xd/ex, Xd/I, or Xd. Furthermore, all firms in 
the market together generate zero profits. Low-productivity firms produce to minimize the loss of fd. 
104
 This is proved by the theory of E. Galois. For a survey, see Taton (1983) and Stroth (1998). 
105
 See Appendix 2.9.9 for the full input sheet. 
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well as α  and µ , are set to constant numerical values, considering fd<fex<fi and 
0<µ < α <1. 
 
After paying market-entry costs of fd, firms draw their individual productivity levels θ. 
We apply a uniform distribution of the firms over θ, specified as F[θ_]. The 
distribution function is defined piecewise to ensure that F[θ_] takes the value 0 if 
the distribution is not reached and takes the value 1 in the boundaries of minθ and 
maxθ . To guarantee continuous results, firms are ranked according to their individual 
productivity, starting with low-productivity firms. This is reflected by the expression 
θ[i_,n_]. The productivity of a single firm θ[i_,n_] depends on the rank i of the 
i-th firm, given a mass of firms in the economy n.  
For further analysis, a function is computed to provide the rank of indifferent firms 
between two strategies. This expression is given by inr[θ_,n_]and reports the  
rank of the firms, given the productivity θ  and the mass of firms n founded in the 
country.  
The demand of the representative household as in (46), results in optimal output for 
the firms, as derived previously. Therefore, the computation of the profit-maximizing 
output is represented by x[θ_,X_,τ_,t_]. The optimal output of a firm i depends 
on its productivity θ , the market size X, the tariff τ , and the transport costs t. As the 
tariff τ  is only relevant for the export strategy, we must consider τ =0 for the 
domestic and the MNE strategies. 
The choice of integration strategy is driven by cut-off productivity thresholds. The first 
threshold separates domestic producers from exporters from j and is computed as 
θde[X_,τ_,t_], considering X and τ  in the country in which the differentiated 
goods are sold. The associated firm number is reported by ide[n_,X_,τ_,t_]. 
The expression calculates the rank of the indifferent firm in terms of productivity, 
depending on the endogenous mass of firms n in j, the endogenous market size in 
the other country, the tariff rate τ , and the transport costs t. For example, by 
entering ide[25000,5000,0.03,1.04], the system calculates the rank of the 
indifferent firm ide with cut-off productivity ex/dθ  to be the 20515.2nd firm, given a 
mass of 25000 firms in this country, a market size of 5000, a tariff of 3%, and 
transport costs of 1.04. Hence, it is the 20515.3rd firm out of 25000 that exports for 
sure.  
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Analogously, we compute the threshold productivity i/exθ  as θei[X_,τ_,t_] with 
the associated rank of the firm producing with cut-off productivity i/exθ  as 
iei[n_,X_,τ_,t_]. This expression considers the mass of firms in the country j 
and X, τ , and t where the economic activity takes place. The same notion is used to 
code the cut-off level i/dθ  as θdi[X_,τ_,t_]linked to idi[n_,X_,τ_,t_]. 
 
2.5.2 Consistency of market size X 
 
The market size X depends on the mass of firms n, the tariff τ , the household 
demand x(i) and is endogenously given by 








α
= ∫
θ
α
max
0
j )i(x1X , with its adequate 
specification dependent on the strategies represented in the economy. The inclusion 
of the endogenously defined market size X from a demand perspective, as in section 
2.2.1, in the numerical model does not result in consistency, which is needed to 
derive results. The proof of inconsistency starts with computing the market size of 
country j from a supply perspective for firms active in the different strategies in j, 
j }B,A{∈  (i.e., Yd [supply of domestic firms from A and vice versa from B], Yex 
[supply of exporting firms from B and vice versa from A] and Yi [supply of MNEs with 
origin in B and vice versa with origin in A]). The market size for domestic producers in 
A, referring to the representative household, shows Yd[nA_,X_,τ_,t_]. Yd 
depends on the mass of firms in the domestic market nA, the market size X in A, the 
tariff τ , and the transport costs t. It is characterized by the integral over the output 
of all domestic firms i. 
 
Analogously, we compute the market size of firms that export from Country B to 
Country A. From the perspective of firms producing in B and exporting to A, the 
export market, referring to the representative household in A, is given by 
Yex[nB_,X_,τ_,t_]. The size of the export market of firms from Country B in 
Country A depends on the mass of firms located in Country B, as given by nB, on 
the market size X in Country A, the tariff τ , and the transport costs t. The definition 
of Yex in the numerical analysis also considers the scenario that possibly no 
exporters exist.  
The market size for MNEs in terms of the representative household is defined by 
Yin[nB_,X_,τ_,t_]. The market for MNEs in Country A depends on the mass of 
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firms being located in Country B, nB, the market size X in A, the tariff τ  in A, and 
the transport costs t. Also, the coding includes conditions to guarantee that the 
system integrates correctly regarding prevailing integration strategies. The entire 
market size from a supply perspective, referring to the representative household in A, 
is determined as the sum of all three market segments and is represented by: 
Y[nA_,nB_,X_,τ_,t_]:=Yd[nA,X,τ,t]+Yex[nB,X,τ,t]+Yin[nB,X,τ,t] 
 
Inconsistency in market size will result in differing outcomes regarding market size 
from both supply (Y) and demand (X) perspectives. If the configuration is consistent, 
we may expect a result, for example, of Y=5000 if X=5000. However, in using the 
code defined previously and inserting X=5000, Y=5000 does not necessarily occur. 
For example, Y[20000,20000,5000,1,0.03,1.03] results in a market size Y= 4820.77. 
The inconsistency in market size is clarified in figure 13. 
  
Figure 13. The inconsistency of the market size. 
 
The inconsistency of the market size in figure 13 is apparent. The curve of the market 
size X has a different progression than the curve Y. The intersection of both curves 
gives the true market size for the given values.  
To achieve the essential consistency of market size, the computation uses a quasi-
Newton method, which is computed as Xm[nA_,nB_,τ_,t_].106 The method is 
named quasi-Newton because we use an approximation for the slope, using the 
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 As in Spelucci (1993) and Knorrenschild (2008). 
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gradient of the secant of the function Xm for which we search. Figure 14 is a 
visualization of this method:107 
 
Figure 14. Visualization of the Quasi-Newton method.   
 
The program is coded to find the null, starting with calculating the secant at a value of 
1000 (in figure 14, this corresponds to x0) and assuming a width of 20 (in figure 14, 
this corresponds to the second value x1). The slope of the secant results in a null, 
which is the next starting value (in figure 14, this corresponds to x2). The slope of the 
secant associated with this new starting value gives a new null (in figure 14, this 
corresponds to x3). This iteration is repeated until the exact null is found. Meanwhile, 
the width in which boundaries the slope of the secants is calculated is reduced 
stepwise.  
 
2.5.3 The mass of firms n in equilibrium 
Firm decisions to enter the market are based on the expectation of future profits. 
Heterogeneous firms enter production as long as their future earnings expectations 
are positive. Hence, the mass of firms in the market is determined by expected profits 
being equal to 0. After computing the profit function of single firms i with their 
particular strategies, expected profits are determined by the profits of all firms in the 
specific market.  
                                            
107
 As in Knorrenschild (2008). 
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For firms selecting a domestic strategy in Country A, we apply 
Gd[i_,nA_,nB_,τ_,t_]. We must consider that the tariff τ must be set to 0 
because the trade barrier is not relevant in the domestic market. The same applies 
for transport costs t, which must be set to 1. To compute the profit of a firm from A 
with rank i, we must consider the mass of firms in A and B because of competitive 
conditions. 
The profit of a firm in the export strategy is computed as 
Gex[i_,nA_,nB_,τB_,t_]. Profits of exporting firms i from Country A to Country 
B depend on the mass of firms in Countries A and B, nA and nB, the tariff being 
applied in Country B (i.e., Bτ ), and transport costs t. 
The profit function of MNEs originally located in Country A with subsidiaries in B is 
coded as Gin[i_,nA_,nB_,τB_,t_]. Profits of a MNEs, i, from Country A (being 
MNEs) in Country B are also dependent on the mass of firms in A and B,  nA and 
nB, the tariff rate τB, and the transport costs t.  
Expected profits (EG) in an economy result from the integration of profits over all 
firms in the different strategies. For Country A, they are given by: 
EG[nA_,nB_,τA_,τB_,t_]:=EGd[nA,nB,τA,t]+EGex[nA,nB,τB,t]+EGin[
nA,nB,τB,t].  
The computation of expected profits includes conditions to ensure that profits are 
only integrated if the associated strategy exists. 
 
Finally, coding the mass of firms in equilibrium results from firms entering the market 
competing the expected profits to zero. For firms in A, this is given by: 
Firms[nB_,τA_,τB_,t_]. The process to find the null is coded with the instruction 
to test several values in defined steps. After determining the first negative value of 
expected profits, the program returns to approach the null exactly, while the width of 
the steps is permanently reduced. For example, the instruction to calculate the mass 
of firms in equilibrium in Country A given nB=20000, τA=3%, τB=3%, and transport 
costs t=1.03 is depicted by Firms[20000,0.03,0.03,1.03]. The example 
results in ≈25577 firms in Country A given 20000 firms in Country B, with associated 
expected profits of -4.06419×10-6. This is support for the previously described 
method. 
 
 
2.5.4 The maximization of welfare 
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Considering the utility function in (45), households in the two symmetric countries 
benefit from consumption of homogeneous goods x0 and differentiated goods. To 
implement the utility maximization process, we must first consider the stand-alone 
contribution of x0. Without the existence of a differentiated sector, the representative 
household only generates utility by consuming x0. Hence, the benefit of one unit of 
differentiated goods is constituted by its net contribution (i.e., additional utility versus 
additional costs). The computation of the equilibrium utilizes this notion to implement 
the utility-maximizing process. The equilibrium of this model is labelled 
Equilibrium[τA_,τB_,t_] and is dependent on the given value of the tariff τ 
in Countries A and B and the transport costs t. The equilibrium is computed so that 
the system delivers data that describe the equilibrium. Given the exogenous 
variables, the system endogenously determines the equilibrium mass of firms in A 
and B. The tariff rates being unequal (i.e., BA τ≠τ ) results in the mass of firms 
differing in both countries nA≠nB. The programming of the mass of firms in equilibrium 
is visualized in figure 15. 
 
Figure 15. The computation of the mass of firms, τA ≠τB.  
 
In the first step, the computation to find the correct value for the mass of firms begins 
with nB=1 and searches for the corresponding mass of firms in Country A 
conditioned on nB=1 [i.e., nA(nB)]. In the figure, this is denoted as a. Given nA(1) 
firms in Country A, the iteration proceeds by calculating the associated mass of firms 
nA 
nB 
 
1 a 
b 
C 
nA* 
nB* 
 
a* 
b* 
1 
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in Country B, denoted as a*. Analogously, we assume nA=1 and search for the 
associated value for the mass of firms in B, denoted as b [i.e., nB(nA)]. Given nB(1) 
firms in B, the system calculates the corresponding mass of firms in A, denoted as b*. 
The intersection of the two resulting graphs gives the new starting value, denoted as 
C. This loop is repeated until the difference between the new starting value minus the 
old starting value ≤ 10 (i.e., nB3-nB0≤10) in the program or C in the figure. The 
computation proceeds by using calculations of expected profits for Country A and B. 
The system calculates expected profits and all further key figures for the different 
possible integration strategies and sums them up afterwards. Hence, EGewA 
denotes expected profits in A; EGewB denotes expected profits in B. 
The next relevant variable is the consistent market size for Country A, which is 
calculated using Xm[nA_,nB_,τ_,t_] as defined in section 2.5.2, and 
analogously for B. The results show the contribution of the different strategies to total 
market size and separately for Countries A and B. For example, the share of output 
of all domestic firms in its market in A is computed as YDA=Yd[NA,XMA,τA,t], 
where capital letters denote equilibria values. The expression is dependent on the 
mass of firms in Country A, NA; on the overall market size in A, XMA; and on the 
transport costs t.108 
The sum of expenses for differentiated goods in the representative household in A is 
represented by MA=MYDA+MYEXA+MYINA. MYDA=MYd[NA,XMA,τA,t] denotes 
expenses of the representative household in A for goods from domestic producers,   
MYEXA=MYex[NB,XMA, τA,t] are expenses for imports from Country B to country 
A consumed by households in Country A, and MYINA=MYin[NB,XMA,τA,t] is the 
calculation for expenses for MNE goods from B of the representative household in 
Country A. The analogous notion is used to compute expenses for households in 
Country B, (MB).  
Equilibria and, therefore, welfare are constituted by the utility of consumption of 
differentiated goods. Again, to determine utility, we distinguish between Countries A 
and B and between the different strategies. For Country A, we compute the utility of 
consumption of differentiated goods from domestic firms, from imports from Country 
B, and from MNEs in A originally located in B. Then, the overall utility of the 
                                            
108
 Analogously, we compute YEXA, YINA for the market size of the export and the MNE strategy in 
Country A. The analogue computation for Country B is given as YDB, YEXB, and YINB.  
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representative household from differentiated good consumption in A is given, 
dependent on the sum of the three subfunctions: 
UA=1/µ (YCDA+YCINA+YCEXA)^µ, referring to (45) and respectively for Country B.  
Finally, welfare in A is given as WA=UA-MA for Country A and WB=UB-MB for 
Country B.  
 
2.6 The results of numerical analysis 
Using the knowledge of the behavior of firms concerning their integration strategies, 
governments maximize welfare (measured per capita) of the representative 
households in their jurisdictions by optimally choosing a tariff τ . Therefore, we 
examine equilibria of the model resulting from a variation of the tariff τ . All things 
being equal, this results in equilibria for each of the two countries, A and B.  
To analyze the numerical output, we focus on the mass of firms in equilibrium 
labelled as N in the following tables, thereby indicating the mass of differentiated 
goods in the country. Furthermore, we focus on the consistent market size Xm and its 
contribution by the output of firms selecting different integration strategies.  
 
Table 3 is a summary of equilibria of the model using different levels of the tariff τ  
assuming that the governments in A and B behave cooperatively. 
Tariff N Xm Xd Xex Xi U E W=U-E international strategies
0 23662 5130 3172 1958 0 280.5 126.22 154.27 exporter
0.01 23601 5081 3200 1881 0 278.89 125.04 153.85 exporter
0.02 23567 5036 3230 1806 0 277.39 123.95 153.44 exporter
0.03 23275 4998 3219 1132 647 276.14 123.45 152.70 exporter, multinational
0.04 23056 4980 3203 485 1292 275.54 123.53 152.01 exporter, multinational
0.05 23025 4974 3203 90.7 1680 275.33 123.79 151.54 exporter, multinational
0.06 23040 4973 3206 0 1768 275.32 123.89 151.43 multinational
0.07 23040 4973 3206 0 1768 275.32 123.89 151.43 multinational
0.08 23040 4973 3206 0 1768 275.32 123.89 151.43 multinational
0.09 23040 4973 3206 0 1768 275.32 123.89 151.43 multinational
0.1 23040 4973 3206 0 1768 275.32 123.89 151.43 multinational
0.11 23040 4973 3206 0 1768 275.32 123.89 151.43 multinational
 
Table 3. Symmetric results, BA τ=τ , nA=nB, t=1.01. 
 
Here, the welfare maximum is reached if both Countries A and B choose 
BA τ=τ=τ =0. Welfare of the representative household in both countries is 
W=WA=WB=154.27. Furthermore, the equilibrium at τ =0 is characterized by a mass 
of firms of N=NA=NB=23662 and a market size of Xm=XmA=XmB=5130. In line with 
theoretical findings, foreign differentiated goods are imported and the MNE strategy 
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does not exist. Increasing tariff rates τ  results in a decrease of the mass of firms N 
in equilibrium at the expense of exporters, accompanied by stimulation of MNEs and 
a decrease in welfare.  
At τ =0.03, highly productive exporters change their integration status and found 
MNEs. In the range τ =0.03 to τ =0.05 both international strategies coexist. Where 
exporters are increasingly squeezed out of the market in this range, founding MNEs 
becomes more attractive. At the tariff of τ =0.06, protectionism has reached a level 
where the export strategy does not exist anymore and foreign differentiated goods 
are provided by MNEs. Welfare of the representative household is at W=151.43 in 
both Countries A and B. Because exporters have already disappeared at τ =0.06, an 
increase in the tariff rate τ  is ineffective. Hence, welfare remains at W= 151.43, 
independent of increasing tariff levels τ . 
 
Because policy makers of Country A attempt to maximize the welfare of households 
in their country, they do not consider welfare in Country B and vice versa (i.e., they 
behave noncooperatively). Given any certain tariff level Bτ , there is incentive to 
determine the welfare-maximizing best-response tariff Aτ and vice versa.  
We implement this approach in the numerical model to find equilibrium because the 
mass of firms in A (i.e., NA) settles at a level that guarantees expected profits in both 
countries being competed to zero. The same iteration is repeated for the second 
country. Using the knowledge of the existing masses of firms in both countries given 
the tariff rates Aτ  and Bτ , we determine equilibrium-describing variables and study 
welfare. Given the condition of consistency regarding NA and NB, with the outcome 
of numerical analysis in terms of welfare in A and B, we derive Nash equilibria 
concerning the tariff rates τ A and τ B.109 This can be done for any combination of 
full-percentage tariff rates. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
109
 Furthermore, tests of stability of this model confirm this notion of equilibrium. A convergence of 
equilibria still appears if firms in A and B alternately enter and exit the market. For a survey, see Nash 
(1951). 
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2.6.1 Best-response tariffs 
Given a scenario where Country B chooses 0B =τ , the best-response tariff of 
Country A is Aτ =5%.110 In this situation, welfare in Country A is WA=158.68 at the 
expense of welfare in Country B (i.e., WB=148.15).111 The equilibrium is 
characterized by NA= 39099 varieties available in Country A versus NB=6998 
varieties of differentiated goods in Country B. The domestic market in Country A is at 
XmA=5375, associated with a market share of 92% of domestic producers. The tariff 
Aτ =5% protects the market from imports while stimulating the foundation of MNEs 
and market entry of domestic producers. The market share of MNEs in A is 7.23% 
compared with a market share of 0.0005% of exporters. Furthermore, households 
benefit because differentiated goods of MNEs are cheaper than imports subject to 
the tariff.  
 
Given the preceding scenario, we find the best-response tariff to Aτ =5% at 
%3B =τ .112 Hence, the constellation of Bτ =0 and Aτ =5% is not a stable equilibrium. 
If Country B deviates from choosing Bτ =0 and instead determines Bτ =3%, the 
welfare of the representative household increases to WB=151.81. Welfare of the 
neighboring Country, A, is at WA=152.56. The equilibrium is characterized by a 
market size in Country A XmA=4946 in contrast to the XmB=5030 associated with a 
mass of firms in Country A NA=21136, compared with NB=25194. Hence, consumers 
in Country B benefit from a richer supply of differentiated goods compared with 
households in Country A.  
 
To determine the unique, stable equilibrium of this model, we find the best-response 
tariff to %3B =τ  at Aτ =4%.113 In this equilibrium, the representative household of 
Country A has a welfare of WA=152.775, compared with welfare in Country B 
WB=152.04. The higher level of protectionism in Country A stimulates not only the 
foundation of MNEs but also gives incentives to domestic firms in Country A to enter 
the market. The market share of exporters in Country A is 9.17% in contrast to 
                                            
110
 Because the countries are symmetric, the response can also be interpreted as the response of 
Country B to a given tariff rate in Country A. 
111
 See Appendix 2.9.10 for a table summarizing all responses to Bτ =0%. 
112
 See Appendix 2.9.11 for a table summarizing all responses to Bτ =5%. 
113
 See Appendix 2.9.12 for a table summarizing all responses to Bτ =3%. 
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23.99% in Country B. Because imports are more expensive than the same goods 
provided by MNEs, consumers in Country A benefit from comparably low imports, 
which explains WA>WB. 
Finally, given Aτ =4%, Country B has incentive to respond optimally with Bτ =3% 
when Country A analogously has a welfare of WA=152.75%. The stability of the 
equilibrium Aτ =3% and Bτ =4%, respectively Aτ =4% and Bτ =3%, is guaranteed 
because tariff rates of τ =3% and Aτ =4%, respectively, are best responses for one 
another.114 Figure 16 is a summary of the results of best-response tariffs, showing 
the unique, stable equilibrium at Aτ =3% and Bτ =4% and vice versa. 
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Figure 16. Mutual best-response tariffs. 
 
Table 4 is a summary of the notion of best response tariffs. 
Given τ Best-response τ W(given tariff) W (best-response tariff)
0% 5% 148.15 158.68
1% 4% 150.13 156.22
2% 4% 151.47 154.20
3% 4% 152.04 152.75
4% 3% 152.75 152.04
5% 3% 152.56 151.81
6% 3% 152.46 151.80
7% 3% 152.46 151.80
8% 3% 152.46 151.80
9% 3% 152.46 151.80
10% 3% 152.46 151.80
 
                                            
114
 See Appendix 2.9.13 for a table summarizing all responses given Bτ =4%. 
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Table 4. Best-response tariffs.
 
 
Thus, it can be summarized that although the constellation at Aτ = Bτ =0 is welfare 
superior for both countries, the instability of this equilibrium is characterized by 
mutual incentives to deviate until the stable equilibrium at Aτ =3% and Bτ =4% is 
reached. From both individual and world welfare perspectives, a noncooperative tariff 
setting results in an outcome characterized by inefficiently high tariff rates.  
Governments are completely informed when setting tariff rates. For this reason, they 
both know that the other has an incentive to deviate from a zero tariff setting. 
Considering this, welfare in its own jurisdiction is maximized considering the tariff rate 
the other country will select. The zero tariff rate scenario can only be obtained under 
reliable cooperation (i.e., with a social planner) because each single government has 
incentive to deviate.  
 
2.7 Outline  
These derived results of inefficient tariff rates selected by governments in a 
noncooperative tariff setting are supported by findings in other trade literature and 
empirical studies.115 Our analysis uses an alternative approach dependent on 
exogenously given parameters, such as transport costs and fixed costs, and the 
resulting endogeneity of integration strategies, endogenous market entry, and 
heterogeneity of firms. 
 
2.7.1 The role of exogenously given parameters 
Our model derives cut-off levels between the different integration strategies 
(domestic producers, exporters and horizontal MNEs), dependent on exogenously 
given parameters and their constellation to each other. At the first cut-off level ex/dθ  in 
(63), firm productivity is such that additional profits of exporting exactly result in zero 
profits. The productivity in (63) increases with increasing fixed costs, market size, 
tariff rate, and transport costs. 
At the next threshold i/exθ  in (64), the productivity level is such that profits of an 
exporting firm equal the profits of an MNE. 
                                            
115
 As in Broda et al. (2008). 
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The critical productivity level in (64) increases with increasing overhead costs (fi – 
fex), an increasing market size X, decreasing transport costs t, and tariff rate τ . An 
increasing i/exθ  is associated with a smaller mass of firms selecting MNE strategies.  
The existence of prevailing integration strategies depends on the constellation of 
these exogenously given parameters. For example, the MNE strategy does not exist 
if 0=τ  because the expression in (64) is infinite. Additionally, the threshold is infinite 
if exogenously given parameters satisfy the condition ( )τ+≤
α
1
1t . Alternatively, if 
exogenously given parameters satisfy the condition α
α−






≥τ+ t
f
f)1(
)1(
ex
i
, it implies that 
i/dθ < ex/dθ  and heterogeneous firms directly integrate as horizontal MNEs. Therefore, 
based on the cut-off levels, the mass of firms selecting integration strategies as well 
as which strategies are optimal to select at all, depends on exogenously given 
parameters. These dependencies in a setting with heterogeneous firms distinguish 
this model from the latest literature.116 
 
2.7.2 The role of exogenous market entry and market size 
In this model the mass of firms in equilibrium results endogenously because 
expected profits are competed to zero until the last firm entering the market 
generates zero profits. With the inclusion of this endogeneity, we can analyze the 
implications of national and international policy decisions on integration modi of 
heterogeneous firms. Furthermore, both the decisions of MNEs and exporting firms to 
enter the market and the mass of domestic firms are dependent on the tariff. Given a 
specific tariff rate, the exact composition of prevailing integration strategies in this 
country is due to the constitution of competition. For example, if a tariff rate 
increases, fewer exporters enter the market; depending on the size of transport 
costs, they also may refrain from becoming exporters. Then, fewer firms will supply 
demand in this country, and expected profits will increase. Therefore, the output of 
each single firm is influenced. Also, more domestic firms and MNEs may enter the 
market, competing expected profits to zero. Hence, equilibria with different tariff rates 
are determined by other compositions of integration strategies and other masses of 
firms producing individual optimal output. This endogenous market size and 
                                            
116
 As in Davies and Eckel (2007). 
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especially further entry of domestic firms in a setting with heterogeneous firms 
distinguishes this model from the latest literature.117  
 
2.7.3 The role of heterogeneity 
In our model, stable equilibria are obtained with a 3%-4% tariff setting scenario. This 
result is driven by the incentive of each government to deviate unilaterally from free 
trade to induce positive impacts on welfare in its jurisdiction. This influence on 
welfare is characterized by the following implications: The mass of firms in its country 
increases. Increased welfare, therefore, results in more available varieties of 
differentiated goods for consumers there. More goods from domestic firms and MNEs 
are supplied; but in contrast, fewer products from exporters are available for them 
induced by the tariff. For the unilaterally deviating country, the overall impact in this 
scenario is that the tariff induces positive welfare implications due to love-for-variety 
preferences and positive tariff revenue, even though fewer varieties of exporters are 
supplied. 
The extent of more domestic firms and MNEs entering the market in this analysis 
also depends on the distribution of firms over productivity levels. In this analysis, a 
uniform distribution F(θ) is assumed. The specification of an alternative distribution 
function, therefore, may induce differing results. The assumption of a distribution G(θ)  
in which the mass of firms increases with productivity so that many MNEs and few 
domestic firms exist slows the stimulating effect on domestic firms to enter the market 
if positive tariff rates are selected. 
Hence, an increase in the tariff rate of a single government has the following 
implications: As an increase in the tariff rate induces some exporters not to enter the 
market and expected profits are competed to zero, alternatively, integrated firms can 
enter the market and single firm adjust their outputs. Depending on the distribution 
function, the composition of the mass of firms selecting different integration strategies 
then differs. For this reason, if G(θ) instead of F(θ) is applied, fewer domestic firms 
can enter the market and single optimal output adjusts according to endogenous 
market entry conditions. Obviously, the extent of the resulting implications depends 
on exact parameter configurations. However, the impact of F(θ) with more firms with 
lower single output always is positive for consumers due to love-for-variety 
preferences. If, instead of F(θ), G(θ) is applied, this impact on welfare concerning 
                                            
117
 As in Davies, Egger and Egger (2009). 
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more available varieties is dampened. Instead, outputs of single firm output will be 
increasingly influenced.   
Another positive impact on utility of the representative household is achieved by 
providing a lump-sum transfer. Because an additional lump-sum transfer is used only 
to finance the consumption of 0x  and the homogeneous goods are appreciated less 
than the differentiated goods, according to (45), the impact of transfer on welfare is 
not extensive.  
The third impact of a tariff on welfare concerns some highly productive exporters that 
do not enter the market. Instead, these firms integrate as MNEs, providing cheaper 
goods. This has positive implications for the representative household because 
consumers benefit from relatively cheap varieties supplied by MNEs.  
 
In an analysis with the herein described distribution function G(θ), love-for-variety 
preferences will be less satisfied than in the analysis with F(θ). Previously, in the 
analysis with F(θ), the positive impact on welfare by unilaterally deviating from the 
cooperative free trade scenario is mainly driven by higher satisfaction of these 
preferences. With this alternative distribution of firms G(θ), fewer domestic firms will 
enter the market; and far more cheap varieties supplied by MNEs will be available for 
consumers in the jurisdiction of this government.  
Hence, in contrast to F(θ), this distribution function G(θ) more likely results in a 
negative impact due to the tariff (i.e., the negative impact of fewer varieties provided 
by exporters can be more influential than the positive implication given by tariff 
revenue and stimulated market entry satisfying love-for-variety preferences). 
Obviously, the result depends on exact parameter configurations; but focusing on 
configurations ensuring this described impact of G(θ) free trade will result in a stable 
equilibrium. In the previous analysis, free trade is optimal from a world welfare 
perspective. Unfortunately, it is unstable in a noncooperative tariff setting. Hence, the 
results in this analysis are mainly constituted by the exact specification of the 
distribution of firms over productivity and, therefore, are due to heterogeneity.  
  
2.8 Conclusion 
The requirement of this paper is to provide rationale for the existence of ad-valorem 
tariffs in a model of heterogeneous firms. We determine optimal tariff rates set by 
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benevolent planners (i.e., when countries behave cooperatively and contrast this to 
optimal best-response tariff rates if countries behave noncooperatively).  
 
To derive welfare maximizing ad-valorem tariff rates set by benevolent planners, we 
develop a model with heterogeneous firms. When determining optimal tariff rates, 
governments take their impact on optimal integration strategies for firms, as well as 
on market entry and the mass of firms, into account. The integration strategies 
heterogeneous firms choose as optimal depend on their individual productivity levels. 
Given their individual productivity levels, firms maximize profits considering relative 
sizes of fixed costs, size of transport costs, market sizes, per-unit variable costs, and 
the tariff level. Therefore, each firm individually either selects domestic production, an 
exporting strategy, or MNE activities as optimal, where the composition of prevailing 
strategies is determined endogenously, depending on the ad-valorem tariff rates 
chosen by the governments. These described behavioral modifications of integration 
strategies of heterogeneous firms responding to economic policy interventions are 
included in the government considerations. Due to the incorporation of several 
endogenous variables, especially market entry and market sizes, this utilitarian 
maximization of welfare is solved numerically in this analysis. Results of numerical 
analysis with cooperative behavior of countries show that a social planner determines 
a free trade scenario to be optimal from a world welfare perspective (i.e. welfare of 
both countries is maximized). In a noncooperative setting, the government jurisdiction 
has unilateral incentive to deviate from a free trade scenario. This behavior can be 
anticipated by the other government, resulting in both governments deviating from a 
zero tariff scenario, which results in inefficiently high tariff rates, which are stable 
Nash equilibria. These Nash equilibria are characterized by lower welfare for both 
countries than in a social planner’s scenario without tariffs. 
In a noncooperative setting, the social planner’s free trade scenario is not stable 
because each government has a unilateral incentive to deviate, even though it 
generates the highest welfare from a world welfare perspective. 
 
In conclusion, our model provides rationale for the existence of ad-valorem tariffs in a 
model of heterogeneous firms. The instability of a free trade scenario with countries 
behaving noncooperatively is given by the incentive of a single government to 
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deviate. The welfare-superior free trade scenario can only be obtained under reliable 
policy coordination. 
 
2.9 Appendix  
 
2.9.1 Demand 
We use the utility function in (45), 
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2.9.2 The domestic firm 
The derivation of the profit-maximizing output: 
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The derivation of the optimal price: 
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The domestic firm i applies the price pj(i), which is the standard mill price. The factor 
α
1
 expresses the mark-up. The closer differentiated goods substitute, the higher α , 
the smaller is the market power of the single firm.  
Maximum attainable profits are: 
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2.8.3 The exporter 
The derivation of the optimal output of an exporting firm from country A: 
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2.9.4 The MNE 
The profit function of a firm that engages in an MNE strategy is similar to the profit 
function of a domestic firm. Only fixed costs in this strategy are higher fi>fex. The 
derivation of the profit-maximizing price is shown in the following:
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Analogously, we find profit-maximizing output by applying *ij (i)p  into xj(i): 
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2.9.5 Derivation of cut-off level ex/dθ  
We derive the productivity level that at least additionally guarantees zero profits from 
exporting: 
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Firms that are at least as productive as ex/dθ engage in the export strategy. 
2.9.6 Derivation of cut-off level i/exθ  
The next threshold is a productivity level at which exporting and multinational firms 
have same profits. Firms with productivity levels above this level engage in a MNE 
activity. 
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Firms producing with productivity i/exθ  are indifferent whether to choose the MNE or 
exporting strategy or not. A firm with productivity )i(θ  just above i/exθ  engages in a 
MNE strategy and generates positive profits from this activity. 
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2.9.7 Derivation and analysis of cut-off level i/dθ  
The next cut-off level characterizes a situation in which the export strategy does not 
exist. Firms in this scenario directly integrate their firm following a MNE activity. The 
resulting cut-off level can be derived as follows: 
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Firms that satisfy the following condition integrate their firm as an MNE, the export 
strategy does not exist: 
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2.9.8 Utility of the representative household at Xd,i, Xd/ex and Xd  
For the constellation that ensures the market size to be Xd,i, the following condition 
i/dθ < ex/dθ  must hold and utility is given by: 
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Because the export strategy does not exist, a transfer cannot be provided. 
For that the market size is Xd,ex, the condition ex/dθ < maxθ  must hold. Furthermore, the 
MNE strategy does not exist if 0=τ  because i/exθ  is infinite 
( ) 01
11
0
)1(
)1(
1
=
















τ+
−
=τ
α
α−
α−
 which results in utility with transfer:  
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
µ
θ
θ
αθ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ








α
+
αµ
+τ⋅+








+−=
∫∫
∫∫∫
max
ex/d
max
max
ex/d
max
ex/d
max
*
exj
0
*
dj
*
exj
*
exj
*
exj
0
*
dj
*
djjj
ix1diix11
diixdiix)i(pdiix)i(pmU
 
 
Only the domestic strategy exists if ex/dθ > maxθ  and i/dθ > maxθ  hold. This results in 
following utility for the household: 
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2.9.9 Mathematica input and plots 
fd:=0.001 
fex:=.0015 
fin:=.0019 
α :=0.75 
µ :=0.6 
θmin:=0 
θmax:=30 
t:=1.01 
F[θ_] := Piecewise[{{0, θ <= θmin}, {(θ - θmin)/(θmax - θmin), θ > θmin && θ < 
θmax}, {1, θ >= θmax}}] 
inr[θ_,n_]:=Piecewise[{{-1,θ< θmin || θ> θmax},{n F[θ],θ≥ θmin && θ θmax}}] 
θ[i_,n_]:=Piecewise[{{-1,i<0||i>n},{i(θmax-θmin)/n+θmin,i≥0&&i 
n}}]  
x[θ_,X_τ_,t_]:= (α θ)^(1/(1-α))/(((1+τ) t)^(1/(1-α)) X^((1-µ)/(1-α))) 
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θde[ X_,τ_,t_] :=(a=t fex^((1-α) / α) X^((1-µ) / α) (1+τ)^(1/α)/(α(1-α))^((1-
α)/α));If[a<θmin,a=θmin,If[a>θmax,a=θmax]];a) 
ide[n_,X_,τ_,t_]:=inr[θde[X,τ,t],n] 
θei [X_τ_,t_]:=(If[t^α1/(1+τ),θmax,Min[θmax, (fin-fex)^((1-α)/α) X^((1-µ)/α)/(α(1-
α))^((1-α) /α) (1-(1/(t^α (1+τ)))^(1/(1-α)))  ^((1-α) / α))]]) 
iei[n_,X_,τ_,t_]:=inr[θei[X,τ,t],n] 
θdi[X_,τ_,t_] :=Min[θmax,fin^((1-α)/α) X^((1-µ)/α)/(α(1-α))^((1-α)/α))] 
idi[n_,X_,τ_,t_]:=inr[θdi[X,τ,t],n] 
Yd[nA_,X_,τ_,t_]:=NIntegrate[(1/α) (x[ θ[i,nA],X,0,1])^α,{i,0,nA}] 
Yex[nB_,X_,τ_,t_]:=If[ide[nB,X,τ,t]<Min[iei[nB,X,τ,t],nB],NIntegrate[(1/α) (x[ 
θ[i,nB],X,τ,t])^α,{i,ide[nB,X,τ,t],Min[iei[nB,X,τ,t],nB]}],0] 
Yin[nB_,X_,τ_,t_]:=NIntegrate[(1/α)(x[θ[i,nB],X,0,1])^α,{i,Min[nB,Max[iei[nB,X,τ,t],idi[
nB,X,τ,t]]],nB}] 
Y[nA_,nB_,X_,τ_,t_]:=Yd[nA,X,τ,t]+Yex[nB,X,τ,t]+Yin[nB,X,τ,t] 
Xm[nA_,nB_,τ_,t_]:=(k=0;X0=1000;Z0=Y[nA,nB,X0,τ,t]-X0;d=20*2^(-
k);X1=X0+d;Z1=Y[nA,nB,X1,τ,t]-X1;X2=N[(d Z0+X0 Z0-X0 Z1)/(Z0-
Z1)];While[Abs[X2-X0]>.00001&&k<15,X0=X2;k++;Z0=Y[nA,nB,X0,τ,t]-X0;d=20*2^(-
k);X1=X0+d;Z1=Y[nA,nB,X1,τ,t]-X1;X2=N[(d Z0+X0 Z0-X0 Z1)/(Z0-Z1)]];X2) 
Gd[i_,nA_,nB_,τ_,t_]:=x[θ[i,nA],Xm[nA,nB,τ,t],0,1] (1/(α θ[i,nA]))-
x[θ[i,nA],Xm[nA,nB,τ,t],0,1]/θ[i,nA]-fd 
Gin[i_,nA_,nB_,τB_,t_]:=x[θ[i,nA],Xm[nB,nA,τB,t],0,1] (1/(α θ[i,nA]))-
x[θ[i,nA],Xm[nB,nA,τB,t],0,1]/θ[i,nA]-fin 
Gex[i_,nA_,nB_,τB_,t_]:= x[θ[i,nA],Xm[nB,nA,τB,t],τB,t] (t/(α θ[i,nA]))-  
x[θ[i,nA],Xm[nB,nA,τB,t],τB,t] t/θ[i,nA]-fex 
EGd[nA_,nB_,τA_,t_]:=NIntegrate[Gd[i,nA,nB,τA,t],{i,0,nA}] 
EGex[nA_,nB_,τB_,t_]:=If[ide[nA,Xm[nB,nA,τB,t],τB,t]<Min[iei[nA,Xm[nB,nA,τB,t],τ
B,t],nB],NIntegrate[Gex[i,nA,nB,τB,t],{i,ide[nA,Xm[nB,nA,τB,t],τB,t],Min[iei[nA,Xm[nB
,nA,τB,t],τB,t],nA]}],0] 
EGin[nA_,nB_,τB_,t_]:=NIntegrate[Gin[i,nA,nB,τB,t],{i,Min[nA,Max[iei[nA,Xm[nB,nA,
τB,t], τB,t],idi[nA,Xm[nB,nA,τB,t],τB,t]]],nB}] 
EG[nA_,nB_,τA_,τB_,t_]:=EGd[nA,nB,τA,t]+EGex[nA,nB,τB,t]+EGin[nA,nB,τB,t] 
Firms[nB_,τA_,τB_,t_]:=(N1=2^10;K=10;While[EG[N1,nB,τA,τB,t]>0,N1=2 
;N1;K=K+1];K=K-2;N1=N1-2^K;While[K>-6,K=K-
1;If[EG[N1,nB,τA,τB,t]>0,N1=N1+2^K,N1=N1-2^K]];Return[N1]) 
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MYd[nA_,X_,τ_,t_]:=NIntegrate[1/(α  θ[i,nA]) x[ θ[i,nA],X,0,1],{i,0,nA}] 
MYex[nB_,X_,τ_,t_]:=If[ide[nB,X,τ,t]<Min[iei[nB,X,τ,t],nB],NIntegrate[ t/(α  θ[i,nB]) (x[ 
θ[i,nB],X,τ,t]),{i,ide[nB,X,τ,t],Min[iei[nB,X,τ,t],nB]}],0] 
MYin[nB_,X_,τ_,t_]:=1/s NIntegrate[1/(α  θ[i,nB]) (x[ 
θ[i,nB],X,0,1]),{i,Min[nB,Max[iei[nB,X,τ,t],idi[nB,X,τ,t]]],nB}] 
Country maximizes own welfare: 
Equilibrium[τA_,τB_,t_]:=(nA0=1;nB0=1;J=0;nA1=N[Firmenanzahl[nB0,τA,τB,t]];nB1
=N[Firms[nA0,τB,τA,t]];nA2=N[Firms[nB1,τA,τB,t]];nB2=N[Firms[nA1,τB,τA,t]];nA3
=N[nA2-nA1 nA2-nA1 nB1+nA1 nA2 nB1+nA1 nB2-nA2 nB2/(1-nA1-nB1+nA2 
nB1+nA1 nB2-nA2 nB2)];nB3=N[(nB1-1)/(nA2-nA1) (nA3nA1)+1]; 
Print[{J,N[nA3],N[nB3]}];While[(Abs[nA3-nA0]>10||Abs[nB3-nB0]>50)&&J<10, 
nA0=nA3;nB0=nB3;nA1=Firms[nB0,τA,τB,t];nB1=Firms[nA0,τB,τA,t];nA2=Firms[nB
1,τA,τB,t];nB2=Firms[nA1,τB,τA,t];nA3=N[nA2-nA1 nA2-nA1 nB1+nA1 nA2 
nB1+nA1 nB2-nA2 nB2/(1-nA1-nB1+nA2 nB1+nA1 nB2-nA2 nB2)];nB3=N[(nB1-
1)/(nA2-nA1) (nA3-nA1)+1]; J++;Print[{J,nA3,nB3}]]; Print[{"Equilibrium",J,nA3,nB3}]; 
NA=nA3;NB=nB3;EGewA=EG[NA,NB,τA,τB,t];EGewB=EG[NB,NA,τB,τA,t];XMA=X
m[NA,NB,τA,t];XMB=Xm[NB,NA,τB,t];YINA=Yin[NB,XMA,τA,t];YINB=Yin[NA,XMB,τ
B,t];YEXA=Yex[NB,XMA,τA,t];YEXB=Yex[NA,XMB,τB,t];YDA=Yd[NA,XMA,τA,t];YD
B=Yd[NB,XMB,τB,t];MYDA=MYd[NA,XMA,τA,t];MYDB=MYd[NB,XMB,τB,t];MYEXA
=MYex[NB,XMA,τA,t];MYEXB=MYex[NA,XMB,τB,t];MYINA=MYin[NB,XMA,τA,t];MY
INB=MYin[NA,XMB,τB,t];YCDA=Yd[NA,XMAτA,t];YCDB=Yd[NB,XMB,τB,t];YCINA=
Yin[NB,XMA,τA,t];YCINB=Yin[NA,XMB,τB,t];YCEXA=Yex[NB,XMA,τA,t];YCEXB=Ye
x[NA,XMB,τB,t];UA=1/µ(YCDA+YCINA+YCEXA)^µ;UB=1/µ(YCDB+YCINB+YCEXB)
^µ;MA=MYDA+MYEXA+MYINA;MB=MYDB+MYEXB+MYINB;WA=UA-MA;WB=UB-
MB;result={DateString[],τA,τB,t,NA,NB,EGewA,EGewB,XMA,XMB,YDA,YDB,YEXA,
YEXB,YINA,YINB,MYDA,MYDB,MYEXA,MYEXB,MYINA,MYINB,YCDA,YCDB,YCEX
A,YCEXB,YCINA,YCINB,UA,UB,MA,MB,WA,WB};Print[result];PutAppend[result,targ
etfile]) 
 
Best-response tariff: 
Equilibrium[τA_,τB_,t_]:=(nA0=1;nB0=1;J=0;nA1=N[Firms[nB0,τA,τB,t]];nB1=N[Fir
ms[nA0,τB,τA,t]];nA2=N[Firms[nB1,τA,τB,t]];nB2=N[Firms[nA1,τB,τA,t]];nA3=N[ 
nA2-nA1 nA2-nA1 nB1+nA1 nA2 nB1+nA1 nB2-nA2 nB2/(1-nA1-nB1+nA2 nB1+nA1 
nB2-nA2 nB2)];nB3=N[(nB1-1)/(nA2-nA1) (nA3-nA1)+1]; Print[{J,N[nA3],N[nB3]}]; 
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While[(Abs[nA3-nA0]>10||Abs[nB3-nB0]>50)&&J<10, nA0=nA3;nB0=nB3; 
nA1=Firms[nB0,τA,τB,t];nB1=Firms[nA0,τB,τA,t];nA2=Firms[nB1,τA,τB,t];nB2=Firm
s[nA1,τB,τA,t];nA3=N[nA2-nA1 nA2-nA1 nB1+nA1 nA2 nB1+nA1 nB2-nA2 nB2/(1-
nA1-nB1+nA2 nB1+nA1 nB2-nA2 nB2)];nB3=N[(nB1-1)/(nA2-nA1) (nA3-
nA1)+1];J++;Print[{J,nA3,nB3}]];Print[{"Equilibrium",J,nA3,nB3}];NA=nA3;NB=nB3;E
GewA=EG[NA,NB,τA,τB,t];EGewB=EG[NB,NA,τB,τA,t];XMA=Xm[NA,NB,τA,t];XMB
=Xm[NB,NA,τB,t];YINA=Yin[NB,XMA,τA,t];YINB=Yin[NA,XMB,τB,t];YEXA=Yex[NB,
XMA,τA,t];YEXB=Yex[NA,XMB,τB,t];YDA=Yd[NA,XMA,τA,t];YDB=Yd[NB,XMB,τB,t]
;MYDA=MYd[NA,XMA,τA,t];MYDB=MYd[NB,XMB,τB,t];MYEXA=MYex[NB,XMA,τA,t
];MYEXB=MYex[NA,XMB,τB,t];MYINA=MYin[NB,XMA,τA,t];MYINB=MYin[NA,XMB,,
τB,t];YCDA=Yd[NA,XMA,τA,t];YCDB=Yd[NB,XMB,τB,t];YCINA= 
Yin[NB,XMA,τA,t];YCINB=Yin[NA,XMB,τB,t];YCEXA=Yex[NB,XMA,τA,t];YCEXB= 
Yex[NA,XMB,τB,t];UA=1/µ (YCDA+YCINA+YCEXA)^µ;UB=1/µ 
(YCDB+YCINB+YCEXB)^µ;MA=MYDA+MYEXA+MYINA;MB=MYDB+MYEXB+MYIN
B;WA=UA-MA;WB=UB-
MB;result={DateString[]τA,τB,t,NA,NB,EGewA,EGewB,XMA,XMB,YDA,YDB,YEXA,
YEXB,YINA,YINB,MYDA,MYDB,MYEXA,MYEXB,MYINA,MYINB,YCDA,YCDB,YCEX
A,YCEXB,YCINA,YCINB,UA,UB,MA,MB,WA,WB};Print[result];PutAppend[result, 
targetfile]) 
 
2.9.10 Response tariffs of country A given 0B =τ  
Tariff NA NB XmA XmB XdA XdB XexA XexB XiA XiB UA UB EA EB WA WB
0 23662 23662 5130 5130 3172 3172 1958 1958 0 0 280.50 280.50 126.22 126.22 154.27 154.27
0.01 29385 17782 5205 5015 3871 2449 1333 2566 0 0 282.94 276.71 127.00 124.52 155.94 152.19
0.02 33863 13061 5275 4924 4391 1839 884 3084 0 0 285.21 273.68 127.92 123.16 157.29 150.52
0.03 37008 9455 5329 4848 4739 1357 488 3491 102 0 286.98 271.13 128.80 122.01 158.18 149.12
0.04 38531 7653 5363 4809 4897 1109 173 3700 293 0 288.06 269.88 129.47 121.42 158.60 148.40
0.05 39099 6998 5375 4795 4956 1017 30 3778 389 0 288.45 269.36 129.77 121.21 158.68 148.15
0.06 39140 6960 5375 4795 4961 1011 0 3783 415 0 288.20 269.34 129.81 121.20 158.66 148.14
0.07 39140 6960 5375 4795 4961 1011 0 3783 415 0 288.20 269.34 129.81 121.20 158.66 148.14
0.08 39140 6960 5375 4795 4961 1011 0 3783 415 0 288.20 269.34 129.81 121.20 158.66 148.14
 
   
2.9.11 Response tariffs of country A given %5B =τ  
Tariff NA NB XmA XmB XdA XdB XexA XexB XiA XiB UA UB EA EB WA WB
0 6998 39099 4795 5375 1017 4956 3778 30 0 389 269.36 288.45 121.21 129.77 148.15 158.68
0.01 13036 33437 4849 5233 1870 4377 2980 54 0 802 271.18 283.85 121.29 127.67 149.89 156.18
0.02 18129 28477 4901 5114 2567 3832 2334 73 0 1208 272.92 279.96 121.67 125.89 151.25 154.06
0.03 21136 25194 4946 5030 2960 3458 1214 84 772 1488 274.41 277.19 122.60 124.64 151.81 152.56
0.04 22476 23642 4967 4989 3132 3277 497 89 1339 1624 275.12 275.85 123.33 124.03 151.79 151.82
0.05 23025 23025 4974 4974 3203 3203 91 91 1680 1680 275.33 275.33 123.79 123.79 151.54 151.54
0.06 23109 22994 4976 4974 3214 3198 0 91 1762 1685 275.39 275.36 123.93 123.80 151.47 151.55
0.07 23109 22994 4976 4974 3214 3198 0 91 1762 1685 275.39 275.36 123.93 123.80 151.47 151.55
0.08 23109 22994 4976 4974 3214 3198 0 91 1762 1685 275.39 275.36 123.93 123.80 151.47 151.55
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2.9.12 Response tariffs of country A given %3B =τ  
Tariff NA NB XmA XmB XdA XdB XexA XexB XiA XiB UA UB EA EB WA WB
0 9455 37008 4848 5329 1357 4739 3491 488 0 102 271.13 286.98 122.01 128.80 149.12 158.18
0.01 15337 31438 4903 5194 2171 4152 2732 773 0 269 272.96 282.59 122.16 126.61 150.81 155.98
0.02 20254 26599 4954 5081 2831 3607 2124 1000 0 474 274.69 278.88 122.57 124.78 152.12 154.11
0.03 23275 23275 4998 4998 3219 3219 1132 1132 647 647 276.15 276.15 123.45 123.45 152.70 152.70
0.04 24633 21734 5022 4960 3388 3034 461 1190 1173 736 276.93 274.87 124.18 122.83 152.75 152.04
0.05 25194 21136 5030 4946 3458 2960 84 1214 1488 772 277.19 274.41 124.64 122.60 152.56 151.81
0.06 25256 21087 5030 4945 3466 2954 0 1216 1564 775 277.21 274.38 124.74 122.59 152.46 151.80
0.07 25256 21087 5030 4945 3466 2954 0 1216 1564 775 277.21 274.38 124.74 122.59 152.46 151.80
0.08 25256 21087 5030 4945 3466 2954 0 1216 1564 775 277.21 274.38 124.74 122.59 152.46 151.80
 
 
2.9.13 Response tariffs of country A given %4B =τ  
Tariff NA NB XmA XmB XdA XdB XexA XexB XiA XiB UA UB EA EB WA WB
0 7653 38531 4809 5363 1109 4897 3700 173 0 293 269.88 288.06 121.42 129.47 148.4 158.60
0.01 13658 32875 4863 5223 1952 4314 2911 301 0 608 271.64 283.52 121.51 127.30 150.13 156.22
0.02 18713 27931 4915 5105 2641 3766 2274 403 0 936 273.38 279.67 121.90 125.47 151.47 154.20
0.03 21734 24633 4960 5022 3034 3388 1190 461 736 1173 274.87 276.93 122.83 124.18 152.04 152.75
0.04 23056 23056 4980 4980 3203 3203 485 485 1292 1292 275.54 275.54 123.53 123.53 152.01 152.01
0.05 23642 22476 4989 4967 3277 3132 89 497 1624 1339 275.85 275.12 124.03 123.33 151.82 151.79
0.06 23706 22426 4990 4967 3286 3125 0 498 1704 1343 275.86 275.10 124.14 123.32 151.72 151.78
0.07 23706 22426 4990 4967 3286 3125 0 498 1704 1343 275.86 275.10 124.14 123.32 151.72 151.78
0.08 23706 22426 4990 4967 3286 3125 0 498 1704 1343 275.86 275.10 124.14 123.32 151.72 151.78
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3.1 Introduction  
In a recent innovation to trade literature, heterogeneity of firm-productivity has been 
incorporated into models of monopolistic competition with international trade and 
multinational firms. Initially, models of vertical or horizontal integration strategies of 
multinational firms were developed under the assumption of homogeneous 
productivities between all plants in a market.118 Later, theoretical work was focused 
on the study of optimal integration strategies of such complex firms in the presence of 
firm heterogeneity in terms of total factor productivity.119 One key finding was that the 
optimal integration strategy for a firm depends on its productivity. In addition, given 
productivity differences across firms – coexistence of alternative modes of integration 
is based on the notion of firm heterogeneity.  
Empirically, the activity of multinational enterprises is among the most dynamic 
economic activities (followed by international trade in goods and services).120 For 
instance, the average annual growth rate of foreign affiliate sales was 8.4% during 
the period of 1996-2000 and was 16.2% in 2006.121 The focus of empirical analyses 
of integration strategies of multinational enterprises (MNEs) has been on whether 
purely vertical or horizontal strategies are prevalent in data on foreign direct 
investments (FDI). As a result of such work, indirect evidence has favored horizontal 
MNE models more so than vertical MNE models.122  
Work on the role of profit taxes on FDIs has suggested that FDI react sensitively to 
changes in tax rates.123 The latter indicates that the debate on optimal taxation 
should be of key interest to policy makers. Researchers have also pointed out the 
importance of corporate taxation in influencing firm location and production 
decisions.124 Empirical evidence in support of this has suggested the relevance of 
taxation to location and volume of FDIs (i.e. production decisions of MNEs). The 
various impacts include the impact of a corporate tax rate in the parent country on 
inbound FDI, the impact of the corporate tax rate in the host country on outbound 
                                            
118
 As in Markusen (1984) and Helpman (1984). 
119
 Compare with Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). 
120
 In the year 2006 global FDI inflows grew for the third consecutive year and reached the level of 
$1.306 trillion being slightly below the record level of $1.411 trillion in 2000. As in UNCTAD (2008) and 
World Bank Institute (2007). 
121
 In the same time, the gross product of foreign affiliates increased 7.3% p.a. in the years of 1996-
2000 and rose by 16.2% in 2006. Exports of foreign affiliates showed an increase of 3.3% p.a. in 
1996-2000 and rose by 12.2% in 2006. As in UNCTAD (2008).  
122
 As supported by Markusen and Maskus (2001) and Brainard (1993a). 
123
 As in Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Blonigen and Davies (2004). 
124
 See Hines (1999) or Gresik (2001) for a survey.  
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FDIs, and the effects of parent and host country taxation in terms of different 
methods of double taxation relief.125    
Research regarding statutory tax rates and their impact on FDIs is abundant, 
containing diverse distinctions between different methods of double taxation relief 
and the impact of statutory corporate tax rates on MNE activities.126 In analyzing the 
impact of withholding tax rates on MNE activities, we have seen that they are 
independent of the method of double taxation relief. For example, if foreign-earned 
profits are subject to withholding taxes levied, increasing withholding tax rates 
reduces MNE activities in the host country.127 
Although diverse implications of withholding tax rates are cogitable, these and the 
impacts on tax rates on MNE activities of heterogeneous firms have hardly been 
studied in theoretical work.    
 
To focus on the topics of firm heterogeneity, the increasing importance of MNEs, and 
the impact of corporate taxation on MNE activities, we have set up a model of 
heterogeneous firms that select their strategies from a menu of three options: 
domestic operations, exporting operations, or horizontal MNE activities.128 We have 
assumed that manufacturing firms supply varieties of differentiated goods under 
monopolistic competition.  
In our model, social welfare-maximizing governments levy withholding taxes on MNE 
profits earned by subsidiaries producing in the jurisdiction of the particular 
government. Furthermore, the generated tax revenue is spent for a lump-sum 
transfer to the households there. These corporate tax rates affect the integration 
strategies of heterogeneous firms. Of course the economic structure and the nature 
of competition are essential for this to be a welfare-maximizing policy.129  
We also have distinguished between the perspectives of a social planner and a 
single government on maximization because a single government only maximizes its 
own national welfare. An increase in withholding tax rates, nevertheless, induces a 
                                            
125
 To see the impact on inbound FDI, see Head, Ries and Swenson (1999) for a survey; to see the 
impact on outbound FDI see Mutti and Grubert (2004) for a survey; and for the impact of parent and 
host country taxation, see Swenson (1994).  
126
 We can distinguish between the credit, exemption, and deduction methods. See Egger et al. 
(2006b) for a survey. 
127
 As in Egger et al. (2006b). 
128
 In contrast to Davies and Eckel (2007) assuming mobile firms. 
129
 As in Dixit and Grossman (1986), Venables (1985), or Helpman and Flam (1986). 
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decline of MNE investments in this jurisdiction.130 This coherence is consistent with 
the findings of Hines (1999) or Devereux and Griffith (2003).131 Governments are 
completely informed and consider the implications of taxation on the integration 
strategies of heterogeneous firms and the resulting impacts on the utility of the 
representative household in their own jurisdictions. Social planners consider welfare 
implications in both countries.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 outlines the model 
and derives optimal integration strategies of firms in the differentiated sector. These 
are dependent on the relative size of fixed costs for plant setup, market, country 
sizes, firm productivities, transport costs, and corporate taxation.  After presenting 
welfare maximization and governments objectives, we set up a numerical framework 
in section 3.2.5. In contrast to related theoretical work, we endogenously derive the 
mass of firms entering markets as well as the market size itself.132 We study the 
results of this numerical analysis with special emphasis on the role of country size. In 
section 3.2.6, we flesh out the main differences of this approach relative to recent 
theoretical work. Finally, in section 3.3, we conclude and point to the implications of 
our findings in terms of optimal taxation and economic outcome. 
 
3.2 The model 
The following partial analysis is a description of optimal integration strategies of 
heterogeneous firms, with particular emphasis on the role of profit taxation. We focus 
on the optimal tax policy of governments providing a lump-sum transfer to 
households in their jurisdictions, depending on the integration strategies chosen by 
heterogeneous firms. 
 
First, consider a simple model with two countries, A and B, in which only one factor, 
labor (L), is used for production and firm or plant setup. L is assumed to be mobile 
between sectors but immobile across national borders. Goods may be consumed 
from local or foreign producers. The latter results in goods trade, which invokes 
iceberg-type trade costs. With regard to integration strategies, firms choose between 
                                            
130
 Evidence for this can be found in Devereux (2006) and in Hines and Rice (1994). 
131
 Early empirical work finds negligible effects of tax policies on FDI. See Brainard (1997) and 
Wheeler and Mody (1992) for a survey. 
132
 In contrast, see Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2006) or Davies, Egger and Egger (2009). 
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three options: locating in one country and serving only domestic consumers, 
concentrating production in one country and serving consumers worldwide from there 
(exporting), or engaging in multiplant production and serving consumers locally 
through domestic and foreign subsidiaries (MNEs).  
 
There are two industries. One of them produces a homogeneous good x0; the other 
industry produces differentiated goods. The homogeneous good is supplied under 
perfect competition. For the sake of elegance, let us assume that one unit of labor is 
needed to fabricate one unit of the homogeneous good. We focus on parameter 
configurations, which ensure diversification of production, so that the homogeneous 
good is produced in both countries in equilibrium and may be traded at zero costs 
across national borders.  
 
Varieties of the differentiated good are supplied under monopolistic competition. 
Each firm in the differentiated sector acts as a monopolist in supplying its variety. 
However varieties are substitutable at an elasticity of σ  > 1, which also reflects the 
elasticity of demand. Consequently, firms in that sector charge a fixed markup over 
marginal costs. 
 
To enter the differentiated industry, the amount of fd units of labor, which are sunk 
costs, must be invested. These can be considered firm setup costs. With this 
investment a firm in this heterogeneous sector discovers its own potential productivity 
level ( θ ). The productivity level drawn by a firm is a random variable. 
 
3.2.1 Demand 
We assume that the preferences of households are quasi-linear and that households 
are identical with respect to their preferences. In formal accounts, the utility function 
of the representative household is represented by: 
( ) }B,A{j,diix11xU max
0
j0j ∈







αµ
+=
µθ
α
∫                          (76)                                                                             
The representative households in A and B benefit from consumption of the 
homogeneous good xo, which is taken as the numéraire for convenience. 
Furthermore, each of the two countries hosts a second industry that produces 
differentiated goods under monopolistic competition. )i(x j  is the consumption of 
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output of the i-th firm, which is { }max,...,0i θ∈ . The condition 0<α <1 being constant 
results in a constant elasticity of substitution (C.E.S.) of =σ 1/ (1-α ) >1 between any 
pair of differentiated goods. This expression reflects standard properties of love for 
variety preferences, where a broader supply of differentiated goods results in 
increased utility. µ  is a constant with 0<µ < α <1 and reflects the preference for the 
differentiated industry over the homogenous industry in the utility function of the 
representative household. At a certain level of differentiated products supplied in one 
country, an additional unit shows diminishing marginal utility. The consumption of 
differentiated products is represented by the expression 








α
= ∫
θ
αdi)i(x1X
max
0
j , the sub-
utility of the differentiated sector.  
 
Obviously, the utility function is linear in 0x  but nonlinear in the differentiated 
varieties. This implies that the demand for differentiated products depends on prices 
of differentiated goods but not on earnings. 
 
To derive demand of a single household demand for the variety xj(i) in country j,  we 
consider the utility function in (76) and satisfy the standard side condition 
∫
θ
⋅+⋅≥
max
0
jj00j )i(x)i(pxpm . Labor income m is spent on the homogeneous good, 
where we set p0 = 1, and on differentiated goods. This results in the demand of a 
single household for differentiated goods of133 
α−
α−
µ−
θ
α








α
=
∫ 1
1
j
1
1
0
j
j
)i(pdi)i(x1
1)i(x
max
            (77)   
 
or, 
( ) α−
µ−θ
α








α
=
∫
1
j
1
0
j
j
)i(xdiix1
1)i(p
max
           (78) 
respectively. 
                                            
133
 See 3.4.1 in the Appendix. 
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The demand of a single household in country j for differentiated goods of the i-th firm 
depends on the price firm i sets, on how any pair of differentiated goods can be 
substituted for another through α, on µ , and on the subutility of consumption 








α
= ∫
θ
αdi)i(x1X
max
0
j . The impact of an increasing α is that products of the 
differentiated sector become closer substitutes for one another, which results in 
reduced market power for a single firm.  
 
As can be seen from equations (77) and (78), the size of X is determined 
endogenously. For this reason, X can also be interpreted as the market size for 
differentiated goods and demands for specification. X depends on the strategic 
alignment of heterogeneous firms. 
We also distinguish between different scenarios. In the first case, market size X 
consists of the market of domestic firms, foreign firms exporting their goods from 
abroad (henceforth referred to as exporters), and of firms choosing horizontal MNE 
activity. Market size X in equilibrium is defined as: 
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Alternatively, in another scenario, the export strategy does not exist (i.e., is not 
profitable). Firms choose either supplying domestically or acting as MNEs. This 
scenario results in a market size of: 
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Finally, MNE activity may be nonprofitable so that market size consists of demand 
from domestic and exporting producers only. The specified market size in this case 
shows: 
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Figure 17 shows market size under the alternative integration strategies of 
heterogeneous firms. 
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Figure 17. The market size X depending on different integration strategies. 
 
 
3.2.2 Production 
As mentioned before, we focus on equilibria with diversification of production so that 
each of the two countries, j={A,B}, hosts the two industries. The associated country 
size of A and B is reflected by sA and sB.  
 
We assume that countries A and B are endowed with a fixed amount of 
internationally immobile labor, L. Because the homogeneous good is freely tradable, 
is used as the numéraire, and uses one unit of L for one unit of output, there is 
international wage equalization at unitary wages (i.e., w
 j =1) as long as diversification 
of production prevails. 
 
The differentiated goods available in a country j are provided by different sources. 
Consumers in j buy goods produced by national producers in j, imports from the other 
country, and goods from subsidiaries in j where the origin of these firms is in the 
other country (MNEs). Hence, the mass of firms in the world equals the amount of 
differentiated goods potentially available.  
Firms in the differentiated sector differ with respect to their productivity, but ex-ante 
all firms are identical. If they expect positive earnings from the production process, 
they pay sunk entry costs fd upfront, which are measured in units of labor. As long as 
firms expect positive profits, they enter the market. It is assumed that the individual 
productivity levels of the firms in each country are independent draws from a 
cumulative productivity distribution function F(θ ). Because of the fee fd, the firms may 
independently draw their productivity from the distribution F(θ) with support over (0, 
Integration strategies 
Market size 
domestic,exporter domestic, exporter, 
multinational 
domestic, multinational 
Xd,ex Xd,ex,i Xd,i 
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θmax). With this procedure, firms located in the home country, even with very low 
productivity, will produce domestically to reduce the loss of fd. The time line in figure 
18 shows the logical sequence from the moment prior to entry, where all firms are 
identical, to the moment where firms in the industry decide on their integration 
strategies and output: 
 
Figure 18. Steps towards the choice of integration of the firm. 
 
Firms choose their integration strategy according to their productivity θ(i). In their 
domestic country, all firms start as domestic producers. If productivity is low, a firm 
will not enter the foreign market, neither through exports nor through foreign plant 
setup. If productivity is high enough, a firm has the choice to serve foreign markets 
additionally via exports or foreign affiliate production (the latter being referred to as 
horizontal MNE activity). The choice between exporting and foreign plant setup is 
driven by the proximity-concentration trade-off, characterized by the savings in 
trading costs for MNE activity relative to exports, reflected by iceberg transport costs t 
for cross-border trade of differentiated varieties.134 The idea of iceberg transport 
costs is that to deliver one unit of differentiated goods, the producer must ship t ≥ 1 
units to the distant point of sale. On the other hand, in foreign plant setup, the fixed 
costs fi in terms of units of labor must be higher than the fixed costs for exporters fex 
because production facilities must be duplicated.135 For this reason fd<fex<fi is 
assumed.  
In addition to these fixed costs, firms pay variable costs, depending on their own 
productivity levels θ (i), on the integration strategies (i.e., exporters pay transport 
costs t>1), and on country size [i.e. sjxj(i)t/ θ (i)]. Hence, country size sj reflects the 
total demand for variety i in j and t=1 for domestic producers and MNEs. Given two 
firms with the same amount of output in one country, the firm with higher productivity 
θ (i) must bear lower variable costs, according to sjxj(i)/ θ (i).  
                                            
134
 See e.g. Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Brainard (1993b), or Markusen and Venables (2000) for 
a survey. 
135
 As in Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). 
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Furthermore, governments may choose positive profit tax rates subject to foreign 
MNEs to maximize welfare in their own jurisdictions. If tax revenue in j is positive, it is 
passed on to households in j as a lump-sum transfer. In this analysis, a government 
in j can levy taxes on profits earned by MNEs in j. Because these MNEs are 
headquartered in the other country, only the profits earned from production in the 
plant in j can be taxed by the government in j (i.e., the location of tax payment is 
identical with an MNE subsidiary location. Therefore, in this setting, double taxation is 
not the problem in the analysis.136 
For this reason, Aγ denotes a withholding tax rate of the government in A on profits of 
an MNE plant in A, where the origin of this firm is in B.  With Aγ >0, these firms 
consider Aγ  an additional factor influencing profits. Bγ denotes a withholding tax rate 
of the government in B on profits of an MNE plant in B, where the origin of this firm is 
in A. 
Because jγ  describes a withholding tax rate on profits earned by subsidiaries, 
taxation is not considered for domestic and export profits (i.e., Aγ and Bγ  are relevant 
parameters considering profits of MNEs only). 
 
Given the household demand in (77) and the price consumption curve in (78), it is 
straightforward to compute maximum attainable profits for a firm in j serving its 
domestic market: 
d
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This finally results in an expression for the profit-maximizing output of a firm i in its 
domestic market j, j { }B,A∈ ,137 
                                            
136
 As in Egger et al. (2006a). 
137
 See 3.4.2 in the Appendix. 
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The optimal output of a firm in the domestic market depends on market size X.139 
According to (82), the optimal output level of a single firm is negatively correlated with 
X due to competitive conditions. Furthermore, the productivity level of a firm is 
positively correlated with its output.  
In setting the price set, firms follow standard markup pricing in which higher 
productivity is associated with smaller price. The markup is represented by the 
factor
α
1
.  
Accordingly, maximum attainable profits of a domestic firm in j are given by:140 
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Analogously, we now can derive profits of firms with export strategies. Profits of 
exporters from Country A are defined by: 
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Profits of exporters from Country B are defined by: 
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An exporting firm has two sources of earnings. The company generates profits from 
domestic sales and from export activity. The variable costs for exports depend on t. 
                                            
138
 See 3.4.2 in the Appendix. 
139
 The market size X has to be specified according to Xd,ex, Xd,ex,i or Xd,i. 
140
 See 3.4.2 in the Appendix. 
BEST-RESPONSE TAX RATES ON PROFITS OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS 
 
 
115
For a firm i from j, the expression (85) and (86) above result in optimal output in the 
other country (output for exporting),141 
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associated with the optimal price for exports,142 
)i(
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= .                              (88) 
In addition to the previous analysis, we can see that the optimal output and price for 
exports depend on transport costs t in contrast to the optimal output and price when 
supplying domestic demand. Accordingly, maximum attainable profits of a firm i from 
A,  exporting to B, are given by:143 
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Analogously, this can be derived for a firm i from B exporting to A. 
 
Now, it is straightforward to compute maximum attainable profits for firms engaged in 
multinational activities. As they produce goods for both markets locally, transport 
costs do not occur. Instead a firm i from Country A opens an affiliate in B and 
becomes a horizontal MNE.  
 
To maximize social welfare, a government in j may choose to levy withholding taxes 
on profits of foreign MNEs earned by subsidiaries in its jurisdiction. Profits of an MNE 
headquartered in Country A are defined by: 
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Profits of an MNE headquartered in Country B are defined by: 
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 See 3.4.3 in the Appendix. 
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 See 3.4.3 in the Appendix. 
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 See 3.4.3 in the Appendix. 
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An MNE expects at least zero profits from running both domestic and foreign 
subsidiaries. Profit maximizing plant output144 
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Accordingly, the maximum attainable profits of a multinational firm i headquartered in 
Country A are given by146 
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Analogously, this can be derived for MNEs from B with subsidiaries in A. 
 
Firms choose their integration strategies based on the knowledge of their productivity 
levels. This results in the cut-off levels being the determinants of minimum levels of 
productivity for a firm i to generate zero profits additionally when ex-ante selecting a 
strategy with more than domestic production. In general, more productive firms are 
more successful in all three strategies. 
The least productive firms only serve the domestic market through domestic 
production. Because of their low productivity, their variable costs are too high. 
Therefore, the higher fixed costs of operating in an additional market cannot be 
covered.  
 
At this point, the cut-off levels must be analyzed. At the first cut-off, firm productivity 
is such that additional profits of exporting result in exactly zero profits. 
For a firm i from A exporting to B, this is derived from: 
321
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Analogously, this holds true for a firm i from B exporting to A.    
   
With 0D ≥ , this applies for:147  
                                            
144
 See 3.4.4 in the Appendix. 
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 See 3.4.4 in the Appendix. 
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 See 3.4.4 in the Appendix. 
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The market size X results endogenously, according to Xd,ex,i. Furthermore, the cut-off 
productivity depends on the country size sj. The larger the foreign country sj, the 
smaller the productivity of a firm has to be for the export strategy to become 
reasonable. A firm with productivity ex/dθ  generates zero profits from exporting. 
Hence, this firm is indifferent in terms of only selling domestically or engaging in 
exports in addition to domestic sales. A firm with productivity just above this level is 
already earning positive profits from exporting and will definitely engage in exporting. 
  
The critical productivity level in (95) is positively correlated with t, fex, and market size 
X. Hence, the indifferent firm must be more productive to break even. In other words, 
a higher productivity yields lower variable costs of production. Furthermore, 
conditional on the existence of the export strategy, productivity levels exist that 
ensure that profits of exporters exceed profits of MNEs. 
  
At the next productivity level threshold, profits of an exporting firm equal profits of an 
MNE (i.e.  iex )i()i( pi=pi ).148 
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Only firms with i/ex)i( θ>θ  gain positive profits from serving foreign markets through 
building subsidiaries instead of exporting their goods. i/exθ  depends on the difference 
in fixed costs (fi – fex) > 0, which can be interpreted as overhead and set-up costs of 
an MNE subsidiary. The higher the overhead costs (fi – fex) for a foreign subsidiary 
are, the more productive the indifferent firm must be to engage in MNE activity (i.e., 
the cut-off level i/exθ takes over a higher value). The higher the transport costs t are, 
the more likely firms are to engage in the MNE integration strategy. Higher t, 
therefore, results in a lower value of i/exθ . The larger the foreign country sj, the 
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 See 3.4.5 in the Appendix. 
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 See 3.4.6 in the Appendix. 
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smaller the productivity of the firm must be for the export strategy to become 
reasonable. Furthermore, only if )1(j t)1( α−
α−
>γ−  holds does a real and unique solution 
exist. If the parameter configuration of the transport costs t, the tax rate γ , and α  do 
not satisfy this condition, MNE activities do not exist. 
 
Alternatively, certain configurations of parameters may result in a situation in which 
domestic firms integrate directly as MNEs instead of choosing the export strategy. 
The following cut-off level is the relevant productivity threshold if i/dθ < ex/dθ . The 
associated cut-off level results from 
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The associated market size X in this scenario endogenously results in Xd,i. The larger 
the foreign country sj, the smaller the productivity of a firm must be for the MNE 
strategy to become reasonable. For i/dθ < ex/dθ  so that this cut-off level exists, the 
following condition must hold:150 
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≥γ−              (98) 
 
3.2.3 Welfare maximization and the objective of the government 
In the following, governments can set profit taxes in a first stage and cannot rescind 
their offers by assumption. Then, firms decide upon their optimal integration 
strategies, whereas the governments take this into account when setting tax rates. A 
government chooses a withholding tax rate, 10 j <γ< , j { }B,A∈ , to capture profits of 
foreign MNEs earned in plants in j. Hence, MNE profits from production in j are taxed 
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 See 3.4.7 in the Appendix. 
150
 See 3.4.7 in the Appendix. 
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by the government in j. This tax revenue is passed on to the households within that 
jurisdiction. When selecting an optimal tax rate jγ , to be optimal, the government in j 
maximizes the utility of the representative household in its country.  
 
Furthermore, transport costs t reduce exporting firm profits and are given 
exogenously. Taxation reduces MNE profits, where tax rates are set endogenously 
by both governments. The set of optimal integration strategies is influenced by these 
transport costs and profit taxes, both of which have an impact on the mass of firms 
choosing the different optimal integrations strategies. 
 
3.2.3.1 The objective of the governments 
In this section, cases are analyzed, in which the governments of both countries, A 
and B, can levy withholding taxes Aγ  and Bγ , which are taken into account in the 
MNE profit functions. In this setting, taxes are paid on MNE profits either in A or in B. 
The location of tax payments depends on the production location of a firm.  
Furthermore, by assumption, households do not know the underlying tax basis for 
provision of the lump-sum transfer so that the composition of consumption of 
differentiated goods is not distorted.  
The price for the homogeneous product is p0=1; and prices for differentiated products 
are shown by pj(i), where pj(i) is the price for variety i in country j.  
As already shown, the representative household utility in country j, j { }B;A∈ , is given 
by (76), which can also be shown by: 
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Representative household utility increases in m j  and declines in p j (i). 
For a government to pass on a lump-sum transfer to the households in its jurisdiction 
j and, therefore, to select jγ >0, the representative household utility with lump-sum 
transfer may not be smaller than the utility in (99), considering the implications of 
profit taxation in the other jurisdiction. Hence, government tax revenue depends on 
the strategies chosen by the firms. For this reason, the firm profit functions 
dependent on tax rates must be examined to consider the associated utility function, 
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including lump-sum transfer. To show these welfare implications, optimal integration 
strategies with taxation are examined in the following subsection. 
 
3.2.3.2 Strategic alignment 
According to alternative parameter configurations, strategic alignments of firms and 
their impact on welfare with jγ >0 are examined in the following: 
1. For all integration strategies to coexist these conditions must hold: ex/dθ < i/exθ , 
which results in a relation between the fixed costs; transport costs t; and the tax rate 
jγ : 
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Furthermore, for the MNE strategy to exist, )1(j t)1( α−
α−
>γ−  must hold.151 The resulting 
utility function of the representative household with lump-sum transfer is given by: 
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2. Alternative parameter configurations can result in a situation in which only 
domestic and MNE firms enter production. For this constellation to exist, the following 
conditions must hold: i/dθ < ex/dθ  which results in a relation between the fixed costs; 
transport costs t; and the tax rate jγ :152 
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≥γ−          
Furthermore, to ensure that the MNE strategy exists, it follows from i/dθ  that  
jj s)1)(1( α−γ− 0≠ must hold. Therefore, governments must select jγ <1. The resulting 
utility function of the representative household with lump-sum transfer is given by: 
                                            
151
 See 3.4.7 in the Appendix. 
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3. Alternative parameter configurations may result in a situation in which no MNEs 
enter production. Then, the MNE strategy only exists if )1(j t)1( α−
α−
>γ−  holds. 
Otherwise, only domestic and exporting strategies are chosen. Additionally, to 
guarantee that the export strategy exists, ex/dθ < maxθ  must hold. This can also be 
written as: 
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The resulting utility function of the representative household is given by: 
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Without firms selecting MNE activities, a tax base does not exist. For this reason, a 
lump-sum transfer to the representative household cannot be provided independent 
of the size of jγ . 
4. Alternative parameter configurations may result in a situation in which only 
domestic firms enter production. For this constellation to exist, the following 
conditions have to hold: ex/dθ > maxθ  and i/dθ > maxθ  
The resulting utility function of the representative household is given by: 
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                                         (105) 
Without firms selecting MNE activities, a tax base does not exist. For this reason, a 
lump-sum transfer to the representative household cannot be provided independent 
of the size of jγ . 
 
3.2.3.3 The decision of the government 
The decision of the government depends on the exogenous variables, such as 
transport costs, country size, variable costs, fixed costs, and firm productivity 
resulting in a set of optimal integration strategies. 
First, the prices of a single firm do not change because of the taxes levied. These are 
only influenced by transport costs.153 Transport costs are passed on to the 
households, whereas taxes are paid by the firms; and prices in A and B for goods 
from the same firm only differ if transport costs exist. If a strategy of production in A 
and B is reasonable, not all profits of a firm are taxed. Instead, only profits generated 
by MNEs in the foreign market are subject to taxation of the foreign government. 
Hence, the government in B taxes the profits gained in B of MNEs that have their 
origins in A and vice versa. 
Governments consider the following aspects when setting their optimal tax rate, 
0< jγ <1: 
1. Firm profits, including taxation, only change if levied taxes influence firms to 
choose strategies other than MNE activities as optimal. If this is true, government tax 
revenues also change because the mass of firms choosing MNE activities is 
influenced by the size of jγ .  
2.  Prices in the differentiated sector depend on the chosen strategies of firms, and 
the mass of firms selecting the MNE strategy depends on jγ . If i/exex/d θ<θ , this 
impact on the utility of households in j increases if firms select the export strategy 
instead of MNE activity as optimal because of taxation in j.  
                                            
153
 For optimal prices pj(i)* see 3.4.2, 3.4.3, and 3.4.4 in the Appendix. 
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3. The degree of taxation influences the mass of firms entering the market in j 
because of profit taxation in j. The utility of households in j is affected by this variety 
effect.    
4.  In general, a lump-sum transfer is additional income for households in that country 
and is spent on x0. 
5.  If firms in the differentiated sector select strategies other than at jγ =0, the working 
income of households is not lowered because they can work in the homogeneous 
sector. 
6.  When selecting jγ >0, the tax rate selected by one government depends on the 
tax rate of the other. 
7.  The market size X results endogenously and depends on the selected jγ . 
 
Only if the positive impacts of taxation outweigh the negative ones are governments 
acting as benevolent planners interested in selecting 0< jγ <1. For this reason, each 
government solves 
j
U
γ∂
∂
, as in (101) and (102). In these expressions, the market size 
has different outcomes depending on the integration strategies heterogeneous firms 
choose. This endogeneity of the market size X results in a situation in which every 
parameter configuration results in a corresponding level of X. This implies that the 
mass of firms in equilibrium varies endogenously. 
Due to market entry conditions, expected profits according to (101), (102), (104), and 
(105) are competed to zero. As an example, consider the situation in (101). Expected 
profits for all firms headquartered in A are defined by: 
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Vice versa, this also accounts for all firms headquartered in B. Furthermore, market 
size X and the mass of firms in equilibrium are interdependent. The market size X 
and the mass of firms induce further interdependences to other equilibrium 
determining expressions (i.e., the cut-off levels and the demand of the households).  
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Even without the complexity induced by the linkages of the different variables, the 
maximization of welfare in (101), (102), (104), and (105),
j
U
γ∂
∂
, results in a problem 
with a dimensionality higher than fourth degree.154 These aspects preclude an 
analytical solution of 
j
U
γ∂
∂
 and suggest using numerical analysis to determine the 
welfare-maximizing tax rates jγ  and their interactions with other variables. 
 
3.2.4 The numerical framework setup 
To derive a solution to this problem and to find a welfare-maximizing expression for 
the tax rate γ j, we use Mathematica 7.0. This program is utilized to set up the 
numerical framework that represents the theory of the model as derived in previous 
sections.155  
 
3.2.4.1 Definitions 
The coding of the numerical framework starts with defining variables and making 
assumptions. Analogously to the assumptions of the model, the fixed costs, maxθ , α , 
and µ  are set to constant numerical values, considering fd<fex<fi and 0<µ < α <1. 
 
After paying the market-entry costs of fd, a firm draws its individual productivity level 
θ . We apply a uniform distribution of the firms over θ , specified as F[θ_]. The 
distribution function is defined piecewise to ensure that F[θ_]takes the value 0 if 
the distribution is not reached and takes the value 1 in the boundaries of minθ and 
maxθ . To guarantee continuous results, firms are ranked according to individual 
productivity, starting with low-productivity firms, reflected by the expression 
θ[i_,n_]. The productivity of the single firm θ[i_,n_] depends on the rank i of 
the i-th firm, given a mass of firms in the economy n.  
For further analysis, a function to provide the rank that is between two strategies is 
computed using the expression inr[θ_,n_], which reports the rank of the firm 
given the productivity θ  and the mass of firms n founded in the country.  
                                            
154
 A derivation of a unique solution with dimensionality higher than fourth degree cannot be provided. 
This is proved by the theory of Galois. For a survey see Taton (1983). 
155
 See 3.4.8 in the Appendix for the full input sheet, with given values for specific variables.  
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The demand of the representative household as in (77), results in optimal output for 
the firms as derived previously. Therefore, the computation of the profit-maximizing 
output is represented by x[θ_,X_,t_, γ_]. The optimal output of a firm i depends 
on its productivity θ , the market size X, the transport costs t, and the withholding tax 
rate γ j. As the tax rate of country j, γ j, is only relevant for the MNE strategy, we must 
consider jγ =0 for both the domestic and the exporting strategies. 
The choice of the integration strategy of firms is driven by cut-off productivity 
thresholds. They are coded as follows: The first threshold separates domestic 
producers from exporters from j and is computed as θde[X_,s_,t_],  
considering  X and s in the country in which the differentiated goods are sold. The 
associated firm number is reported by ide[n_,X_,s_,t_]. With this expression, 
the rank of the indifferent firm is calculated in terms of productivity, depending on the 
endogenous mass of firms n in j, the endogenous market size in the other country, its 
country size, and the transport costs t. Becasuse the domestic and exporting strategy 
both are independent of the tax rate; ide[n_,X_,s_,t_] does not depend on it. 
For example, by entering ide[25000,5000,1,1.05], the system calculates the 
rank of the indifferent firm ide with cut-off productivity ex/dθ  to be the 19912nd firm, 
given a mass of 25000 firms in this country, a market size of 5000, a country size of 
1, and transport costs of 1,05. Hence, it is the 19913rd firm out of 25000 exports for 
sure.  
 
Analogously, we compute the threshold productivity i/exθ  as  θei[X_,s_,t_, γ_] 
with the associated rank iei[n_,X_,s_,t_, γ _], considering  X , s, and γ  in the 
country in which the economic activity takes place. The same notion is used to code 
the cut-off level i/dθ  as θdi[X_,s_,t_, γ_], linked to the rank 
idi[n_,X_,s_,t_, γ_], considering  X, s, and γ  in the country in which the 
economic activity takes place. 
 
3.2.4.2 Consistency of market size X 
The inclusion of the endogenously defined market size X from a demand perspective 
as in section 3.2.2, into the numerical model does not result in the consistency 
needed to derive results. The proof of inconsistency starts with computing market 
size of country j from a supply perspective for firms active in the different strategies in 
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j, j { }B,A∈  (i.e., Yd [supply of domestic firms from A vice versa from B], Yex [supply of 
exporting firms from B vice versa from A], and Yin [supply of MNEs with origin in B 
and vice versa with origin in A] ). The market size for domestic producers in A, 
referring to the representative household, yields Yd[nA_,X_,t_]. Yd depends on 
the mass of firms in the domestic market nA, the market size X in A, and transport 
costs t. It is characterized by the integral over the output of all domestic firms i.  
 
Analogously, we compute the market size of firms that export from Country B to 
Country A. From the perspective of firms producing in B and exporting to A, the 
export market size, referring to the representative household in A, is given by 
Yex[nB_,X_,s_,t_,γ_]. The size of the export market of firms from B in A depends 
on the mass of firms located in B (nB), the market size X in A, the country size s in A, 
transport costs t, and the tax rate γ in A. The definition of Yex in the numerical 
analysis also considers the scenario that possibly no exporters exist. 
The market size for multinational firms in terms of the representative household is 
defined by Yin[nB_,X_,s_,t_,γ_].The market for MNEs in country A depends 
on the mass of firms located in B, nB, the market size X in A, the country size s in A, 
transport costs t, and the tax rate γ in A. This coding also includes conditions to 
guarantee that the system integrates correctly regarding prevailing integration 
strategies.  
 
The entire market size from a supply perspective, referring to the representative 
household in A, is determined as the sum of all three market segments and is 
represented by: 
Y[nA_,nB_,X_,s_,t_,γ_]:=Yd[nA,X,t]+Yex[nB,X,s,t,γ]+Yin[nB,X,s,t
,γ] 
Inconsistency in the market size will result in differing outcomes regarding the market 
size from supply (Y) and demand (X) perspectives. If the configuration is consistent, 
we should expect a result of Y=5000, for example, if X is 5000. However, using the 
code defined previously, inserting X=5000, Y=5000 does not necessarily occur. For 
example, Y[20000,20000,5000,1,1.05,0.08] results in a market size of Y= 
4192.26. The inconsistency of the market size can be clarified with the figure 19 in 
which the inconsistency is obvious.156 The curve of the market size X has a different 
                                            
156
 The plot can be implemented using the code:  
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progression than the curve Y. The intersection of both curves gives the true market 
size for the given values, Xm=4691.47. 
 
 
 
Figure 19. The inconsistency of the market size. 
 
 
To achieve the essential consistency of market size, the computation uses a quasi-
Newton method, computed as Xm[nA_,nB_,s_,t_,γ_].157 The method is so 
named because we use an approximation for the slope using the gradient of the 
secant of the function Xm, for which we search. Figure 20 shows the visualization of 
the method.158 The program is coded to find the null, starting the calculation of the 
secant at a value of 1000 (in figure 20, this corresponds to x0), assuming a width of 
20 (in figure 20, this corresponds to the second value x1). The slope of the secant 
results in a null, which is the next starting value (in figure 20, this corresponds to x2). 
The slope of the secant associated with this new starting value results in a new null 
(in figure 20, this corresponds to x3). This iteration is repeated until the exact null is 
found. Meanwhile, the width in which the boundaries of the slope of the secants are 
calculated is reduced stepwise.  
 
                                                                                                                                        
Plot[{Y[20000,20000,X,1,1.05,0.08],X},{X,0,7000},AxesLabel→{X(Y),Y(X)}  
157
 As in Spelucci (1993) and Knorrenschild (2008). 
158
 As in Knorrenschild (2008). 
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Figure 20. Visualization of the quasi-Newton method.   
 
3.2.4.3 The mass of firms in equilibrium 
Firm decisions to enter the market are based on the expectation of future profits. 
Heterogeneous firms enter production as long as their future earnings expectations 
are positive. Hence, the mass of firms in the market is determined by expected profits 
being equal to zero. After computing the profit function of the single firm i with its 
particular strategy, expected profits are determined by the profits of all firms in the 
specific market. The profit functions of the single firms in the different strategies are 
computed.  
For a firm selecting the domestic strategy in A, we apply 
Gd[i_,nA_,nB_,s_,t_,γ_]. We must consider that the tax rate γ has to be set to 
0 and transport costs to 1 because they both are not relevant for domestic producers. 
Furthermore, the rank of the i-th firm, the mass of firms in A and B, and the country 
size of A must be considered to compute Gd of the i-th firm. Although this firm selects 
the domestic strategy in Country A, the mass of firms in B must be considered 
because of competitive conditions.  
The profit of a firm in the export strategy is computed as 
Gex[i_,nA_,nB_,sB_,t_,γB_]. Profits of an exporting firm, i, from A to B depend 
on the mass of firms in A and B (nA and nB), the size of B, transport costs t that 
apply for the export strategy, and the tax rate being applied in B (γB for MNEs).  
y 
x 
x0 
x1 x2 
x3 
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The profit function of MNEs originally located in A with subsidiaries in B is coded as 
Gin[i_,nA_,nB_,sB_,t_,γB_]. Profits of an MNE, i, from A, being an MNE in B, 
also depend on the mass of firms in A and B (nA and nB), the size of B (sB), 
transport costs t that apply for the export strategy, and the tax rate on profits of MNEs 
earned in B being applied in country B(γB). 
 
Expected profits (EG) in an economy result from the integration of profits over all 
firms in the different strategies. For A, they are given by:  
EG[nA_,nB_,sA_,sB_,t_,γA_,γB_]:=EGd[nA,nB,sA,t, γA]+EGex[nA,nB,
sB,t, γB]+EGin[nA,nB,sB,t, γB]  
The computation of expected profits includes conditions to ensure that profits are 
only integrated if the associated strategy exists. 
 
Finally, coding the mass of firms in equilibrium results from the expected profits being 
competed to zero by firms entering the market. 
For firms in A, this is given by:  
Firms[nB_,sA_,sB_,t_,γA_,γB_]. The process to find the null is coded by the 
instruction to test several values in defined steps. After determining the first negative 
value of expected profits, the program exactly approaches the null while the width of 
the steps is permanently reduced. 
For example, the instruction to calculate the mass of firms in equilibrium in A given 
nB=18000, sA=1, sB=1, t=1.05, γ A=0.08, and γ B=0.08 is depicted by 
Firms[18000,1,1,1.05,0.08,0.08]. The example results in 12852.1 firms in 
A, given 18000 firms in Country B, with associated expected profits of -0.00004, thus 
supporting the previously described method. 
 
3.2.4.4 Equilibria 
Considering the utility function in (76), households in the two countries benefit from 
consumption of homogeneous good x0 and differentiated goods. To implement the 
utility maximization process, we must first consider the stand-alone contribution of x0. 
Without the existence of a differentiated sector, the representative household only 
generates utility by consuming x0. Hence, the benefit of one unit of differentiated 
goods is constituted by its net contribution (i.e., additional utility versus additional 
costs). The computation of the equilibrium utilizes this notion to implement the utility- 
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maximizing process. In this computation, the equilibrium of the model is labeled as 
Equilibrium[sA_,sB_,t_,γA_,γB_] and depends on the given values of 
country sizes, transport costs, and tax rates in A and B. It is computed so that the 
system delivers data describing the equilibrium. 
 
Given the exogenous variables, the system endogenously determines the equilibrium 
mass of firms in A and B. The tax rates being unequal, BA γ≠γ ,  results in the mass 
of firms differing in both countries, nA•nB. The programming of the mass of firms in 
equilibrium can be visualized in figure 21. 
 
 
Figure 21. The computation of the mass of firms, γA ≠γB. 
  
In computing to find the correct value for the mass of firms, nB=1 is the starting point. 
The program searches for the corresponding mass of firms in A conditioned on nB=1 
(i.e. nA(nB). In the figure, this is denoted as a. Given nA(1) firms in A, the iteration 
proceeds by calculating the associated mass of firms in B, denoted as a*. 
Analogously, we assume nA=1 and search for the associated value for the mass of 
firms in B, denoted as b (i.e. nB(nA)). Given nB(1) firms in B, the system calculates 
the corresponding mass of firms in A, denoted as b*. In the intersection of the two 
resulting graphs, the new starting value is given, C. This loop is repeated until the 
nA 
nB 
 
1 a 
b 
C 
nA* 
nB* 
 
a* 
b* 
1 
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difference between the new starting value minus the old starting value is ≤ 20 (i.e., 
nB3-nB0≤20) in the program or C in the figure.159     
The computation proceeds using calculations of expected profits for A and B. The 
system calculates expected profits and all other key figures for the different possible 
integration strategies and sums them up afterwards. Hence, EGewA denotes 
expected profits in A; EGewB denotes expected profits in B. 
The next relevant variable is the consistent market size for A, which is calculated 
using Xm[nA_,nB_,sA_,t_,γA], as defined in section 3.2.4.2, and analogously 
for B. Afterwards, the contributions of the different strategies to total market size are 
shown separately for A and B. For example, the share of output of all domestic firms 
in its market in A is computed as YDA=Yd[NA,XMA,t]; the capital letters denote 
equilibrium values. The expression depends on the mass of firms in A (NA), the 
overall market size in A (XMA), and transport costs t.160 
The representative household sum of expenses for differentiated goods in A is 
represented by MA=MYDA+MYEXA+MYINA. MYDA=MYd[NA,XMA,sA,t] denotes 
expenses of the representative household in A for goods from domestic producers,  
MYEXA=MYex[NB,XMA,sA,t,γA] are expenses for imports from B to A, and  
MYINA=MYin[NB,XMA,sA,t,γA] is the calculation expenses of the 
representative household in A for goods from MNEs from B. The analogous notion 
(MB) is used to compute expenses for the representative household in B.  
Equilibria and, therefore, welfare are constituted by the utility of consumption of 
differentiated goods. Again, to determine utility, we distinguish between A and B and 
between the different strategies. For A, we compute the utility of consumption of 
differentiated goods from domestic firms, from imports from B and from MNEs in A 
originally located in B. Then, the overall utility of the representative household from 
differentiated good consumption in A is given, dependent on the sum of the three 
subfunctions, resulting in UA=1/µ(YDA+YINA+YEXA)^µ,  referring to (76) and vice 
versa for B. 
In addition, the representative household benefits from a lump-sum transfer financed 
by profit taxation of foreign MNE production in subsidiaries. A single MNE with origin 
                                            
159
 Compare with the computation in the input sheet as in derivation 3.4.8 in the Appendix for nB3-
nB0 ≤ 20. 
160
 Analogously, we compute YEXA for the share of output of all exporting firms located in B supplying 
A’s market. The same notion is used to compute YINA, which denotes the share of output of all MNEs 
headquartered in B supplying the market in A by a subsidiary in A. The analogue computation for 
Country B is given as YDB, YEXB, and YINB. 
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in A pays taxes according to its profits: TinB[i_,nA_,nB_,sB_,t_,γB_]:= 
(Gin[i,nA,nB,sB,t,γB]+fin)*γB/(1-γB). 
Because this is tax revenue paid on profits of a single MNE with origin in A gained by 
its subsidiary in B and is subject to taxation in B, total tax revenue in the jurisdiction 
of B is defined by:  
ETinB[nA_,nB_,sB_,τB_,t_,γB_]:=NIntegrate[TinB[i,nA,nB,sB,τB,t
,γB],{i,Min[nA,Max[iei[nA,Xm[nB,nA,sB,τB,t,γB],sB,τB,t,γB],idi
[nA,Xm[nB,nA,sB,τB,t,γB],sB,τB,t,γB]]],nA}]and analogously for A. 
That is, ETinB is given by the integral over all firms selecting the MNE strategy and 
paying profit taxes in B and vice versa in A.  
A household in B obviously receives a lump-sum transfer TB=1/sB*ETinB and a 
household in A receives TA=1/sA*ETinA from its government.  Finally, welfare is 
given as WB=UB-MB+TB for B and WA=UA-MA+TA for A. 
 
3.2.4.5 Results of numerical analysis 
Using the knowledge of the behavior of firms concerning their integration strategies, 
governments maximize welfare (measured per capita) in their jurisdictions by 
optimally choosing withholding tax rates γ j. Therefore, we examine equilibrium of the 
model resulting from a variation of the tax rates γ j (c.p., this results in equilibrium for 
each of the two countries, A and B).  
To analyze the numerical output, we focus on the mass of firms in equilibrium, 
labeled NA and NB, for the mass of firms in each country, A or B, thereby indicating 
the mass of differentiated goods in each country. Furthermore, we focus on the 
consistent market sizes in each country, XmA and XmB, and their contributions 
based on the output of firms selecting different integration strategies.  
 
3.2.4.5.1 Results with identical country sizes 
In a scenario in which the two countries, A and B, behave cooperatively, referring to a 
social planner’s perspective, the resulting numerical analysis indicates that welfare is 
maximized for both jurisdictions with the choice of γ A= γ B=0.161 In this case, the 
welfare of the representative household in each country results in 
                                            
161
 See derivation 3.4.8 in Appendix for the full input sheet with given values for specific variables. 
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WA=WB=139.023.162 In this scenario, an equilibrium mass of firms of NA=NB=15239 
and an equilibrium market size of XmA=XmB=4313.14 come to the fore. NA=NB is 
constituted by ≈11139 domestic firms, no exporters from B, and ≈44100 MNEs. 
Furthermore, the market size in equilibrium is constituted by a domestic market share 
of YDA=YDB=2515.59 (≈58.32%) and a market share of MNEs of 
YINA=YINB=1797.54 (≈41.68%). On the one hand, these market shares consider the 
mass of firms; on the other hand, they also consider the output of the firms selecting 
each strategy. Separating these two impacts, we find 73.1% of the firms select the 
domestic strategy and 26.9% select the MNE strategy. Because the governments do 
not levy taxes on profits of MNEs, the export strategy does not exist in this 
equilibrium because costs associated with an MNE activity are lower than costs of 
exporting due to transport costs. Obviously, a lump-sum transfer to the households 
cannot be provided in this equilibrium because γ A= γ B=0.  
 
Because policy makers of A attempt to maximize the welfare of households in their 
country, they do not consider the welfare in B and vice versa. Hence, they behave 
uncooperatively. Given any certain tax rate γ B, there is incentive to determine the 
welfare-maximizing best-response tax rate γ A and vice versa. We implement this 
approach in the numerical model, finding equilibrium because the mass of firms in A 
(NA) settles to a level that guarantees expected profits in both countries are 
competed to zero. The same iteration is repeated for the second country, B.  
Using the knowledge of the existing masses of firms in both countries given the tax 
rates γ A and γ B, we determine equilibrium describing variables, and study welfare. 
Given this condition of consistency, regarding NA and NB, with the outcome of 
numerical analysis in terms of welfare in A and B, we can derive Nash equilibria 
concerning tax rates γ A and γ B.163 This can be done for any combination of full-
percentage tax rates. 
 
                                            
162
 See 3.4.9 in the Appendix for a table summarizing welfare implications resulting from any 
combination of γ A and γ B.  
163
 Compare with Nash (1951). Furthermore tests of stability of this model confirm this notion of 
equilibrium. A convergence of equilibria still appears if firms in A and B alternately enter and exit the 
market.  
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Given a scenario in which both countries, A and B, have γ j=0, the best response tax 
rate of one country, given zero taxation in the other country, is γ j=8%.164 For this 
country, this results in welfare in equilibrium of Wj=142.555. This obvious increase of 
welfare from Wj=139.023 to Wj=142.555 is achieved at the expense of the other 
country because its welfare declines to Wj=135.183 without the application of 
taxation in this jurisdiction. Instead, a social planner will refrain from this solution 
because total welfare declines in this scenario compared to the zero taxation setting 
described previously. 
 
Assuming that A is the deviator, choosing γ A=8%, this scenario is characterized by 
NA=25974 varieties available in A versus NB=4316 varieties of differentiated goods 
in B. NA is constituted by ≈19543 domestic firms, ≈5287 exporters from B and ≈1144 
MNEs. NB is constituted by ≈3077 domestic firms, no exporters from A, and ≈1239 
MNEs. 
This tax rate constellation shows the following implications: The market in A is given 
by XmA=4494, associated with an increased market share of 90.8% domestic 
producers. The market share of MNEs in A declines to 2.5%; and, in this 
constellation, differentiated goods also are imported to A. The market share of these 
exporting firms from B in A is 6.7%. In contrast with zero taxation, this strategy is not 
existent. Again, on the one hand, these market shares consider the mass of firms; on 
the other hand, they also consider the output of the firms selecting each strategy. 
Separating these two impacts of output and masses of firms selecting single 
strategies, we find 75.24% of firms selecting the domestic strategy, 20.36% from B 
exporting, and 4.4% selecting the MNE strategy. In comparison to a zero taxation 
scenario, the mass of MNEs declines and the mass of exporters from B and domestic 
firms increases.    
Households in A benefit from more firms entering the market. This increase is 
associated with a larger market size and is due to the love for variety preferences. 
Furthermore a positive per-capita lump-sum transfer to households in A is achieved. 
Also, a negative impact of γ A=8% is generated because fewer cheap differentiated 
goods from MNEs are available. Imports are more expensive than goods supplied by 
MNEs.  
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In total, the positive impact outweighs the negative for households in A. For this 
reason, welfare in A increases because of γ A=8% and γ B=0%, compared to a 
scenario without taxation. 
In contrast, the market in Country B is given by XmB=4116, associated with a market 
share of 18.3% of domestic producers. The market share of MNEs in A increases to 
81.7% and still no goods are imported to B. Households in B suffer from a decreased 
mass of firms entering the market there because the mass of domestic firms in B 
declines dramatically. On the one hand, more cheap goods from MNEs are available 
for households in B; but, on the other hand, fewer national firms enter the market in 
B. Hence households suffer from fewer available varieties of goods due to market 
entry conditions (i.e., expected profits are competed to zero). In addition to fewer 
domestically produced varieties being available, the increased market share of MNEs 
reflects not only more varieties from MNEs but also single MNE output, which does 
not increase households’ utility due to love for variety preferences. Because the 
increased market share of MNEs does not increase welfare to the same extent, the 
negative impact of market shares cannot be compensated by an increased market 
share of MNEs in B due to love for variety preferences. Because γ B=0% is selected, 
a per-capita lump-sum transfer in B does not arise. In sum, welfare in B declines 
compared to the situation without profit taxation in both countries. 
 
Given the described situation for B, we find the best-response tax rate to γ A=8% to 
be γ B=7%.165 Hence the constellation of γ A=8% and γ B=0% is not stable. Country B, 
therefore, does not select γ B=0%; instead γ B=7% is the best response given γ A=8%. 
The welfare of the representative household increases to WB=138.082 compared to 
WB=135.183 in the γ A=8% and γ B=0% scenario.   
The welfare of the neighbor country, A, then decreases to WA=138.319 instead of 
WA=142.555 in the γ A=8% and γ B=0% scenario. The equilibrium is characterized by 
a market size in A of XmA=4260 in contrast to XmB=4238 associated with a mass of 
firms NA=16156 compared to NB=14233. NA is constituted by ≈11814 domestic 
firms, ≈248 exporters from B, and ≈4094 MNEs; and NB is constituted by ≈10379 
domestic firms, ≈180 exporters from A, and ≈3674 MNEs. 
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Compared to the γ A=8% and γ B=0% scenario, this indicates an increased market 
size XmB as well as a considerable increase in the mass of firms NB.  
Increased welfare in B, therefore, is due to more available varieties of differentiated 
goods for consumers in B. Fewer products from MNEs are available for them 
because of taxation, but more goods from domestics and exporters are supplied. In 
this scenario, taxation induces positive welfare implications due to love for variety 
preferences and positive tax revenue for households in B compared to the previous 
scenario. 
 
The constellation of γ A=8% and γ B=7% is a stable equilibrium with a noncooperative 
tax setting. This can be seen because the best response for A, given γ B=7%, again 
is γ A=8%. Hence, this combination of tax rates is a best response for one another.166 
Because the countries are identical, obviously γ A=7% with γ B=8% is also a stable 
equilibrium. Even though both countries generate lower welfare than without taxation, 
these are stable equilibria in contrast to a zero taxation scenario because every 
country has incentive to deviate.  
Figure 22 summarizes the results of best-response taxes and shows the two stable 
equilibria: 
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Figure 22. Best-response tax rates with sA = sB. 
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From both individual and world welfare perspectives, a noncooperative tax setting 
results in inefficiently high tax rates. Governments are completely informed when 
setting tax rates. For this reason, they both know that the other has incentive to 
deviate from zero taxation. Considering this, welfare in its own jurisdiction is 
maximized considering the tax rate the other country is to select. Hence, zero 
taxation is not a stable choice for either country, even though it will deliver the highest 
welfare for each of them. 
Therefore, the zero taxation scenario should only be obtained under reliable 
cooperation (i.e., with a social planner) because each single government has 
incentive to deviate.  
 
3.2.4.5.2 Results with different country sizes 
In a scenario assuming A is marginally larger than B and in which the two countries 
behave cooperatively, the results of numerical analysis indicate that welfare is 
maximized in both jurisdictions with the choice of γ A= γ B=0. In this case, the welfare 
of the representative household in each country results in WA=139.829 and 
WB=139.201.167 Compared to the scenario with identical country sizes, this result 
shows that already the marginally larger country size of A delivers a positive welfare 
implication that also occurs for the smaller country, B. In this scenario, an equilibrium 
mass of firms of NA=16235 and NB=14671 and an equilibrium market size of 
XmA=4355 and XmB=4322 come to the fore. NA is constituted by ≈11889 domestic 
firms, no exporters from B, and ≈4346 MNEs; NB is constituted by ≈10735 domestic 
firms, no exporters from A, and ≈3936 MNEs.  
The market size in equilibrium is constituted by a domestic market share of 
YDA=2649 (≈60.08%) and YDB=2416 (≈55.9%) and a market share of MNEs of 
YINA=1706 (≈39.2%) and YINB=1907 (≈44.1%). These market shares include the 
mass of firms selecting a strategy as well as the output of these single firms. 
Because the governments do not levy taxes on profits of MNEs, the export strategy 
does not exist in this equilibrium because the costs associated with MNE activity are 
lower than the costs of exporting due to transport costs and fixed costs relations. 
Obviously, a lump-sum transfer to the households cannot be provided in this 
equilibrium because γ A= γ B=0.  
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In comparison to the analysis with identical country sizes, the mass of firms increases 
in A and decreases in B. The market sizes of both countries increase, but the impact 
of country size results in a stronger magnitude for the market size in A than in B. 
Furthermore, the constitution of market shares changes. The domestic market share 
increases in A and declines in B in contrast to the market shares of MNEs that 
decline in A and increase in B in comparison to the analysis with equally sized 
countries.  
The impact of country size results in the following implications for country A: Because 
country size is larger, the demand is also larger, resulting in more firms entering the 
market in A. Hence, NA and XMA are greater than in the previous analysis with 
identical country sizes; and more domestic firms are founded. Households in A 
benefit because more varieties are available. Furthermore, the foundation of 
domestic firms is stimulated because competition given by MNEs from B is not as 
intense. This is because fewer firms decide to enter the market in B because it is the 
smaller country. For these reasons, welfare in A is not higher because of the 
availability of cheaper differentiated goods from MNEs but because of a higher 
satisfaction of love for variety preferences.  
The impact of country size results in the following implications for country B: The 
assumption of the larger country size of A results in more firms being stimulated to 
enter the market in A. This is because firms in A face greater national demand. For 
this reason, more firms supplying demand in B with MNE activities also enter the 
market in A. This intensifies competition in B. For this reason, fewer domestic firms 
enter the market in B. Hence, NB is smaller than with identical country sizes. 
Although fewer varieties of differentiated goods are available in B, XMB is greater 
than before; and the impact on welfare is positive compared to the previous analysis. 
Hence, all things being equal, if country size in A exogenously is given marginally as 
being bigger than in B, welfare in B is higher, even though it is the smaller country in 
this analysis.  
 
Because policy makers of countries attempt to maximize the welfare of their 
households, they do not consider welfare in the other jurisdictions. Given any certain 
tax rate γ B, there is incentive to determine the welfare-maximizing best-response tax 
rate γ A and vice versa.  
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With the outcome of the numerical analysis in terms of welfare in A and B, we can 
derive Nash equilibria concerning the tax rates γ A and γ B.168 This can be done for 
any combination of full-percentage tax rates.  
 
Given this scenario in which both countries have γ j=0, the best-response tax rate of 
one country, given zero taxation in the other country, is γ j=8%.169 The deviator 
achieves a welfare increase at the expense of the other country (i.e., WA= 143.078 
with WB=135.185 if A deviates and WB=142.566 with WA=135.687 if B deviates). 
Instead, a social planner will refrain from this solution because total welfare declines 
in this scenario compared to the zero taxation setting described previously. 
  
Selecting γ j=8%, the deviator achieves a welfare increase in its jurisdiction because 
households in this country benefit from a bigger mass of firms entering the market. 
This is associated with a larger market size and is due to love for variety preferences. 
Furthermore a positive per-capita lump-sum transfer to households in this country is 
achieved.  
Also a negative impact of γ j=8% is generated in this jurisdiction because fewer 
cheap differentiated goods from MNEs are available. Although imports also occur, 
these are more expensive than goods supplied by MNEs. In total, the positive impact 
outweighs the negative. For this reason, welfare in j increases, because of γ j=8%, if 
profits in the other country are not taxed.  
In this scenario, households in the other country suffer from fewer firms entering the 
market there because the mass of their domestic firms declines dramatically. On the 
one hand, more cheap goods from MNEs are available for households in this country. 
On the other hand, as expected profits are competed to zero, fewer national firms 
enter this market; and households suffer from fewer available varieties. In addition to 
fewer domestically produced varieties being available, the increased market share of 
the MNEs reflects not only more varieties from MNEs but also single MNE output, 
which does not increase household utility due to love for variety preferences. 
Because the increased market share of MNEs does not increase welfare to the same 
extent, the negative impact of market shares cannot be compensated by an 
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 Furthermore tests of stability of this model confirm this notion of equilibrium. A convergence of 
equilibria still appears if firms in A and B alternately enter and exit the market. Because this model 
consists of one period only, entry and exit happens immediately off the reel.  
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 See 3.4.14 and 3.4.15 in the Appendix for tables summarizing all responses to Bγ =0% or Aγ =0%.  
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increased market share of MNEs in B due to love for variety preferences. As taxation 
in this country is not applied, a per-capita lump-sum transfer does not arise here. In 
sum, welfare in this country declines compared to the situation without profit taxation 
in both countries.  
 
Given the described situation for the heretofore nondeviating country, we find the 
best-response tax rate to γ j=8% at 7% instead of zero taxation.170 Hence the 
constellation of γ j=8% as response to zero taxation is not stable. The country 
responding on γ j=8% achieves a welfare increase at the expense of the other 
country (i.e., WA= 138.555 with WB=138.326 if A responds with γ j=7%, and 
WB=138.129 with WA=138.847 if B responds with γ j=7%). 
 
Increased welfare in the country selecting a tax rate of 7% instead of zero taxation, 
therefore, is due to more available varieties of differentiated goods for consumers. 
Because of taxation, fewer products from MNEs are available for them, but more 
goods from domestic and exporting firms are supplied. In this scenario, taxation 
induces positive welfare implications due to love for variety preferences and positive 
tax revenue compared to the previous scenario without taxation in this jurisdiction. 
 
The 8%-7% tax rate constellation is a stable equilibrium. This can be seen because 
the best response for A given γ B=7% again is γ A=8%, and the best response for B 
given γ A=7% again is γ B=8%. Hence, this combination of tax rates is the best 
response for one another.171 Although both countries generate lower welfare than 
without taxation, these are stable equilibria in contrast to a zero taxation scenario 
because every country has incentive to deviate.  
Figure 23 is a summary of the results of best-response taxes and shows the two 
stable equilibria. 
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 See derivations 3.4.16 and 3.4.17 in the Appendix for tables summarizing all responses to Bγ =8% 
and Aγ =8%. 
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 See derivations 3.4.18 and 3.4.19 the Appendix for tables summarizing all responses to Bγ =7% 
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Figure 23. Best-response tax rates with sA ≠ sB. 
 
These stable equilibrium tax rates are identical with those for symmetric countries; 
but the conditions of consistency, foremost the implications on welfare, differ in 
magnitude to the previous analysis. Obviously, the exact values of optimal tax rates, 
as well as the results of these values in both settings with symmetric and asymmetric 
countries, only occur due to the selected parameter configurations. 
From both individual and world welfare perspectives, a noncooperative tax setting 
results in inefficiently high tax rates. Governments are completely informed when 
setting tax rates. For this reason, they both know that the other has an incentive to 
deviate from zero taxation. Considering this, welfare in its own jurisdiction is 
maximized considering the tax rate the other country is to select. Hence zero taxation 
is not a stable choice for either country, even though it would deliver highest welfare 
for each of them. 
Therefore the zero taxation scenario could only be obtained under reliable 
cooperation (i.e., with a social planner) because each single government has 
incentive to deviate.  
 
3.2.5 Outline  
Support for the here derived result of inefficient tax rates selected by governments in 
a noncooperative tax setting is found in other trade literature and empirical studies.172 
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In this analysis, we utilize an alternative approach dependent on exogenously given 
parameters such as transport costs and fixed costs and the resulting endogeneity of 
integration strategies, endogenous market entry, and heterogeneity of firms. 
 
3.2.5.1 The role of the constellation of exogenously given parameters  
In our model, cut-off levels are derived between domestic, export and MNE 
producers. These depend on exogenously given parameters. At the first cut-off, firm 
productivity is such that additional profits of exporting exactly result in zero profits: 
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The critical productivity level in (95) increases with increasing t, fex, and market size 
X. Hence, the indifferent firm must be more productive to break even. Additionally, 
the cut-off productivity depends on the country size sj. The larger the foreign country 
sj, the smaller firm productivity must be for the export strategy to become reasonable.  
The next threshold is the productivity level at which profits of an exporting firm equal 
the profits of an MNE: 
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The critical productivity level in (96) increases with increasing overhead costs (fi – 
fex), an increasing market size X, decreasing transport costs t, increasing jγ , and a 
decreasing sj. An increasing i/exθ  is associated with a smaller mass of firms selecting 
MNE strategies. Furthermore, only if )1(j t)1( α−
α−
>γ−  does a real and unique solution 
exist. If the parameter configuration of the transport costs t, the tax rate jγ , and α  
does not satisfy this condition, MNE activities do not exist. 
 
Alternatively, certain configurations of parameters may result in a situation in which 
domestic firms integrate directly as MNEs instead of choosing the export strategy. 
The following cut-off level is the relevant productivity threshold if i/dθ < ex/dθ :   
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The critical productivity level in (97) increases with increasing fi and an increasing 
market size X. Additionally the cut-off productivity depends on the country size sj and  
jγ . The smaller the foreign country sj and the higher the tax rate jγ , the higher firm 
productivity must be for the MNE strategy to become reasonable.  
 
For i/dθ < ex/dθ  so that this cut-off level exists, the following condition must hold: 
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As can be seen from the cut-off levels, the mass of firms selecting an integration 
strategy, as well as which strategies are optimal to select at all, depends on 
exogenously given parameters. These dependencies in a setting with heterogeneous 
firms distinguish this model from the latest literature.173 
 
3.2.5.2 The role of endogenous market entry and market size 
In this model, the mass of firms in equilibrium results endogenously because 
expected profits are competed to zero until the last firm entering the market 
generates zero profits. With the inclusion of this endogeneity we can analyze the 
implications of national and international policy decisions on integration modi of 
heterogeneous firms. Taxation influences not only entry of MNEs and exporting firms 
into the market but also the mass of domestic firms. 
Given a specific tax rate, the exact composition of prevailing integration strategies in 
this country is due to the constitution of competition. For example, if a tax rate 
increases, fewer MNEs enter the market; and, depending on the size of transport 
costs, they also may refrain from becoming exporters. Then, fewer firms will supply 
demand in this country and expected profits will increase. Therefore, the output of 
each single firm is influenced; and more domestic firms can enter the market, 
competing expected profits to zero. Hence, equilibria with different tax rates are 
determined by other compositions of integration strategies and other masses of firms 
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producing individual optimal outputs. This endogenous market size and especially 
further entry of domestic firms in a setting with heterogeneous firms distinguish this 
model from the latest literature.174  
 
3.2.5.3 The role of heterogeneity 
In our model, stable equilibria are obtained with a 8%-7% tax setting scenario. This is 
driven by the incentive of each government to deviate unilaterally from zero taxation 
to induce positive impacts on welfare in its jurisdiction. This influence on welfare is 
characterized by following implications: The mass of firms in its country increases. 
Increased welfare, therefore, results in more available varieties of differentiated 
goods for consumers there. Although more goods from domestic and export firms are 
supplied, fewer products from MNEs are available for them, induced by taxation. For 
the unilaterally deviating country, the overall impact in this scenario is that taxation 
induces positive welfare implications due to love for variety preferences and positive 
tax revenue, even though fewer cheap goods supplied by MNEs are available. The 
extent of more domestic firms entering the market in this analysis also depends on 
the distribution of firms over productivity levels. In this analysis, a uniform distribution 
F(θ) is assumed. The specification of an alternative distribution function, therefore, 
might induce different results.  
The assumption of a distribution G(θ) in which the mass of firms increases with 
productivity so that many MNEs and few domestic firms exist, will slow the 
stimulating effect on domestic firms to enter the market if positive tax rates are 
selected. Hence, an increase in the profit tax rate of a single government has the 
following implications: Because an increase in the profit tax rate induces some MNEs 
not to enter the market and expected profits are competed to zero, alternatively 
integrated firms can enter the market and the outputs of single firms are adjusted. 
Depending on the distribution function, the composition of the mass of firms selecting 
different integration strategies then differs. For this reason, if G(θ) instead of F(θ) is 
applied, fewer domestic firms can enter the market and single optimal output adjusts 
according to endogenous market entry conditions. Obviously, the extent of the 
resulting implications depends on the exact parameter configuration. However, the 
impact of F(θ) with more firms with lower single output is always positive for 
consumers due to love for variety preferences. If, instead of F(θ), G(θ) is applied, this 
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impact on welfare concerning more available varieties is dampened. Instead, the 
outputs of single firm will be increasingly influenced.   
Another positive impact on utility of the representative household is achieved by 
providing a lump-sum transfer. As an additional lump-sum transfer only is used to 
finance the consumption of 0x  and the homogeneous good is appreciated less than 
differentiated goods. According to (76), the impact of transfer on welfare is not 
extensive.  
The third impact of taxation on welfare concerns some MNEs providing cheaper 
goods not entering the market. This has negative implications for the representative 
household because these relatively cheap varieties are not supplied.   
 
In an analysis with the here described distribution function G(θ), love for variety 
preferences is satisfied less than in the analysis with F(θ). Previously, in the analysis 
with F(θ), the positive impact on welfare by unilaterally deviating from the cooperative 
zero tax setting scenario is mainly driven by higher satisfaction of these preferences. 
With this alternative distribution of firms G(θ), fewer domestic firms will enter the 
market and far fewer cheap varieties supplied by MNEs will be available for 
consumers in this  jurisdiction.  
Hence, in contrast to F(θ), this distribution function G(θ) will more likely result in a 
negative impact of taxation (i.e. the negative impact of fewer cheaper varieties 
provided by MNEs can be more influential than the positive implication given by tax 
revenue and stimulated market entry satisfying love for variety preferences). 
Obviously, the results depend on the exact parameter configurations; but 
configurations that ensure this described impact of G(θ) zero taxation will result in a 
stable equilibrium. In the previous analysis, zero taxation is optimal from a world 
welfare perspective but, unfortunately, is unstable in a noncooperative tax setting. 
Hence, the results in this analysis are mainly constituted by the exact specification of 
the distribution of firms over productivity and, therefore, due to heterogeneity.  
 
3.3 Conclusion  
We develop a model with heterogeneous firms to derive welfare-maximizing profit tax 
rates set by benevolent planners. Heretofore, governments levy withholding tax rates 
on profits earned by MNE subsidiaries located in their countries. When selecting 
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these optimal tax rates, governments take their impact on the optimal integration 
strategies of firms, as well as on market entry and market sizes, into account.  
The integration strategies chosen depend on the individual productivity levels of 
firms. Given their productivity levels, firms maximize profits, considering relative sizes 
of fixed costs, size of transport costs, country and market sizes, per-unit variable 
costs, and degree of government profit taxation. Therefore, each firm individually 
either selects domestic production, an export strategy, or MNE activities as optimal; 
the composition of the prevailing strategies is determined endogenously, dependent 
on the withholding profit tax rates chosen by the governments. These described 
behavioral modifications of integration strategies of heterogeneous firms responding 
to economic policy interventions are included in the considerations of the 
government. Due to the incorporation of several endogenous variables, especially 
market entry and market size, this utilitarian maximization of welfare is solved 
numerically in this analysis, considering identical and differing country sizes. 
Numerical analysis with identical country sizes results in a zero taxation scenario that 
can only obtained under cooperation of governments (i.e., from a social planner’s 
perspective). An incentive for governments to deviate unilaterally from a zero taxation 
scenario is given in a noncooperative setting. Because this can be anticipated by the 
other government, both governments deviate from the zero taxation scenario, 
resulting in inefficiently high tax rates, which are stable Nash equilibria. The 
constellation of these profit tax rates is characterized by lower welfare for both 
jurisdictions than without taxation. Because of the unilateral incentive to deviate from 
a scenario without taxation, the zero taxation scenario is not stable in a 
noncooperative setting, although it generates the highest welfare from a world 
welfare perspective.    
 
Numerical analysis, assuming one country to be marginally larger than the other, 
results in the same optimal tax rates in equilibrium (i.e., a social planner selects a 
zero taxation scenario to be optimal considering welfare in both countries; and in a 
noncooperative tax setting, stable Nash equilibria with inefficiently high tax rates are 
obtained). In comparison to the analysis with identical country sizes, we emphasize 
the implication of these differing country sizes on welfare of the representative 
households in both countries. Our main finding in this context is that not only the 
welfare of the assumed marginally larger country is higher but also the welfare in the 
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exogenously given smaller country is higher because of a larger world demand than 
in the numerical analysis with identical country sizes. 
In conclusion, using our model, we derive inefficiently high tax rates in a 
noncooperative setting and zero taxation from a social planner’s perspective when 
governments act as benevolent planners and set withholding tax rates on profits 
earned by subsidiaries of MNEs in their countries. Based on our results and the 
existence of only a little research regarding withholding tax rates with MNE activity, 
we are motivated to do further research.  
 
3.4 Appendix  
3.4.1 Demand 
We use the utility function in (76), 
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The domestic firm i applies the price pj(i) in country j.  
The maximum attainable profits for a domestic firm i from country j are given by: 
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3.4.3 The derivation of the optimal output of exports of a firm i from country A: 
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The derivation of the optimal price for exports to B of a firm i from A: 
dAex
exBB
exBexBBexA )i(f)i(
t)i(xs)i(x)i(ps)i( pi+−
θ
−=pi
 
BEST-RESPONSE TAX RATES ON PROFITS OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS 
 
 
150
dAex
B
)1(
1
exB
)1(
)1(
)1(
1
exB
)1(
)1(exBBexA )i(f)i(
ts
)i(pX
1
)i(pX
1)i(ps)i( pi+−
θ
−=pi
α−α−
µ−
α−α−
µ−  
dAex
B)1(
1
exB
)1(
)1(
)1(
exB
)1(
)1(
B
exA )i(f)i(
ts)i(p
X
1)i(p
X
s)i( pi+−
θ
−=pi α−
−
α−
µ−
α−
α−
α−
µ−  
0)i(
ts
X
1)i(p)i(p
1
1
X
s)i(p
1)i(p
)i( B
)1(
)1(
)1(
1
exB
)1(
exB
)1(
)1(
B)1(
1
exB
exB
exA
=
θ






α−
+





α−
α
−=
∂
pi∂
α−
µ−
α−
−
−
α−
µ−
α−
−
 
)i(
t)i(p
)i(
t)i(p
)i(tp)i(
1
*
exj
*
exB
)1(
exB
αθ
=
αθ
=
θ
=α −
 
 
Maximum attainable profits of an exporting firm i from country A: 
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3.4.4 The MNE 
In contrast to a domestic firm, MNE profits bear higher fixed costs fi>fd and an MNE 
pays taxes jγ  on the difference between sales and variable costs.   
The derivation of the optimal output of an MNE from A supplying the market in B by a 
subsidiary in B is given by: 
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Maximum attainable profits of an MNE i from Country A therefore are given by: 
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3.4.5 Derivation of cut-off level ex/dθ  
We derive the productivity level that at least guarantees zero profits from exporting. 
The exporting firm generates zero profits from D; and hence, is indifferent whether to 
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engage in export activities or not. Firms with productivity levels just above this 
threshold benefit from exporting: 
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Firms that are at least as productive as i/dex/d θ<θ engage in export strategies. 
 
3.4.6 Derivation of cut-off level i/exθ  
The next threshold is a productivity level at which exporting and multinational firms 
have the same profits. Firms with productivity levels above this level engage in a 
MNE activity. 
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Firms producing with productivity i/exθ  are indifferent whether to choose the MNE or 
exporting strategy or not. A firm with productivity )i(θ  just above i/exθ  engages in a 
MNE strategy and generates positive profits from this activity. 
 
3.4.7 Derivation and analysis of cut-off level i/dθ  
The next cut-off level characterizes a situation where the export strategy does not 
exist. Firms in this scenario directly integrate their firm following a MNE activity. The 
following condition must be satisfied: 
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Firms that satisfy the following condition integrate their firm as an MNE, the export 
strategy does not exist: 
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3.4.8 Mathematica- Input 
fd:=0.0014 
fex:=.0015 
fin:=.0017 
α :=0.75 
µ :=0.6 
θmin:=0 
θmax:=30 
F[θ_]:=(θ-θmin)/(θmax-θmin) 
inr[θ_,n_]:=n F[θ] 
θ[i_,n_]:=Piecewise[{{-1,i<0||i>n},{i (θmax-θmin)/n +θmin,i≥0 &&in}}] 
x[θ_, X_,t_]:= (α θ)^(1/(1-α))/((t)^(1/(1-α)) X^((1-µ)/(1-α))) 
θde[ X_,s_,t_] :=t fex^((1-α) / α) X^((1-µ) / α) /(α (s (1-α))^((1-α)/α)) 
ide[n_,X_,s_,t_]:=inr[θde[X,s,t],n] 
θei [ X_,s_,t_,γ_]:=If[γ≥1-t^(-α/(1-α)),∞, (fin-fex)^((1-α)/α) X^((1-µ)/α)/(α (s (1-α))^((1-
α) /α) (1-γ-t^(-α/(1-α)))^((1-α)/α))] 
iei[n_,X_,s_,t_,γ_]:=inr[θei[X,s,t,γ],n] 
θdi[X_,s_,t_,γ_] :=fin^((1-α)/α) X^((1-µ)/α)/(α (s (1-γ) (1-α))^((1-α)/α)) 
idi[n_,X_,s_,t_,γ_]:=inr[θdi[X,s,t,γ],n] 
Yd[nA_,X_,t_]:=NIntegrate[(1/α) (x[ θ[i,nA],X,0,1])^α,{i,0,nA}] 
Yex[nB_,X_,s_,t_,γ_]:=If[ide[nB,X,s,t]<Min[iei[nB,X,s,t,γ],nB],NIntegrate[(1/α) (x[ 
θ[i,nB],X,t])^α,{i,ide[nB,X,s,t],Min[iei[nB,X,s,t,γ],nB]}],0] 
Yin[nB_,X_,s_,t_,γ_]:= NIntegrate[(1/α) (x[ 
θ[i,nB],X,0,1])^α,{i,Min[nB,Max[iei[nB,X,s,t,γ],idi[nB,X,s,t,γ]]],nB}] 
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Y[nA_,nB_,X_,s_,t_,γ_]:=Yd[nA,X,t]+Yex[nB,X,s,t,γ]+Yin[nB,X,s,t,γ] 
Xm[nA_,nB_,s_,t_,γ_]:=(k=0;X0=1000;Z0=Y[nA,nB,X0,s,t,γ]-X0;d=20*2^(-
k);X1=X0+d;Z1=Y[nA,nB,X1,s,t,γ]-X1;X2=N[(d Z0+X0 Z0-X0 Z1)/(Z0-
Z1)];While[Abs[X2-X0]>.00001&&k<15,X0=X2;k++;Z0=Y[nA,nB,X0,s,t,γ]-
X0;d=20*2^(-k);X1=X0+d;Z1=Y[nA,nB,X1,s, t, γ]-X1;X2=N[(d Z0+X0 Z0-X0 Z1)/(Z0-
Z1)]];X2) 
Gd[i_,nA_,nB_,s_,t_,γ_]:=s x[θ[i,nA],Xm[nA,nB,s,t,γ],0,1] (1/(α θ[i,nA]))-s 
x[θ[i,nA],Xm[nA,nB,s,t,γ],0,1]/θ[i,nA]-fd 
Gin[i_,nA_,nB_,sB_,t_,γB_]:=(1-γB) (sB x[θ[i,nA],Xm[nB,nA,sB,t,γB],0,1] (1/(α 
θ[i,nA]))-sB x[θ[i,nA],Xm[nB,nA,sB,t,γB],0,1]/θ[i,nA])-fin 
Gex[i_,nA_,nB_,sB_,t_,γB_]:= sB x[θ[i,nA],Xm[nB,nA,sB,t,γB],τB,t] (t/(α θ[i,nA]))-  sB 
x[θ[i,nA],Xm[nB,nA,sB,t,γB],t] t/θ[i,nA]-fex 
EGd[nA_,nB_,sA_,t_,γA_]:=NIntegrate[Gd[i,nA,nB,sA,t,γA],{i,0,nA}] 
EGex[nA_,nB_,sB_,t_,γB_]:=If[ide[nA,Xm[nB,nA,sB,t,γB],sB,t]<Min[iei[nA,Xm[nB,nA,
sB,t,γB],sB,t,γB],nA],NIntegrate[Gex[i,nA,nB,sB,t,γB],{i,ide[nA,Xm[nB,nA,sB,t,γB],sB
t],Min[iei[nA,Xm[nB,nA,sB,t,γB],sB,t,γB],nA]}],0] 
EGin[nA_,nB_,sB_,t_,γB_]:=NIntegrate[Gin[i,nA,nB,sB,t,γB],{i,Min[nA,Max[iei[nA,Xm[
nB,nA,sB,t,γB],sB,t,γB],idi[nA,Xm[nB,nA,sB,t,γB],sB,t,γB]]],nA}] 
EG[nA_,nB_,sA_,sB_,t_,γA_,γB_]:=EGd[nA,nB,sA,t,γA]+EGex[nA,nB,sB,t,γB]+EGin
[nA,nB,sB,t,γB] 
Firms[nB_,sA_,sB_,t_,γA_,γB_]:=(N1=2^10;K=10;While[EG[N1,nB,sA,sB,t,γA,γB]>0,
N1=2 N1;K=K+1];K=K-2;N1=N1-2^K;While[K>-4,K=K-1; 
If[EG[N1,nB,sA,sB,t,γA,γB]>0,N1=N1+2^K,N1=N1-2^K]];Return[N1]) 
MYd[nA_,X_,s_,t_]:= NIntegrate[1/(α  θ[i,nA]) x[ θ[i,nA],X,0,1],{i,0,nA}] 
MYex[nB_,X_,s_,t_,γA_]:=If[ide[nB,X,s,t]<Min[iei[nB,X,s,t,γA],nB],NIntegrate[ t/(α  
θ[i,nB]) (x[ θ[i,nB],X,t]),{i,ide[nB,X,s,t],Min[iei[nB,X,s,t,γA],nB]}],0] 
MYin[nB_,X_,s_,t_,γA_]:= NIntegrate[1/(α  θ[i,nB]) (x[ 
θ[i,nB],X,0,1]),{i,Min[nB,Max[iei[nB,X,s,t,γA],idi[nB,X,s,t,γA]]],nB}] 
TinB[i_,nA_,nB_,sB_,t_,γB_]:=(Gin[i,nA,nB,sB,t,γB]+fin)*γB/(1-γB) 
ETinB[nA_,nB_,sB_,t_,γB_]:=NIntegrate[TinB[i,nA,nB,sB,t,γB],{i,Min[nA,Max[iei[nA,X
m[nB,nA,sB,t,γB],sB,t,γB],idi[nA,Xm[nB,nA,sB,t,γB],sB,t,γB]]],nA}] 
 
Targetfile="DatenPIII.dat" 
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Equilibrium[sA_,sB_,t_,γA_,γB_]:=(nA0=2000;nB0=2000;J=0;nA1=N[Firms[nB0,sA,s
B,t,γA_,γB_]];nB1=N[Firmsl[nA0,sB,sA,t,γB,γA]];nA2=N[Firms[nB1,sA,sB,t,γA,γB]];n
B2=N[Firms[nA1,sB,sA,t,γB,γA]];nA3=N[nA2-nA1 nA2-nA1 nB1+nA1 nA2 nB1+nA1 
nB2-nA2 nB2/(1-nA1-nB1+nA2 nB1+nA1 nB2-nA2 nB2)];nB3=N[(nB1-1)/(nA2-nA1) 
(nA3-nA1)+1];Print[{J,N[nA3],N[nB3]}];While[(Abs[nA3-nA0] >20|| Abs [nB3-
nB0]>20)&&J<50, nA0=nA3; nB0=nB3; nA1=Firms[nB0,sA,sB,t,γA,γB] ; 
nB1=Firms[nA0,sB,sA,t,γB,γA];nA2=Firms[nB1,sA,sB,t,γA_,γB_];nB2=Firms[nA1,s
B,sA,,t,γB,γA];nA3=N[nA2-nA1 nA2-nA1 nB1+nA1 nA2 nB1+nA1 nB2-nA2 nB2/(1-
nA1-nB1+nA2 nB1+nA1 nB2-nA2 nB2)];nB3=N[(nB1-1)/(nA2-nA1) (nA3-nA1)+1]; 
J++;Print[{J,nA3,nB3}]];Print[{"Equilibrium",J,nA3,nB3}];NA=nA3;NB=nB3;EGewA=E
G[NA,NB,sA,sB,t,γA,γB];EGewB=EG[NB,NA,sB,sA,t,γB,γA];XMA=Xm[NA,NB,sA,t,γ
A];XMB=Xm[NB,NA,sB,t,γB];YINA=Yin[NB,XMA,sA,t,γA];YINB=Yin[NA,XMB,sB,t,γB]
;YEXA=Yex[NB,XMA,sA,t,γA];YEXB=Yex[NA,XMB,sB,t,γB];YDA=Yd[NA,XMA,t];YDB
=Yd[NB,XMB,t];MYDA=MYd[NA,XMA,sA,t];MYDB=MYd[NB,XMB,sB,t];MYEXA=MYe
x[NB,XMA,sA,t,γA];MYEXB=MYex[NA,XMB,sB,t,γB];MYINA=MYin[NB,XMA,sA,t,γA]
;MYINB=MYin[NA,XMB,sB,t,γB];UA=1/µ (YDA+YINA+YEXA)^µ;UB=1/µ 
(YDB+YINB+YEXB)^µ;MA=MYDA+MYEXA+MYINA;MB=MYDB+MYEXB+MYINB;W
A=UA-MA+(1/sA) ETinB[NB,NA,sA,t,γA];WB=UB-MB+(1/sB) 
ETinB[NA,NB,sB,t,γB];Ergebnis={DateString[],sA,sB,t,γA,γB,NA,NB,EGewA,EGewB,
XMA,XMB,YDA,YDB,YEXA,YEXB,YINA,YINB,MYDA,MYDB,MYEXA,MYEXB,MYINA
,MYINB,(1/sA) ETinB[NB,NA,sA,t,γA],(1/sB) ETinB[NA,NB,sB,t,γB], 
UA,UB,MA,MB,WA,WB};Print[Result];PutAppend[Result,Targetfile]) 
 
3.4.9 Welfare implications with identical country sizes 
 
 
γA/γB 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
0% 139.023; 139.023 138.508; 139.793  137.843; 140.411 137.204; 140.970 136.631; 141.449 136.128; 141.862
1% 139.793; 138.508  138.934; 138.934 138.442; 139.654 137.825; 140.219 137.256; 140.701 136.752; 141.118
2% 140.411; 137.843 139.654; 138.442 138.842; 138.842 138.388; 139.508 137.836; 139.994 137.337; 140.404
3% 140.970; 137.204 140.219; 137.825 139.508; 138.388 138.742; 138.742 138.337; 139.326 137.854; 139.740
4% 141.449; 136.631 140.701; 137.256 139.994; 137.836 139.326; 138.337 138.633; 138.633 138.281; 139.132
5% 141.862; 136.128 141.118; 136.752 140.404; 137.337 139.740; 137.854 139.132; 138.281 138.519; 138.519
6% 142.194; 135.707 141.443; 136.329 140.729; 136.912 140.057; 137.432 139.463; 137.875 138.916; 138.223
7% 142.432; 135.386 141.678; 135.999 140.955; 136.580 140.281; 137.097 139.675; 137.541 139.130; 137.903
8% 142.555; 135.183 141.788; 135.791 141.049; 136.365 140.369; 136.876 139.747; 137.318 139.155; 137.607
9% 142.545; 135.134 141.744; 135.737 140.986; 136.302 140.274; 136.808 139.616; 137.247 139.046; 137.607
10% 142.544; 135.135 141.754; 135.734 140.987; 136.303 140.275; 136.810 139.617; 137.254 139.041; 137.611
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γA/γB 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
0% 135.707; 142.194 135.386; 142.432 135.183; 142.555 135.134; 142.545 135.135; 142.544
1% 136.329; 141.443 135.999; 141.678 135.791; 141.788 135.737; 141.744 135.734; 141.754
2% 136.912, 140.729 136.580; 140.955 136.365; 141.049 136.302; 140.986 136.303; 140.987
3% 137.432; 140.057 137.097; 140.281 136.876; 140.369 136.808; 140.274 136.810; 140.275
4% 137.875; 139.463 137.541; 139.675 137.318; 139.747 137.247; 139.616 137.254; 139.617
5% 138.223; 138.916 137.903; 139.130 137.681; 139.197 137.607; 139.046 137.611; 139.041
6% 138.356; 138.356 138.162; 138.662 137.953; 138.727 137.875; 138.553 137.881; 138.533
7% 138.662; 138.162 138.204; 138.204 138.082; 138.319 138.023; 138.153 138.033; 138.118
8% 138.727; 137.953 138.319; 138.083 138.002; 138.002 137.996; 137.853 138.010; 137.804
9% 138.553; 137.875 138.153; 138.023 137.853; 137.996 137.689; 137.689 137.712; 137.634
10% 138.533; 137.881 138.118; 138.033 137.804; 138.010 137.634; 137.712 137.635; 137.635
 
 
3.4.10 Best-response tax rates given %0B =γ  
Tax rate NA NB XmA XmB YdA YdB YexA YexB YINA YINB TinA/sa TinB/sb WA WB
0% 15239 15239 4313 4313 2516 2516 0 0 1798 1798 0 0 139.023 139.023
1% 17038 13538 4348 4287 2786 2251 0 0 1562 2035 0.102 0 139.793 138.508
2% 18784 11742 4376 4252 3047 1972 0 0 1329 2281 0.174 0 140.411 137.843
3% 20454 10014 4403 4219 3293 1697 49 0 1061 2522 0.208 0 140.971 137.204
4% 21954 8455 4428 4190 3511 1445 99 0 818 2745 0.213 0 141.449 136.631
5% 23292 7065 4451 4164 3703 1216 144 0 604 2948 0.197 0 141.862 136.128
6% 24427 5887 4470 4143 3863 1020 188 0 419 3123 0.163 0 142.194 135.707
7% 25328 4960 4485 4127 3990 863 236 0 259 3263 0.118 0 142.432 135.386
8% 25974 4316 4494 4116 4081 753 301 0 112 3363 0.058 0 142.555 135.183
9% 26251 4070 4497 4114 4122 711 375 0 0 3403 0 0 142.545 135.134
10% 26250 4071 4497 4114 4122 711 375 0 0 3403 0 0 142.544 135.135
 
 
3.4.11 Best-response tax rates given %8A =γ  
Tax rate NA NB XmA XmB YdA YdB YexA YexB YINA YINB TinA/sa TinB/sb WA WB
0% 25974 4316 4494 4116 4081 753 301 0 112 3363 0.058 0 142.555 135.183
1% 24374 4316 4452 4137 3873 1026 409 0 170 3111 0.088 0.208 141.787 135.789
2% 24374 4316 4412 4157 3662 1290 513 0 237 2867 0.124 0.384 141.049 136.365
3% 21277 8991 4374 4176 3453 1542 612 99 308 2534 0.161 0.507 140.369 136.876
4% 19832 10445 4340 4195 3249 1782 706 220 385 2193 0.202 0.585 139.747 137.317
5% 18501 11740 4307 4209 3059 1996 788 358 460 1855 0.243 0.617 139.155 137.607
6% 17267 13073 4283 4227 2874 2211 873 522 536 1494 0.283 0.596 138.727 137.95
7% 16156 14233 4260 4238 2707 2400 946 728 608 1110 0.322 0.516 138.319 138.082
8% 15225 15225 4242 4242 2564 2564 1008 1008 671 671 0.356 0.356 138.002 138.002
9% 16236 14538 4250 4241 2728 2449 1431 1074 91 717 0.054 0.381 137.852 137.995
10% 16356 14469 4250 4241 2748 2437 1502 1082 0 722 0 0.383 137.804 138.01
 
 
 
3.4.12 Best-response tax rates given %7B =γ  
Tax rate NA NB XmA XmB YdA YdB YexA YexB YINA YINB TinA/sa TinB/sb WA WB
0% 4960 25328 4127 4485 863 3990 0 236 3263 259 0 0.118 135.386 142.432
1% 6624 23641 4148 4443 1146 3766 0 312 3002 364 0.201 0.166 135.999 141.678
2% 8254 21984 4169 4402 1419 3541 0 385 2749 476 0.367 0.218 136.581 140.955
3% 9838 20380 4189 4364 1682 3317 95 456 2412 592 0.482 0.271 137.097 140.281
4% 11332 18877 4208 4330 1927 3102 210 521 2072 707 0.551 0.325 137.541 139.674
5% 12732 17474 4226 4299 2154 2896 339 582 1733 822 0.576 0.379 137.903 139.129
6% 14005 16212 4240 4272 2360 2707 492 636 1389 929 0.553 0.431 138.161 138.661
7% 15084 15084 4246 4246 2537 2537 681 681 1028 1028 0.477 0.477 138.204 138.204
8% 16156 14233 4260 4238 2707 2400 946 728 608 1110 0.322 0.516 138.319 138.082
9% 17143 13490 4266 4233 2867 2277 1333 772 66 1184 0.039 0.550 138.153 138.023
10% 17235 13434 4266 4234 2882 2268 1384 776 0 1190 0 0.550 138.117 138.032
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3.4.13 Welfare implications with asymmetric country sizes 
 
γA/γB 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
0% 139.829; 139.201 139.002; 139.787 138.353; 140.421 137.714; 140.981 137.141; 141.461 136.637; 141.876
1% 140.322; 138.524 139.521; 139.065 138.928; 139.653 138.327; 140.232 137.758; 140.725 137.255; 141.132
2% 140.938; 137.847 140.179; 138.464 139.425; 138.975 138.863; 139.495 138.332;  140.013 137.835; 140.421
3% 141.486; 137.206 140.742; 137.836 140.016; 138.414 139.298; 138.858 138.803; 139.313 138.344; 139.758
4% 141.965; 136.631 141.215; 137.265 140.503; 137.854 139.832; 138.367 139.188; 138.754 138.741; 139.118
5% 142.371; 136.131 141.623; 136.761 140.914; 137.352 140.246; 137.876 139.634; 138.316 139.071; 138.632
6% 142.706; 135.712 141.952; 136.338 141.233; 136.928 140.566; 137.452 139.967; 137.901 139.418; 138.261
7% 142.948; 135.388 142.194; 136.008 141.463; 136.595 140.794; 137.115 140.184; 137.565 139.636; 137.933
8% 143.078; 135.185 142.306; 135.798 141.573; 136.376 140.883; 136.895 140.348; 137.289 139.711; 137.707
9% 143.075; 135.136 142.282; 135.741 141.521; 136.312 140.796; 136.826 140.236; 137.215 139.561; 137.631
10% 143.075; 135.137 142.281; 135.742 141.521; 136.313 140.797; 136.828 140.240; 137.218 139.557; 137.635
 
 
γA/γB 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
0% 136.278; 142.132 135.893; 142.452 135.687; 142.565 135.642; 142.537 135.642; 142.537
1% 136.832; 141.456 136.503; 141.689 136.293; 141.791 136.236; 141.747 136.238; 141.747
2% 137.410; 140.744 137.078; 140.966 136.860; 141.062 136.798; 140.993 136.799; 140.990
3% 137.924; 140.083 137.591; 140.294 137.370; 140.373 137.304; 140.267 137.306; 140.269
4% 138.359; 139.468 138.031;139.689 137.808; 139.757 137.738; 139.620 137.741; 139.622
5% 138.687; 138.918 138.387; 139.145 138.167; 139,.204 138.097; 139.042 138.101; 139.034
6% 138.919; 138.481 138.623; 138.663 138.428; 138.721 138.362; 138.547 138.369; 138.526
7% 139.166; 138.199 138.766; 138.319 138.555; 138.326 138.508; 138.149 138.513; 138.095
8% 139.226; 137.978 138.847; 138.129 138.541; 138.083 138.452; 137.823 138.473; 137.773
9% 139.077; 137.901 138.675; 138.052 138.375; 138.029 138.243; 137.754 138.234; 137.673
10% 139.045; 137.907 138.628; 138.058 138.328; 138.042 138.185; 137.763 138.183; 137.695
 
 
 
3.4.14 Best-response tax rates given %0B =γ (sB=1, sA=1.01) 
 
Tax rate NA NB XmA XmB YdA YdB YexA YexB YINA YINB TinA/sa TinB/sb WA WB
0% 16235 14671 4355 4322 2649 2416 0 0 1706 1907 0 0 139.829 139.201
1% 17781 13061 4375 4287 2885 2164 0 0 1490 2123 0.098 0 140.322 138.524
2% 19550 11191 4404 4252 3147 1879 0 0 1257 2373 0.164 0 140.938 137.847
3% 21212 9464 4431 4220 3390 1604 46 0 995 2616 0.195 0 141.486 137.206
4% 22717 7897 4456 4190 3606 1350 91 0 758 2841 0.197 0 141.965 136.631
5% 24039 6518 4478 4165 3793 1122 132 0 553 3042 0.179 0 142.371 136.131
6% 25170 5340 4496 4143 3951 925 169 0 377 3218 0.147 0 142.706 135.712
7% 26060 4419 4512 4127 4075 769 208 0 229 3358 0.104 0 142.948 135.388
8% 26688 3787 4522 4117 4162 661 263 0 97 3455 0.050 0 143.078 135.185
9% 26945 3555 4525 4114 4199 621 325 0 0 3493 0 0 143.075 135.136
10% 26944 3557 4525 4114 4199 622 325 0 0 3493 0 0 143.075 135.136
 
 
 
3.4.15 Best-response tax rates given %0A =γ (sB=1, sA=1.01) 
 
Tax rate NA NB XmA XmB YdA YdB YexA YexB YINA YINB TinA/sa TinB/sb WA WB
0% 16235 14671 4355 4322 2649 2416 0 0 1706 1907 0 0 139.829 139.201
1% 14230 16540 4312 4347 2350 2705 0 0 1962 1642 0 0.108 139.002 139.787
2% 12435 18300 4278 4376 2073 2969 0 0 2206 1407 0 0.184 138.354 140.423
3% 10700 19980 4246 4403 1800 3217 0 52 2446 1134 0 0.222 137.714 140.981
4% 9129 21494 4216 4428 1548 3438 0 107 2668 883 0 0.233 137.141 141.461
5% 7723 22850 4190 4450 1320 3633 0 157 2871 660 0 0.215 136.637 141.876
6% 6529 24004 4168 4469 1122 3796 0 207 3046 464 0 0.181 136.216 142.207
7% 5567 24945 4152 4485 962 3929 0 265 3190 291 0 0.132 135.889 142.449
8% 4902 25619 4142 4494 850 4025 0 342 3292 127 0 0.066 135.687 142.566
9% 4655 25903 4140 4496 807 4068 0 429 3333 0 0 0 135.641 142.537
10% 4656 25901 4140 4496 807 4067 0 429 3332 0 0 0 135.642 142.537
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3.4.16 Best-response tax rates given %8B =γ (sB=1, sA=1.01) 
 
Tax rate NA NB XmA XmB YdA YdB YexA YexB YINA YINB TinA/sa TinB/sb WA WB
0% 4902 25619 4142 4494 850 4025 0 342 3292 127 0 0.066 135.687 142.566
1% 6520 23992 4162 4452 1123 3813 0 451 3039 188 0.203 0.098 136.293 141.791
2% 8078 22422 4183 4412 1383 3602 0 555 2799 256 0.374 0.134 136.864 141.062
3% 9613 20881 4203 4374 1637 3389 97 655 2469 330 0.493 0.173 137.374 140.374
4% 11068 19430 4221 4340 1875 3184 214 748 2133 408 0.567 0.215 137.808 139.753
5% 12430 18086 4238 4309 2095 2989 347 835 1796 486 0.596 0.256 138.168 139.209
6% 13693 16850 4253 4282 2299 2806 506 914 1448 562 0.576 0.297 138.428 138.721
7% 14821 15768 4263 4260 2481 2642 705 985 1077 633 0.499 0.336 138.555 138.326
8% 15825 14889 4271 4246 2643 2505 979 1048 649 696 0.343 0.368 138.544 138.083
9% 16820 14172 4277 4242 2805 2387 1385 1113 87 742 0.052 0.394 138.375 138.029
10% 16938 14102 4277 4242 2824 2375 1453 1121 0 746 0 0.396 138.328 138.043
 
 
 
3.4.17 Best-response tax rates given %8A =γ (sB=1, sA=1.01) 
 
Tax rate NA NB XmA XmB YdA YdB YexA YexB YINA YINB TinA/sa TinB/sb WA WB
0% 26688 3787 4522 4117 4162 661 263 0 97 3455 0 0 143.078 135.185
1% 25075 5396 4480 4137 3955 936 371 0 154 3200 0.081 0.215 142.306 135.798
2% 23500 6962 4440 4157 3747 1201 474 0 219 2956 0.114 0.396 141.573 136.376
3% 21952 8508 4402 4179 3536 1460 575 102 290 2615 0.152 0.524 140.881 136.895
4% 20693 9787 4372 4193 3361 1671 658 230 354 2292 0.186 0.611 140.348 137.289
5% 19150 11348 4337 4213 3141 1927 757 351 440 1915 0.231 0.637 139.711 137.707
6% 17893 12646 4310 4227 2956 2138 838 541 514 1548 0.272 0.617 139.226 137.978
7% 16791 13825 4288 4239 2791 2330 912 757 585 1153 0.309 0.536 138.847 138.129
8% 15825 14889 4271 4246 2643 2505 979 1048 649 696 0.343 0.368 138.544 138.083
9% 15088 15866 4265 4248 2525 2667 1041 1485 698 96 0.371 0.057 138.452 137.823
10% 15022 15990 4266 4249 2513 2688 1050 1561 702 0 0.372 0 138.473 137.773
 
 
 
3.4.18 Best-response tax rates given %7B =γ (sB=1, sA=1.01) 
 
Tax rate NA NB XmA XmB YdA YdB YexA YexB YINA YINB TinA/sa TinB/sb WA WB
0% 5567 24945 4152 4485 962 3929 0 265 3190 291 0 0.132 135.889 142.445
1% 7255 23233 4174 4442 1246 3702 0 342 2928 399 0.196 0.182 136.503 141.689
2% 8891 21567 4195 4402 1518 3474 0 415 2677 512 0.357 0.235 137.078 140.966
3% 10478 19957 4215 4364 1778 3248 93 485 2345 630 0.468 0.290 137.591 140.294
4% 11972 18451 4235 4330 2020 3032 204 550 2010 748 0.534 0.344 138.031 139.689
5% 13366 17049 4251 4299 2244 2825 328 610 1678 862 0.557 0.399 138.387 139.145
6% 14620 15783 4265 4271 2446 2636 475 664 1344 971 0.534 0.453 138.623 138.66
7% 15720 14734 4276 4251 2622 2475 661 711 993 1066 0.463 0.495 138.766 138.316
8% 16791 13825 4288 4239 2791 2330 912 757 585 1153 0.309 0.536 138.847 138.129
9% 17750 13088 4293 4234 2946 2209 1284 799 63 1225 0.038 0.570 138.675 138.052
10% 17823 13042 4293 4234 2959 2201 1334 802 0 1230 0 0.572 138.628 138.058
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3.4.19 Best-response tax rates given %7A =γ (sB=1, sA=1.01) 
 
Tax rate NA NB XmA XmB YdA YdB YexA YexB YINA YINB TinA/sa TinB/sb WA WB
0% 26060 4419 4512 4127 4075 769 208 0 229 3358 0.104 0 142.948 135.388
1% 24360 6099 4470 4148 3852 1055 285 0 333 3093 0.151 0.207 142.193 136.008
2% 22688 7745 4429 4169 3627 1332 359 0 443 2837 0.202 0.379 141.463 136.595
3% 21086 9331 4392 4189 3406 1595 429 99 557 2496 0.255 0.499 140.794 137.115
4% 19565 10845 4357 4209 3190 1844 495 218 679 2147 0.309 0.572 140.184 137.565
5% 17049 13365 4298 4251 2825 2244 610 328 862 1678 0.398 0.557 139.145 138.387
6% 16857 13574 4299 4241 2793 2286 612 511 894 1443 0.413 0.575 139.166 138.199
7% 15720 14734 4276 4251 2622 2475 661 711 993 1066 0.463 0.495 138.766 138.316
8% 14821 15768 4263 4260 2481 2642 705 985 1077 633 0.499 0.336 138.555 138.326
9% 14074 16776 4259 4266 2359 2806 750 1390 1151 69 0.534 0.041 138.508 138.149
10% 14022 16855 4259 4265 2350 2820 753 1445 1156 0 0.536 0 138.513 138.095
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